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Donald J. Puchala — American Interests and the United Nations

Barry M. Blechman
Robert Powell — What in the Name of God Is Strategic Superiority?

John Massaro — LBJ and the Fortas Nomination

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Book Reviews

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# Political Science Quarterly

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## *From the Editor:*

*In this issue . . .*

DONALD J. PUCHALA analyzes the current roles of the United Nations and finds that contrary to some views, American values and foreign policy interests are, on the whole, served by U.N. activities and policy directions.

BARRY BLECHMAN and ROBERT POWELL examine the nuclear warnings issued by the Eisenhower administration as part of its strategy to end the Korean War and conclude that the actual effect of these warnings is uncertain. They also stress that strategic balance in the 1980s is so fundamentally different from the balance of nuclear forces in 1953 that no valid lessons for contemporary problems may be drawn from this incident.

JOHN MASSARO draws upon previously unpublished source material from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library to examine the nomination of Abe Fortas for Chief Justice. Massaro attributes the Senate's refusal to confirm Fortas to mismanagement of that nomination by President Johnson.

THOMAS E. CAVANAGH reformulates Nelson Polsby's model of the "institutionalization" of the House of Representatives in light of changes seen in the 1970s. Cavanagh contends that increasing membership turnover has promoted the fragmentation of authority in the contemporary House.

MARCUS D. POHLMANN and GEORGE S. CRISCI examine the level of support for labor legislation in the U.S. House of Representatives during the 89th and 95th Congresses and attempt to account for the decreased support in the 95th Congress.

BENNETT RAMBERG argues that Israel's 1981 destruction of Iraq's research reactor portends attacks on large nuclear facilities in future conflicts. He suggests that atomic plant vulnerability to military destruction be included in global nuclear energy risk calculations and strategic planning.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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# American Interests and the United Nations

DONALD J. PUCHALA

For more than 35 years it has been the policy of the United States to support the United Nations by participating in multilateral policymaking, by favoring and furthering institutional growth, and by helping to finance general UN activities and special programs. The American government's positive posture toward the United Nations has met with public approval as evidenced in opinion polls, widespread mass media endorsement, and political party platforms. U.S. presidents of both parties have reaffirmed our committments to international organizations. "The ideals of the United Nations," former Secretary of State Alexander Haig told the 36th U.N. General Assembly, are "also American ideals. The Charter embodies American principles. It will always be a major objective of our statecraft to make the United Nations an instrument of peace."[1]

Continuing support for the United Nations and deepening involvement in its processes, policies, and programs remain in the American national interest. Yet criticisms of the United Nations and questions about U.S. participation are presently being voiced by some analysts of American foreign policy.[2] Their main argument is that the United States is currently subjected to considerable

[1] Alexander M. Haig Jr., "A New Era of Growth," *Current Policy*, No. 314 (21 September 1981), p. 1.

[2] Juliana Geran Pilon, "The United States and the United Nations: A Balance Sheet," *Backgrounder* No. 162 (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, January 1982).

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rhetorical abuse in the U.N. General Assembly and other large multilateral forums where majorities of countries are pressing for world political and economic changes that appear to be inimical to American interests. In addition, the critics contend that the United Nations seems to operate on a double standard by condemning actions of the West while condoning similar behavior by the East. While America is ridiculed and slighted, the critics say, our government continues to pay a substantial share of the organization's bills. Do we get our money's worth from the United Nations? What has the world organization done for the United States lately?

In addition to legitimate questions and concerns, some of the current criticism of the American involvement in the United Nation is ideologically slanted and motivated, in part, by domestic politics in the United States. Such criticism must be interpreted, therefore, in terms of where it is coming from. Furthermore, some bemoaning of the United Nations stems from wishful thinking about the end of American global dominance and the passing of Western cultural universalism. Such positions are symptoms of a broader dissatisfaction with trends in world affairs. However, venting frustrations by attacking the United Nations hardly seems appropriate since the organization cannot alter the fact that the world is mostly non-American, non-Western, and non-Caucasian.

With regard to the more reasoned criticisms, it should be emphasized that there are two fundamental flaws in American critics' assessments. First, they tend either to misrepresent or misperceive the nature of the international organization, attributing to it capabilities it does not have. This enables critics to decry the United Nations for being unable to perform according to the impossibly high standards they themselves have established. Second, critics confuse rhetoric with performance. Clearly, much of the harsh language spoken in U.N. deliberative organs nowadays tends to be anti-American or anti-Western, and much of it is unfair and untrue. But, as is the case of most parliamentary bodies, the weakest members shout the loudest, the most radical seek the most attention, and the most paranoid are the most critical. In these respects, U.N. forums are almost archetypical. Rhetoric is important, but so is performance. Looking at the record, when actual U.N. decisions and programs of action are examined, what emerges in fact is a marked congruence between U.N. policies and U.S. preferences.

Despite this, there are still plausible and very real questions to be asked about the United States and the United Nations. There are also problems about the latter that even supporters identify. The questions deserve a reasoned response, and the problems call for corrective action by the United Nations itself. Both of these points will be addressed in this paper.

## The United Nations Today: Reflections of a Dangerous and Fragmented World

Those who have called the United Nations "a dangerous place" are correct only in that it is a microcosm of the cleavages, contentions, insecurities, and volatili-

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ties of a very dangerous world.[3] Rivalry between superpowers, the nuclear specter frustrating efforts at disarmament, racial, ethnic and class antagonisms, and festering, explosive political issues are some of the stuff of U.N. affairs. Governments go to the United Nations to deal with matters that divide them, but they do not often reach lasting agreements because incompatibilities beneath such issues are real. There is no remedial magic in the Security Council or the General Assembly. Conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union are no more soluble within the United Nations than without, and Cold War issues in general remain practically immune from U.N. influence. Yet governments do sometimes find accommodation through multilateral diplomacy there, and when they do, the world becomes incrementally *less* dangerous—as, for example, with Zimbabwe, earlier in the Suez, in the area of nuclear testing and non-proliferation, in the Latin American nuclear free zone, and until recently in the creation of the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon.

Governments also go to the United Nations to deal with matters that unite them. Many of the most pressing problems of our planet are transnational in origin and impact, and most defy unilateral solutions. Preserving peace among nations; facilitating international commerce; protecting the global environment; ordering the use of the seas, airways and airwaves; alleviating hunger; and accommodating global movements of information, resources, and people are beyond any single country's capacities. These are tasks for collective action, and governments have assigned many of them to the United Nations.[4] Global policies toward global problems are not easily or quickly formulated at the United Nations because consensus is critical for enforcement, and this is elusive in a fragmented, politically-charged world. Nevertheless, when consensus is reached —as, for example, in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade's (GATT) trading rules, the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) lending rules, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development's (UNCTAD) commodities program, the Food Aid Convention and the International Fund for Agricultural Development's (IFAD) rural development program, the allocation of airwaves, and important aspects of the Law of the Sea—the world becomes less anarchic, more predictable, and thus safer.

The United Nations is not a world government, and there is no evident desire by its members to have it evolve toward greater supranationality. Most Americans hardly want yet another level of political authority reaching down into their lives. But along with recognizing that the organization is not an independent power "beyond the nation-state," it must also be accepted that the international organization has limited capabilities. It has no power beyond that which

[3] See Abraham Yeselson and Anthony Gaglione, *A Dangerous Place: The United Nations as a Weapon in World Politics* (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1974), and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *A Dangerous Place* (New York: Berkley Books, 1980).

[4] United Nations Secretariat, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Office of Financial Affairs, *Proposed Medium-Term Plan for the Period 1984–1989* (A/36/6, in press).

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its members grant it, and no legitimacy beyond that which its members accord it. Furthermore, as an association of sovereign states, each one equal under international law, majority rule, consensus, or unanimity must be the principles of U.N. decision-making. Where majority rule prevails, no member can hope to be part of a winning coalition on every decision, and the organization is therefore bound to make policies that some members will not agree with. When policy is formulated by consensus, as it is most frequently at the United Nations, compromises produce "common denominator" agreements acceptable to all members but often less than ideal for most. Where unanimity is the rule, decisions will often not be made at all, and impasse will prevail. In addition, because U.N. members are sovereign states, enforcing the organization's decisions is ultimately a national matter for each of them. The United Nations cannot compel any member to act or react in any specified manner. Nor can it move militarily, politically, financially, or otherwise onto the territory or into the domestic affairs of any member state unless it is specifically invited. In light of this, the answer to the question, "Why didn't the United Nations do something?" is often simply that the member states had not given it either the authority or the power.

## U.S. Preferences and U.N. Policy: A Look at the Record

Talk in the United Nations is too often substituted for action, mainly because action demands consensus, while talk requires only wordsmiths, mass media agents, and attentive home-country audiences. At the present time, some of the talk is critical of the United States, but this was not always so. During the 1950s, much U.N. rhetoric was anti-Communist as Western Europe, Latin America, and much of the rest of the membership echoed Washington's themes.[5] There is also some reason to expect that the present anti-American volume will diminish in years ahead, partly because time puts the Western colonial period further and further into history and as events focus attention on the expansionist tendencies of other types of regimes, particularly the Communist ones. Furthermore, economic development in coming years will create more and more states with interests—and economic and political systems—akin to ours so that gaps in perception and interests between the West and the South could narrow appreciably. Even today the so-called "newly industrializing countries" (NICs) are increasingly uncomfortable with the more radical themes, demands, and accusations of the Group of 77 (G-77), and the anti-American utterances of the NICs are accordingly subdued. During the next two decades many more newly industrializing countries will emerge, and present ones will look, behave, and increasingly sound like the more developed Western countries.

[5] Thomas Hovet Jr., *Bloc Politics in the United Nations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), *passim.*; Hayward R. Alker, Jr. and Bruce M. Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 50–54, 70–80.

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The United States could not afford to tolerate the charges made against it at the United Nations and resolve merely to ride out the present rhetorical storm if there were a direct connection between what extremist orators say at the General Assembly and what the United Nations actually does in policy and program. But this connection is at best tenuous and in some cases non-existent. U.N. programs (as opposed to U.N. rhetoric) reflect the consensus that produced them, and consensus usually requires wooing the United States. Little of substance can happen in the U.N. system without American cooperation—and little happens without American resources—so that it is not very surprising that negotiators often defer to United States preferences. Examples abound:

- Security Council resolutions are frequently modified to court the approval of the United States, as was the case with Iraq's compromises on the 1981 resolution that protested the Israeli air attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor.[6]
- A similar episode in 1981 concerned a Security Council resolution of condolence for three Nigerian soldiers killed in U.N. service in Lebanon. The American government preferred not to have the resolution single out Israel for condemnation, and strong contrary stands by other members of the Security Council eventually gave way to the American position.[7] When U.S. approval cannot be obtained, an American veto is sufficient to kill any possibility of Security Council action.
- On questions of economic development, American influence is linked to its resources, and American preferences consequently often prevail. A case in point is the Third World stance on the question of world economic restructuring, a stance which was modified dramatically between the Sixth and Seventh Special Sessions of the General Assembly after it became apparent that the United States was not going to support schemes of redistribution nor be swayed by confrontational tactics.[8]
- Similarly, the agreement on an International Development Strategy (IDS) for the U.N. Third Development Decade was a bargained compromise that took into account American preferences for free trade and open markets, American insistence that agriculture be a central target of development, and the American position that first responsibility for development rests with the less developed countries themselves.[9]
- The final form of the Integrated Commodities Program agreed to by UNCTAD was largely a concession by the Group of 77 to the American position.

[6] Resolution 487 (1981); see also *Issues Before the 36th General Assembly of the United Nations* (New York: United Nations Association of the United States, 1981), pp. 18-19; *New York Times*, 20 June 1981, pp. 1, 4-5.

[7] Dorothy Rabinowitz, "Reagan's 'Heroine' at the U.N.," *New York Magazine* 20 July 1981, p. 38.

[8] Branislav Gosovic and John Gerard Ruggie, "On the Creation of a New International Economic Order: Issue Linkage and the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly," *International Organization* 30 (1976), pp. 320ff.

[9] United Nations, Department of Public Information, *International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade* (New York: United Nations, 1981).

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• Earlier, the conciliation or "cooling off" mechanism which modified UNCTAD decision-making by moving it away from straightforward majority voting was another case of American preferences taking precedence over G-77 desires.[10]

• The system of "graduation" linking eligibility for assistance to levels of economic development, agreed upon at the June 1980 meeting of the Governing Council of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), was yet another G-77 concession to an American position.[11]

• The structure and functioning of the IFAD are of American design.

• American positions have consistently prevailed in the area of population activities and in the disposition of the United Nations Fund for Population Activities.

• When it became apparent that the United States would not accept international restrictions on the freedom of the press, or anything in the nature of a codified "new international information order," Third World countries in the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) readily accepted an American plan for an International Program for the Development of Communication. The intent of this program is to help less developed countries improve their capabilities in mass communications.[12]

• The voluntary rather than binding nature of the U.N. Code for Restrictive Business Practices is yet another deference to American preferences, and work on the Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations also appears to be evolving in directions that American firms and the U.S. government can accept.

• Important, but ultimately insufficient, concessions were offered to the United States in 1982 on controversial aspects of the draft treaty of the Law of the Sea.

• The U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon was accepted largely in the form that the United States proposed.

More generally speaking, throughout its 35-year history, the organization's principles and most of its actions have been consistent with U.S. interests.[13] Americans, for example, certainly have no trouble with the U.N. principle of *self-determination*. Woodrow Wilson was its early American champion, and the rapid and peaceful dissolution of our fledgling "colonial empire" was its embodiment in policy. The *illegitimacy of armed intervention* is another U.N. principle that Americans can readily accept, though our own record as regards "gunboat diplomacy" is somewhat blemished. The promotion of *peaceful change* is a cornerstone of American diplomacy; it is also a first principle of the

[10] Richard N. Gardner, "The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development," *International Organization* 22 (1968): 114-20.

[11] Cf. Statement of Elliot Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, House Committee on Appropriations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 12 May 1981, pp. 490-511.

[12] *Issues Before the 36th General Assembly*, p. 126.

[13] Flora Lewis, "The Value of the U.N.," *New York Times*, 23 May 1982, p. E23.

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United Nations. *Protecting and promoting human rights* are central to American political theory, just as they are central among U.N. objectives. Conflict resolution through *negotiations, mediation, conciliation and adjudication* are main elements of the American political process and are also prominent in U.N. decision-making. That human affairs should be ordered by *codes of law* rather than contests of power is another tenet of both American and U.N. political thinking.

## U.N. Principles and Practices

Principles are fine, but what about practice? To be sure, there is considerable disparity between the principles held by the United Nations and the domestic and international practices of some of its members. But the day-to-day actions of the organization and the behavior of some of its members should not be confused. In fact, the United Nations itself has expressed disapproval of some of its members' actions. During the 1950s, France and the United Kingdom were censured for their invasion of Egypt, as was Israel; similarly, the Soviet Union was censured for its invasion of Hungary.[14] The 1960s saw the beginning of public U.N. disapproval of apartheid in South Africa, Ian Smith's usurpation in Rhodesia, and Chilean denial of human rights. In the 1970s, U.N. members decried the atrocities of Idi Amin's Uganda and the genocide perpetrated by the government of Kampuchea. More recently, the General Assembly voted sharp disapproval of the Khomeini regime's imprisonment of U.S. diplomats; it condemned the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan by an extraordinary majority of 104 to 18; and it censured Israel for its de facto annexation of the Golan Heights.[15]

These condemnations are important because they forcefully assert the limits of the international community's tolerance. Yet sanctions against deviant members are only a very small part of U.N. activities. Through the years, actions to strengthen the international community in areas of peacekeeping and peaceful change, economic development, and the preservation of the earth's resources have been primary concerns. Here again, in most of these areas there has been a close correlation between U.N. policies and American preferences.

### *In Defense of Peaceful Change*

In the realm of peacekeeping, the United Nations has on several occasions inserted international military contingents to monitor and enforce ceasefires between warring countries and factions. Some of the better known peacekeeping missions include the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO),

[14] United Nations, Department of Public Information, *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1956* (New York: United Nations, 1957), pp. 25-62, 67-89.

[15] See S/RES/46 (1979); A/RES/ES-6/2, A/RES/35/37; *New York Times*, 18 December 1981, pp. 1, 3.

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established in 1948 to monitor the ceasefire between Israel and neighboring Arab states; the Emergency Force (UNEF I and UNEF II) stationed to enforce Egyptian and Israeli ceasefires in 1956 and 1973; the Operation in the Congo (ONUC), executed to quell civil anarchy and prevent fragmentation immediately following the former Belgian Congo's independence; the Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), dispatched in 1964 to separate parties locked in Greek-Turkish communal conflict; and most recently the Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), sent to separate contestants in the Lebanese civil war and to deter terrorist activities along the Lebanon–Israel border. UNIFIL was the organization's second peacekeeping mission to Lebanon.

The primary purposes of these U.N. missions have been to deter renewed fighting, to gain time for diplomacy, and to discourage external, and especially superpower, intervention that could escalate into larger wars. The United States has supported each of the peacekeeping ventures, and the results of these missions have largely supported the American interest. The different ventures in the Middle East, particularly UNEF II, bought some of the time American statesmen required in order to promote Egyptian-Israeli reconciliation. The Congo operation contained anarchy in Central Africa and thwarted Soviet interference. The mission to Cyprus has discouraged two NATO allies from open warfare, and the diplomatic time purchased by the monitored ceasefire may presently be yielding first conciliatory results.

In each of these cases, escalation was controlled, and frequently, "keeping the superpowers out" mainly meant preventing Soviet intervention. The Russian refusal to pay U.N. assessments for peacekeeping operations caused considerable financial stress for the organization. Yet it also denied the Soviet Union legitimacy as a mediator and the opportunity to share credit for peacekeeping successfully executed. American support for U.N. peacekeeping, on the other hand, has enabled the United States to participate in the diplomacy of conciliation both preceeding and following peacekeeping episodes. (This has been especially important for American policy in the Middle East.) The United States initially challenged the Soviet Union on the question of payment for peacekeeping operations, but when the so-called "Article 19 Crisis" threatened to destroy the United Nations, the issue was left unresolved, and Washington announced that it, too, would henceforth support only those U.N. peacekeeping missions that were in the American interest. To date, however, the U.S. government has continued to support all U.N. peacekeeping activities. U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick recently indicated that the Reagan Administration "would like to see the role of the U.N. in promoting and preserving and maintaining peace expanded."[16]

Threats to peace nowadays come as often from terrorists, guerrillas, mercenaries, and other transnational trouble-makers as from hostilities between gov-

[16] "U.S. Positions to Change Under Reagan, Reflect More Realism," *Diplomatic World Bulletin*, 6 April 1981, p. 2.

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ernments. The United Nations is devoting considerable effort to finding ways to control such lawlessness. Nevertheless, building international consensus has been difficult because groups abhorred as "terrorists" by some are acclaimed as "freedom fighters" by others. There is widespread agreement, however, that innocent people should be protected from indiscriminate violence, and toward this end the United Nations has drafted conventions concerning airline hijacking, the protection of diplomats, and the taking of hostages. Basically, these commit signatories either to prosecute or extradite captured terrorists. A U.N. committee is presently drafting a convention against the recruitment, use, financing, and training of mercenaries. Naturally these codes are only as effective as individual governments permit, but many are adhering because proscriptions against terrorism are in almost everyone's interest. Since Americans abroad seem particularly vulnerable to terrorism and are disproportionally chosen as targets, U.S. citizens benefit by whatever deterrents the United Nations can contrive. For example, incidents of aerial piracy involving Americans dropped off markedly since the adoption of the Hijacking Convention in 1977.

### *Decolonization*

Decolonization has been the primary concern in the U.N. principle of peaceful change. In historical perspective, the end of the great European overseas empires represents a world-political change of monumental proportion and import. In a period of less than 30 years, the entire structure of the international state system changed; distributions of power and wealth among states altered; the agenda of diplomacy changed; and global affairs became truly "global" for the first time. Despite its enormity, the change from a world of a few empires to a world of many states was unexpectedly peaceful, quite unlike the decolonization of the Americas during the eighteenth century when Great Britain and Spain were ejected at considerable cost in human lives. Some wars of independence in the 1950s and 1960s—in Algeria, Indochina, and Angola, for example—were long and bloody. Nevertheless, most of Africa, South Asia, the Pacific, and the Caribbean moved to self-government without much bloodshed.

The story of the role of the United Nations in twentieth-century decolonization has been told many times.[17] To monitor the *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*, the U.N. General Assembly appointed a Special Committee on Decolonization in 1962. For nearly two decades this "Committee of 24" has been overseeing the decolonization process and pushing it forward by prodding imperial powers toward planned, orderly withdrawals. The United Kingdom and France have not entirely appreciated the

[17] David A. Kay, *The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960–1967* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); David A. Kay, "The United Nations and Decolonization," in *The United Nations: Past, Present and Future,* James Barros, ed. (New York: Free Press, 1972), pp. 143–70; Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1967), pp. 308–28.

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Committee's zeal, and the United States has lost its enthusiasm for it as well. Yet in many ways the United Nations has been but a handmaiden to history, since colonialism had already lost legitimacy, and the ability to maintain empires was drained from Western Europe during World War II. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Committee of 24 put the "handwriting on the wall" in bold script while counseling haste and order in the midst of what might otherwise have been delay and chaos.

Except for a brief flirtation with imperial grandeur at the end of the nineteenth century, anti-imperialism has been a main tenet of American foreign policy. The United States broke away from the British empire; self-determination was part of Wilsonian idealism; American refusal to endorse the reconstitution of empires after World War II was a source of inter-allied dissension in wartime diplomacy.[18] In light of U.S. tradition, decolonization was something that Americans could understand and welcome. And *peaceful* decolonization was even more welcome, since this spared the United States countless agonizing decisions about policies toward NATO allies on the one hand and contestants in colonial struggles on the other. The United States had difficulties with the Committee of 24, and usually abstained because the issues raised continually forced choices between Western allies and advocates of colonial independence. Had these been choices about battles, rather than resolutions, where our allies were losing, the American dilemma would have been infinitely greater. The battles were far fewer because the United Nations guided peaceful decolonization, a fact sometimes forgotten.

There is no denying that some of the new countries that emerged from decolonization are now among the harshest critics of the United States. Collectively they compose the Group of 77, now about 121 strong, vocally volatile, politically and economically impatient, outwardly single-minded, and narrowly self-interested.[19] They are also highly dependent upon the West financially, commercially, and technologically, and almost powerless in their efforts to effect changes on the issues that interest them most—world economic restructuring, independence for Namibia, the abolition of apartheid in South Africa, and statehood for the Palestinians.

On economic questions the fundamental division between the United States and the Group of 77 stems from relative wealth: The industrialized countries of the so-called North are rich and the less developed nations of the South are poor, in many cases very poor. Southern ideologies center on doctrines of equality, and restructuring schemes involving international leveling reflect the poorer countries' economic conditions and aspirations.[20] These will probably temper as

[18] Robert Beitzell, *The Uneasy Alliance: America, Britain and Russia, 1941-1943* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), pp. 142-43.

[19] Robert L. Rothstein, *The Weak in the World of the Strong: The Developing Countries in the International System* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 3-72.

[20] Roger Hansen, "The Political Economy of North-South Relations," *International Organization* 29 (1975): 925-47.

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economies develop. At this juncture the United States may either contribute to the pace and scope of Southern development, or remain passive and watch it happen anyway, albeit more slowly and haphazardly. Contributing to Third World development by accommodating some of the interests of the Group of 77 may not yield immediate political gains for the United States, since allies are no longer to be bought and the appeal of nonalignment grows as dangers in the East-West relationship mount. Contributing to development, however, will establish economic partnerships and international market relationships where two-thirds of the world's people live, work, and consume, and, consequently, where marketing and investing opportunities are vast. Western Europe and Japan seem to understand this much better than the United States, as does the Soviet Union. Those who promote Marxist revolutions make their views most convincing where people are miserable and frustrated, and the more strained the relationship between the United States and the Group of 77, the slower the probable course of development and the greater the likelihood of revolutions in the Third World.

The major political questions in U.S. relations with the Group of 77—Namibia, apartheid, and Palestine—are complex and dangerous since each could escalate into a large-scale war. Namibia is an issue of self-determination, a decolonization matter with international legal implications. Apartheid is fundamentally a question of human rights denied by a racist doctrine enforced by an obstinate regime. The "Palestine Question" involves issues of self-determination, conflicting territorial claims and security interests, disagreements about the legitimacy and representativeness of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and broader matters having to do with ways and means to a comprehensive Middle Eastern settlement. On each of these issues, the United States has the opportunity to exercise considerable influence because it is able to deal directly with almost all contending parties. If there are keys to peaceful settlement, Washington certainly holds several of them. However, U.S. effectiveness resides in a willingness to accept and an ability to play the mediator's role or, where that is not possible, to protect opportunities for institutions like the United Nations to do so.[21]

### *Economic Development*

The bulk of the United Nations' current work is in the realm of *economic development*. Here, U.N. policies and programs emerge not only from American and G-77 dispute, but from negotiating processes that involve the rest of the Western countries, sometimes some of the eastern countries (increasingly China), and often officials of the U.N. Secretariat and specialized agencies. Contrary to what North-South rhetoric might suggest, there has been substantial agreement

[21] Oran Young, *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 50–115.

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between North and South at the United Nations on development issues and considerable activity at the operational level. Since the United States has been party to most of the development agreements and, indeed, author of some of them, it is more appropriate to explain *why* they are in the American interest rather than to ask whether they are.

U.N. planning for global development is a decade-by-decade effort. In 1980, the United Nations, having entered its Third Development Decade, negotiated and published a very ambitious plan to guide its agencies and member governments toward 1990. Bearing in mind that the plan lists aspirations only, that it obligates no one, and that its goals are loftier than its accomplishments will be, Americans might nonetheless ask whether they would welcome the future that U.N. planners project. The U.N. International Development Strategy assigns "primary responsibility for the development of developing countries" to "those countries themselves," though it also encourages increased North-to-South financial flows and transfer of technology. It envisions a world of increased economic interdependence, "an open and expanding trade system," and "the realization of the dynamic pattern of comparative advantage." It also calls for enhanced cooperation among less developed countries under the rubric of "collective self-reliance" and a more efficient allocation of industrial production globally. Responsibility for world economic growth and well-being is assigned to developed and less developed countries jointly because "in an interdependent world economy, it is the responsibility of all Governments to contribute to the goals and objectives of the Strategy." Linkages between agricultural and industrial development are affirmed, and less-developed country (LDC) investment in agriculture, agrarian reforms, national food policies, and the eradication of hunger are called for. Linkages between development and improved social conditions are also acknowledged, and population, health, and education policies are prescribed, as well as special efforts on behalf of women, children, and youth. "The ultimate aim of development," according to the plan, "is the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population." According to the IDS, a number of institutional reforms are in order, especially in international monetary affairs, where less developed countries are seeking more influence over decision-making.[22]

If the IDS for the Third Development Decade represents the United Nations's interpretation of the New International Economic Order (NIEO), a slogan which has raised so much alarm in the West, it may surprise many Americans to find little in it that is particularly objectionable. Passions surrounding the acronym NIEO have distracted many in the United States from actually studying the substance of the U.N. development plan. Clearly, some of the its aspirations are controversial. How much more aid would be needed, whose technology would flow to whom on what terms, how much of whose industrial production would be relocated and how fast, and what kinds of institutional reforms would be feasible in light of American interests remain to be determined. But these are

[22] United Nations, *International Development*, pp. 1–27.

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matters for negotiation rather than confrontation, and, indeed, the West holds most of the bargaining chips: The industrial countries need only say "no" to Third World demands when such denials are reasoned to be in the western interest.

Furthermore, the controversial issues are not the central features of the development strategy, which centers upon improved well-being for poor countries and poor people and calls for greater international cooperation to accomplish this. The IDS does not seek the redistribution of the world's wealth, nor would the West ever permit this. It does, however, look to a narrowing of the income gap between industrialized and less developed countries in the context of a general increase in world prosperity through the development of new resources, productive capacities, and markets. What the United Nations aspires to in its development planning is notably different from what G-77 extremists advocate. It will also turn out to be different from what some extremists in the West believe they can accept.

Whether or not the development strategy succeeds will depend upon U.N. members' separate and collective policies and actions during the next decade. Meanwhile, a great many development programs are currently underway under U.N. auspices. For example, as a result of the World Food Conference in 1974, an International Fund for Agricultural Development was established, partly financed by the United States, but mostly by Arab countries. IFAD has been paying particular attention to small farmers in poor countries. Rural development efforts of the World Bank under Robert McNamara's presidency were also focused on small farmers. Projects financed by the UNDP are primarily intended to develop economic infrastructure—roads, dams, port facilities, public utility systems, and training schools—that are essential to economic modernity, but unattractive to private investors. Efforts have been mounted by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) to encourage Third World investors to keep funds in their own countries and to encourage inflows of foreign funds. UNIDO is also promoting the development of indigenous industrial technologies. UNCTAD is seeking stabilized markets for internationally traded agricultural and mineral commodities which are mainstays among Third World exports and crucial exchange earners. The International Labor Organization (ILO) is pressing for development oriented directly toward meeting basic human needs such as food, shelter, sanitation, health facilities, and education. With the exception of activities like famine relief and aid to children via UNICEF, little of what the United Nations is doing in development can be interpreted as doling international welfare. Economic development is a multi-faceted process with each phase and element related to every other one; U.N. programs are directed toward welding these interrelationships.

The United Nations is promoting development in the Third World, and development is taking place. By many indicators, growth in the South has been outpacing growth in the North, although, of course, huge income gaps remain.[23]

[23] Martin M. McLaughlin, ed., *The United States and World Development Agenda, 1979* (New York: Praeger Publishers for the Overseas Development Council, 1979), pp. 149–82.

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Whether what the United Nations is doing is in the American interest depends upon whether economic development in the Third World is in the American interest. Aside from all the obvious economic reasons why better-off people make better neighbors, customers, borrowers, and partners, there are political reasons for encouraging development. The correlation between economic desperation and political turmoil is very high, and turmoil in Third World countries tends either to promote local demagogues with "quick fixes" (and usually anti-Western ideologies) or to invite outside meddling. Neither of these is particularly welcome to the United States. In addition, there is domestic political costs to pay in the United States as a result of turmoil in Third World countries, as Americans tend to be quite divided about how our government should respond to such situations.

### *Preservation of the Earth's Resources*

Increasingly during the last decade, the United Nations has been led by its members into issues concerning the disposition of the global commons. The commons are those domains possessed by no nation but used by many or all. These include the high seas, regional seas, the seabed, international river basins, the atmosphere, the ionosphere, and outer space. A generation ago the exploitation of many of these common domains was technologically unfeasible, and their despoilation was unimaginable. Yet today we can mine the oceans and the moon, direct electronic signals and laser beams through the ionosphere, and travel in outer space. We can also pollute the oceans, change the rains to acid, destroy the earth's ozone layer, squander reserves of fresh water, contaminate the atmosphere with radioactivity, and station nuclear weapons on the floor of the sea and on platforms orbiting in outer space. Moreover, because some countries are more technologically able to accomplish these feats than others, there is danger that the exploitable commons will disappear as the pioneers scramble to extend their national jurisdictions. There is also danger that present-day polluters will pass on a highly contaminated earth to future generations.

The thrust of U.N. efforts on issues of global commons has been to attempt to regulate these domains under international law. Some law-making via treaty, convention, and code has been directed toward forestalling the closure of the commons by guaranteeing access to all countries regardless of present power positions or technological prowess.[24] This, for example, has been a major element in U.N. efforts to draft a new treaty codifying the Law of the Sea and in institutionalizing the principle that the oceans are the "common heritage of mankind." Forestalling closure is also a key element in negotiations concerning the allocation of radio and television frequencies, considered at the World Administrative Radio Conference in 1979.[25] A similar issue has been the parceling

[24] Seyom Brown, et. al., *Regimes for the Ocean, Outer Space and Weather* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977).

[25] *Issues Before the 34th General Assembly of the United Nations* (New York: United Nations Association of the United States, 1979), p. 115.

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of satellite space in the earth's geostationary orbit. In 1980, U.N. members concluded the Agreement Concerning the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, stipulating that neither the moon's surface nor its subsurface shall become the national property of any state. Outer space as well as the seabeds were previously demilitarized by U.N.-sponsored treaties in 1967 and 1971. As esoteric as some of these matters may appear, they are but hints of the world affairs of the future fashioned by advancing technology. Current efforts to establish legal regimes are attempts to provide means for future conflict resolution by adjudication rather than by force.

Legislation concerning environmental matters in the United Nations is designed to elicit commitments from states either to refrain from polluting or to cooperate in clean-up efforts. By U.N. agreement, for example, ocean-going oil tankers are regulated by international law, and owners are held responsible for pollution their ships may unleash. A major U.N. treaty, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, attempts to slow the nuclear arms race, but also stems contamination by radioactivity in the atmosphere and the oceans. Ocean contamination is also the target of the U.N. Environmental Program's emphasis on regional seas, where activities are underway to combat pollution in the Mediterranean, the Caribbean Sea, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Guinea, and other areas of the Pacific.[26] All of these programs involve commitments to common action by littoral states, and all are funded by international trusts established to finance U.N. environmental activities. In 1977 the United Nations also adopted a Plan of Action to Combat Desertification at the perimeters of the Sahara, as well as a global plan to preserve the earth's fresh water resources.[27]

American interest in the global commons is consistent with the intent and direction of U.N. efforts. Americans use the global commons much more than other peoples. The United States would probably benefit from a short-run scramble to close off the commons and parcel it into national jurisdictions. Since our technology permits us to exploit now what others can only hope to exploit in the future, we would for a time command the lion's share of the parcelled commons. But there should be no doubt that such a policy would invite challenge and conflict in the future—much as colonizers' territorial conquests in the past invited later decolonization. A commons regulated by law, protected from contamination, and exploited under a regime which allocates shares among users, including the United States and other industrialized countries, promises greater international tranquility by providing an equitable division of

[26] Conference of Plenipotentiaries of the Coastal States of the Mediterranean Region for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution from Land-based Sources, 1980, *Final Act* (New York: United Nations, 1980); *Issues Before the 35th General Assembly*, pp. 103–04; *Issues Before the 36th General Assembly*, p. 107.

[27] *Report of the United Nations Conference on Desertification, Nairobi, Kenya, 29 August–9 September, 1977*, A/CONF.74/36; *Report of the United Nations Water Conference, Mar del Plata, Argentina, 14–25 March, 1977*, U.N.P. Sales No. E.77.11.A.12; see also *Yearbook of the United Nations 1977*, pp. 509–14, 553–63.

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benefits between present and future generations. Far from contradicting American beliefs in free market behavior (since abusive exploitation is regulated even in our own country), U.N. programs concerning the global commons affirm the fundamental American belief that law and not force must be the basis of public order.

## America's Future at the United Nations: Critic, Supporter, Leader

The U.N. system of international organization that emerged after 1945 was for the most part the product of American idealism, imagination, and political creativity. Others read our cues, accepted our visions, followed our lead, and took steps away from traditional international anarchy not only because they believed that the United States was powerful, but because they also believed that the United States was right. A great mistake of those who specialize in rewriting the history of the postwar era is to attribute America's leadership, or "hegemony" as some call it, solely to its power. Certainly, the United States was powerful, and its might was widely respected, particularly by the Soviet Union and its allies. Among non-Communist countries, America's moral leadership was equally compelling. Washington's initiatives were accepted and acclaimed because they were viewed as legitimate, with legitimacy flowing from projected values that people almost everywhere could accept: freedom, human dignity, the rule of law, anti-imperialism, non-aggression, and peaceful change. U.S. endorsement gave a critical measure of legitimacy to the United Nations, and in this sense it very much still needs American approval.

The organization also needs the United States as an anchor. The United States remains among the very few countries in the world that both share the values upon which the United Nations was founded and is capable of acting in the interest of world order. Without the United States, the United Nations becomes a parade of small countries largely unable to act upon their aspirations, plus some Communist states that continue to reject the principles of the organization. When eastern countries use the United Nations at all, they attempt to use it solely as an instrument of their revolutionary foreign policies, and they almost always fail. We may applaud this failure, but if that is all we can expect from international organizations, the world would indeed be a more dangerous place. The United Nations requires American power and authority behind its programs for world order and peaceful change.

The United Nations also needs a constructive critic, sympathetic to its goals but realistic about its shortcomings. The United States must take on the critic's role, as indeed it has already, both to protect our national interests and to keep the organization true to its original purposes. In many ways the United Nations is less than most of its supporters would like it to be, and emphasizing its accomplishments must not distract us from looking at the organization's problems. As Vice President George Bush told the United Nations Association in 1981, there is an urgent need for an "immediate and meaningful reduction in political rhet-

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oric throughout the U.N. system," since it is impossible to politicize every issue and still hope to create humanitarian and developmental programs that benefit the international community.[28] The primary victim of the harsh rhetoric exchanged in U.N. forums is the organization itself, for it loses credibility and efficiency when it turns into a multinational shouting match.

Moreover, the United Nations must be protected against straying from its own ideals, or from being used by overzealous members for ends that are not prescribed in its charter. Recent attempts by some in UNESCO, for example, to push international authorities toward limiting freedom of the press distort U.N. principles concerning the free flow of information. Similarly, the "double standards" evident especially in the General Assembly and the persistent scapegoating of a few governments do little either to advance the causes of the accusers or to enhance the stature of the United Nations. Such behavior contributes only to polarization; it is wholly out of place in an institution chartered to promote international conciliation.

That U.N. activities are costly, that budgets need to be more tightly controlled in times of economic austerity, and that such controls have been less than effective in international organizations in recent years are all true. Former Secretary General Kurt Waldheim's call for "no-growth" budgeting for the next biennium and his insistence that program administrators make their priorities explicit are steps in the right direction. So, too, are expanded Secretariat efforts at evaluation and assessment and more deliberate attempts to terminate ineffective or redundant activities. Much more such monitoring and control are necessary in the U.N. administration, however, and some of this could be prompted by donor countries such as the United States, watching and questioning the ways in which their contributions are used.

If the United Nations needs the United States to all these things, it is also true that in these last decades of the twentieth century, the United States also needs the United Nations, for the organization has become a legitimizer in its own right.[29] Most members currently respect the United Nations, accept commitments contained in its policies and programs, adhere to U.N.-inspired conventions and codes, and accord authority to resolutions that follow from consensus. The United States must therefore watch what happens at the United Nations very closely. For the United States, as for other countries, power plus legitimacy remain the keys to leadership. As underlined throughout this article, American values and foreign policy interests are largely consistent with U.N. principles and policy directions. A more positive U.S. official attitude, then, together with greater willingness to work within the organization, more flexibility and imagination in parliamentary diplomacy, and indeed more diplomacy and less unilat-

[28] Hon. George Bush, "Address by Vice President Bush at UNA/USA," United Nations Association of the United States, New York, 25 May 1981, transcript, p. 5.

[29] Inis L. Claude, Jr., *The Changing United Nations* (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 73–104.

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eral posturing, could help recreate a situation where American foreign policy works in tandem with U.N. objectives to build legitimacy for both. It is time again to identify the United States with the goals and aspirations of most of the peoples of the world. The United Nations is one place where this can be done.*

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# What in the Name of God Is Strategic Superiority?

BARRY M. BLECHMAN
ROBERT POWELL

In 1974, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger exclaimed, "What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?"[1] Although he would state subsequently that his comment reflected fatigue and exasperation, not analysis, the secretary's questions are not to be dismissed so lightly. The issues he raised have profound implications for the size and composition of the defense budget, to say nothing of the character and content of U.S. foreign policy. They have yet to be answered satisfactorily.

Although many individuals and organizations have argued that strategic nuclear superiority is necessary for the nation's security, few have even attempted to demonstrate this position. An exception is Eugene V. Rostow who, in 1981 during the hearings confirming his nomination as director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, offered the American experience in ending the Korean War as an illustration of the ways in which nuclear superiority could be useful. In a prepared statement, Mr. Rostow attributed the end of the long stalemate at the negotiating table to a "nuclear hint from President Eisenhower." He suggested further that Eisenhower's threat was credible only because in 1953, the United States enjoyed a clear strategic advantage as compared to the Soviet Union.[2]

[1] Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), p. 1175.

[2] U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. *Hearings. Nomination of Eugene V. Rostow.* 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, p. 21.

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Was ending the Korean War actually as straightforward as dropping a nuclear hint or have 30 years of faded memories and incomplete information made the complicated seem simple? Did nuclear threats made credible by American strategic nuclear superiority end the negotiating deadlock or was another factor, like the coincident death of Josef Stalin, more important? What sort of nuclear threat was made? What precisely was being threatened? These and similar questions must be answered if we are to understand the utility of nuclear superiority in the Korean case. And one additional question must be answered before the lessons of Korea can be applied to present circumstances: Have fundamental alterations in the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals over the past 30 years altered the relationship between nuclear superiority and political gain?

Before the mid-1960s, U.S. nuclear superiority meant that the United States could attack Soviet nuclear forces relatively successfully, leaving the USSR with very few, if any, weapons capable of retaliation. Strategists call this a capability to carry out "a disarming first strike." In the 1980s, however, both U.S. and Soviet strategic forces are "robust," in that they are each capable of withstanding an attack and retaliating with devastating effect against the attacker's cities, industrial structures, and military forces. This situation is likely to persist because each side is aware of the dangers of its retaliatory forces becoming vulnerable and takes steps to correct any weaknesses that arise. As a result, although one side or the other may eventually gain nuclear superiority, it would be a superiority in numbers at a level well above those earlier levels in the 1950s at which the weaker side would be vulnerable to a disarming first strike. In short, is it one thing to have nuclear superiority when the two sides' forces are at relatively low levels, and quite another to be superior to an adversary who still retains a capability to destroy the aggressor's society in retaliation for a nuclear attack?

## Eisenhower and Korea

The Korean War was a stalemate by the fall of 1952. Both sides had fortified their positions on the battlefield; it was clear that any new military offensive, successful or not, would be very costly. At the negotiating table, the talks had made no progress since the previous spring. A single issue delayed completion of the armistice: The Chinese demanded that all prisoners be returned to their respective countries whereas the United States insisted that only those prisoners who wished to return home should be repatriated.

In the United States, the 1952 Republican election strategy was summarized in the somewhat caustic formula $K_1C_2$: Korea, Corruption, and Communism. Throughout the campaign, the Korean War was labeled "a calamity to be charged against the Democrats."[3] Indeed, Korea was the subject of the speech responsible for giving Eisenhower's "closing drive in the week before the election the

[3] Peter Lyon, *Eisenhower: Portrait of the Hero* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), p. 451.

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big, dramatic push that routed the Democrats in defeat."[4] In this speech, candidate Eisenhower made his famous pledge to go to Korea to end the war.

President-elect Eisenhower arrived in Korea on December 2 and spent the next three days listening to briefings and visiting troops. General Mark W. Clark, Commander of the United Nations' forces in Korea, had prepared "a detailed estimate of the forces and plans required to obtain a military victory in Korea," but Eisenhower never raised the question of what it would take to end the war militarily, and Clark thus never had an opportunity to present his estimates. In fact, the general was convinced by his conversations with Eisenhower that the "president-elect was determined to seek an honorable truce."[5] Although Clark's projection of the conclusion that would satisfy Eisenhower was correct, the President-elect's thoughts had not yet crystallized. He came away determined simply to carry out his pledge to end the war somehow. As the president-elect and most of his future cabinet sailed away from Korea aboard the cruiser *Helena*, there "was general agreement with [Eisenhower's] conclusion that we could not tolerate the indefinite continuance of the Korean conflict; the United States would have to prepare to break the stalemate." The question was: How?[6]

Eisenhower seems to have believed that the Communists were stalling and not negotiating "seriously." He decided to attempt to force the Chinese and North Koreans into taking a more forthcoming position at the bargaining table by threatening to expand the war. As the president wrote later:

> The lack of progress in the long-stalemated talks—they were then recessed—and the nearly stalemated war both demanded, in my opinion, definite measures on our part to put an end to these intolerable conditions. One possibility was to let the Communist authorities understand that, in the absence of satisfactory progress, we intended to move decisively without inhibition in our use of weapons, and would no longer be responsible for confining hostilities to the Korean Peninsula.[7]

In the early morning of 2 February 1953, ten American B-29s dropped 100 tons of high explosives on the Communists' front line positions in Korea. It was the largest attack on the enemy's battle posts in more than a year, and it came only hours before President Eisenhower make his first public threat.[8] In his state of the union address, the new president announced that the Seventh Fleet would end its patrols in the Straits of Formosa and would "no longer be employed to shield Communist China." Although he claimed "this order implies no aggressive intent on our part," the president hoped to remind the Chinese that Formosa might be used as a base in an expanded war.[9]

[4] Sherman Adams, *Firsthand Report* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), p. 42.
[5] Mark W. Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), p. 233.
[6] Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), p. 134.
[7] Ibid., p. 230.
[8] *New York Times*, 2 February 1953, p. 1.
[9] Robert J. Donovan, *Eisenhower: The Inside Story* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), pp. 28–30.

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The immediate reaction from the Chinese was to counter the American threat with one of their own. On 4 February 1953, Peking radio announced that not only "Chinese but all peace-loving people throughout the world would inevitably offer resistance" should Formosa be used as a base in an expanded war.[10] Nonetheless, by the end of March, the Chinese took an important step toward resolving the prisoners-of-war issue. Responding positively to a letter from General Clark sent on February 22, which suggested an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners, the Chinese also accepted in principle the U.N. position concerning repatriation of all prisoners. For a time, the Chinese concession created a feeling of optimism that the war finally might be nearing an end. Hidden in the agreement in principle, however, were significant differences over the implementation of procedures proposed by the United Nations, and, by mid-May, the negotiations were once again stalemated. At this point, the administration made its second threat to expand the war.

As part of a far-ranging good-will trip, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles arrived in India on May 22 for three days of talks. Hoping the Indians would pass the word on to the Chinese, Dulles renewed the administration's warning. Documentation of precisely what was said is not available, but Dulles was later reported to have told Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru "if the war continued, the U.S. would lift the self-imposed restrictions on its actions and hold back no effort or weapon to win." Although Nehru later publicly denied that a threat was made through him, the message is believed to have been passed to the Chinese through the Indian ambassador to Peking.[11]

Whether carefully orchestrated or simply the fortunate result of independent bureaucratic processes, events in other arenas reinforced the admonition made in India. On 10 and 11 May 1953, U.S. bombers attacked North Korean hydroelectric plants on the Yalu River for the first time; two days later, attacks were initiated on five irrigation dams. On May 23, General Clark received the United Nations' final armistice proposal and was "authorized to break off the truce talks rather than recess them, and carry on the war in new ways never yet tried in Korea." Two days later the U.N. proposal was put on the table at Panmunjon.[12]

The Chinese seem to have responded with alacrity. They accepted the United

[10] *New York Times*, 4 February 1953, p. 4.

[11] This account of Dulles's threat in India is based on interviews with members of the Eisenhower administration; on the Secretary's own article, "Policy for Security and Peace," in *Foreign Affairs* 32 (April 1954): 353-64; and on James Shepley, "How Dulles Averted War," *Life*, 16 January 1956, pp. 70-80. Shepley's article, which recounts an interview with Dulles, must be used with caution. Two weeks after its publication, Henry Luce, responding to criticism of Dulles's brinkmanship, published a statement from the editor-in-chief suggesting that the Shepley article may not have conveyed Dulles's words and deeds accurately.

[12] Lyon, *Eisenhower*, pp. 535-36, and Clark, *From the Danube*, pp. 267-68. The United States also is said to have "moved atomic missiles to Okinawa in the Spring of 1953" (see Adams, *First-hand Report*, p. 48), but this claim is spurious. U.S. missiles with nuclear warheads were deployed abroad for the first time in the fall of 1953, and these were sent to Europe. Nuclear-armed missiles were deployed on Okinawa for a brief time but not until the late 1950s.

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Nations' "final offer," with only minor changes, at the first plenary session after it was presented. Within days, on June 8, the final details of the prisoner repatriation process were settled, or so it seemed until ten days later when South Korean President Sygman Rhee rendered much of the agreement moot by releasing 27,000 Communist prisoners. But the die had been cast; the armistice was signed on July 27.

## The Korean Threats: The Background

Before considering President Eisenhower's threats in more detail, it is important to put them in historical context. Other things were happening in the spring of 1953, some of which may have been equally, or even more, important than American threats to end the stalemate at the negotiating table.

Most importantly, Josef Stalin died on 5 March 1953. While it is impossible to know with certitude how Stalin's death affected the negotiations, the pattern of events following his death implies that it had important consequences. The Indian government had moved to end the deadlock over repatriation of prisoners-of-war as early as November 1952, suggesting creation of a commission of neutral nations to assume custody of the prisoners. Under the Indian plan, the fate of prisoners who did not want to be repatriated was to have been determined subsequently at a post-war political conference. The Chinese were shown this proposal before India announced it publicly, and obviously did not reject it. Indeed, according to then-Ambassador to India Chester Bowles, "The Chinese Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, gave every indication that a truce could be arranged on these or similar terms. The Indians felt completely confident that at last peace was at hand."[13]

Despite these promising signs, on 24 November 1952 the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations, Andrei Vyshinsky, denounced the proposal in a speech at the United Nations. Shortly thereafter, the Chinese changed their position, announcing that they preferred the alternative proposed by the USSR. Apparently, Stalin was not yet ready to see the war end and, as a result, the negotiations remained deadlocked.

Four months later, less than three weeks after Stalin's death, the situation changed dramatically; on March 30, the Chinese accepted both General Clark's proposal to exchange sick and wounded prisoners and the principle of releasing those prisoners who did not want repatriation to a neutral commission. Stalin's death may have influenced these events in several ways. The new Soviet leaders may have decided that a continuing war with the West would only exacerbate the uncertainties inherent in their domestic political situation. Or, they may have wanted to establish better relations for economic and diplomatic reasons and realized that ending the war was a prerequisite for broader cooperation. For that matter, the Chinese may have realized that the war was deadlocked, that

[13] Chester Bowles, *Ambassador's Report* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), p. 242.

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they were burdened by its heavy price, and that they had achieved their initial objective of keeping hostile armies from their border. They may have perceived greater freedom-of-action with Stalin's passing and seized the initiative themselves. Whatever the case, American threats to expand the war, including the possible use of nuclear weapons, would have had less impact upon the progress of the negotiations. Instead, a change in Chinese and, possibly, Soviet policy would have made the difference.

The historical record leaves several issues unresolved. Although there is no documentation of the precise wording, there is little doubt that the United States threatened to expand the war in Korea at least twice in the winter and spring of 1953. What effect, if any, these warnings had on Chinese and Soviet leaders is uncertain. The contention that the Korean armistice negotiations were concluded successfully, not because of the threats, but because of Stalin's death, cannot be dismissed. Finally, there is a question that transcends these historical musings. Even if threats to expand the war, with the implication of the use of atomic weapons, did play a major role in ending the Korean stalemate, what is the relevance of this experience for policymakers today? To answer this question, it must be made clear precisely what the Eisenhower administration was threatening.

## The Substance of U.S. Nuclear Warnings, 1953

The nuclear element in the Korean situation was handled subtly. President Eisenhower said the United States had threatened to "move decisively without inhibition in our use of weapons, and would no longer be responsible for confining hostilities to the Korean Peninsula."[14] Secretary Dulles reportedly said "if the war continued, the United States would lift the self-imposed restrictions on its actions and hold back no effort or weapon to win."[15] And, finally, General Clark claimed he was authorized to "carry on the war in new ways never yet tried in Korea."[16]

Atomic weapons were not mentioned explicitly in any of these statements. Rather, an undifferentiated expansion of the war was emphasized in each, expansion either through enlarging its geographic scope or in altering restrictions on the types of weapons used by U.S. forces. Clearly, the possible use of nuclear weapons lay close to the surface of these threats. After all, atomic bombs were an important, and—eight years after Hiroshima—a salient element of America's strategic power. In the eyes of those making the threats, however, the undifferentiated threat to expand the war was the most important feature, not the possibility that, in the end, atomic weapons might be used. As far as General Clark was concerned, for example, "new ways never yet tried" did not refer to

[14] Eisenhower, *Mandate*, p. 230.
[15] Shepley, "How Dulles Averted War," p. 71.
[16] Clark, *From the Danube*, p. 267.

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atomic weapons at all, but to conventional attacks on bridges across the Yalu and on bases in Manchuria.[17] For President Eisenhower, atomic weapons might have seemed necessary only "to keep the attack from becoming overly costly" should the U.S. warning concerning escalation be carried out. Yet, he believed, even this possibility might be avoided by sharing the cost of a renewed offensive with others. In a discussion of the possible use of atomic weapons at the National Security Council in February (1953), President Eisenhower expressed the following view: ". . . if [the allies] objected to the use of atomic weapons we might ask them to supply three or more divisions needed to drive the Communists back, in lieu of the use of atomic weapons."[18]

Indeed, differentiating between atomic weapons and other elements of the American arsenal, at least in Secretary Dulles's view, was making a "false distinction."[19] This perspective is explained at greater length in the Secretary's 1954 article in *Foreign Affairs*, drafted in order to clarify Dulles's famous "massive retaliation" speech before the Council on Foreign Relations in January 1954. In it, Dulles stated:

> The free world must devise a better strategy for its defenses, based on its own special assets. Its assets include, especially, air and naval power and atomic weapons which are now available in a wide range, suitable not only for strategic bombing, but also for extensive tactical use . . .
>
> To deter aggression, it is important to have the flexibility and the facilities which make various responses available. In many cases, any open aggression by Communist forces could only result in starting a general war. But the free world must have the means of responding effectively on a selective basis when it chooses. It must not put itself in the position where the only response open to it is general war.[20]

These lines could easily have been written in 1982 by advocates of limited nuclear options, a point taken up again in the conclusion of this article. For present purposes, Dulles's statement suggests that atomic weapons might be used in a crisis should it be necessary, but then only in conjunction with other American assets, specifically, "air and naval power." In other words Dulles, like Eisenhower, perceived atomic weapons as simply one of several elements in the U.S. strategic arsenal.

Thus it is evident that warnings of possible use of nuclear weapons clearly were intended to be subordinate to the broader threat of seeking a military victory. Although conclusions on this point are necessarily conjectural, it nevertheless seems clear that the targets of these threats perceived the risk of atomic weapons use as only part of the grave dangers they faced.

To the Chinese, the most important implication was probably that Chinese

[17] Personal communication from General Mark W. Clark to Barry Blechman, 5 February 1981.

[18] Declassified memorandum, "Discussion at the 131st Meeting of the National Security Council on Wednesday, February 11, 1953" (12 February 1953), Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Dulles, "Policy For Security and Peace," p. 352.

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territory would be a target; the obvious first step in an expanded war would be the bombing of military bases in Manchuria. Nor could the Chinese discount the possibility of Nationalist troops entering the conflict. That atomic weapons might be used in any new bombing campaign made the threat worse, but it was probably not the crucial factor affecting their decision-making. More important to Chinese leaders was that they faced a much greater military challenge, one which would probably take place on their own territory.

The Soviet Union probably perceived the warning in an even more diffuse manner. The Soviets would have understood U.S. determination to conclude the war and U.S. willingness to deepen the international crisis to achieve this end—even if it meant a much wider conflict, and even to the extreme of using atomic weapons. But what was probably most salient for Soviet decision-makers was that a significant step-up of American military efforts was in store, an escalation which would certainly involve China, and which would thus put pressure on the USSR to become more directly involved. Soviet leaders, therefore, could forecast a disagreeable choice between backing down in the face of American pressures, or entering a rapidly expanding and unpredictable military conflict—one which almost certainly would involve atomic weapons. Although the atomic aspect no doubt worsened the Soviet dilemma, it did not in itself create the problem.

Precisely what, then, was the Eisenhower administration threatening? Clearly not "massive retaliation" against the Soviet Union. Although carrying out the threats might eventually have led to a general atomic war, the scope of the Korean situation was more limited. The tentative allusions to atomic weapons arose because they probably would have been used in the first escalatory step—attacks on Manchurian bases. The allusions to nuclear weapons were not made because it was imagined that there would be a great psychological impact. The allusions were made because then-contemporary military contingency plans assumed that nuclear weapons would be used in any further escalation of the war.[21]

Still, allusions to atomic weapons underscored what was ultimately at risk if the United States felt compelled to expand the war. In this sense, President Eisenhower's warnings that he might deepen the Korean crisis is much like the kind of nuclear threat that might be made today. Should an intense international crisis develop at the present time, it is unlikely that either the United States or the USSR would explicitly threaten the other with a nuclear strike. Rather, the threat would be to take the next step in an escalatory process that

[21] During the winter of 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff drew up contingency plans for expansion of the war should the armistice talks fail. These plans were discussed and accepted by the National Security Council. Most of the possible courses of action involved not only the use of atomic weapons, but their use "on a sufficiently large scale to insure success." See Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 1979, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, Volume 3, "The Korea War" (Washington, D.C.: National Archives Record Group 218; Records of the United States), pp. 954–59.

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both sides knew could eventually get out of control and end up as a major nuclear exchange.

Because of the apparent similarity between President Eisenhower's warnings and contemporary nuclear threats, the Korean situation appears to be a valuable example for today's policymakers of the efficacy of nuclear superiority. One aspect of the Korean threats, however, must still be explored: What was at stake if nuclear war occurred? Before drawing lessons from the Korean situation, we must be certain that whatever was at risk then is also at risk today or, at least, that any differences are insignificant.

## The Risk Inherent in Nuclear Threats

Long before the existence of nuclear arsenals, states from time to time threatened to use force against one another in defense of their vital national interests. Of necessity, each state had to assess as best it could the credibility of the threats made against it. Judgments had to be made about relative military capabilities, and costs had to be weighed against potential gains, for there was always the danger of "things getting out of hand," that is, the danger of having to pay a price greater than the value of what was originally at stake. The act might have taken longer than it would at present, but even before the atomic age, societies could and did destroy one another. In considering the dynamics of threats, earlier eras are distinguished from the present time not by the amount of destruction one nation could potentially inflict on another but rather, by the options available to the losing side's policymakers.

Before the introduction of ballistic missiles and long-range bombers armed with atomic weapons, battles had to be won or lost on the ground before either side considered surrendering a vital interest. Moreover, when a military verdict finally forced the issue, the only alternative to surrender was further intolerable damage. Military superiority was fundamentally asymmetric: If one side had it, the other did not.[22] Thus, the losing side's policymakers had only two alternatives: surrender or face continued destruction and suffering.

In the present era, the set of alternatives available to the "loser" is larger. Nuclear-armed missiles and bombers that can withstand an enemy's attack and retaliate with devastating force—for all practical purposes destroying the attacker's economy, industrial base, and population—have invalidated the previous asymmetry of military verdicts. Throughout any confrontation, both sides will retain the capability to destroy one another. Thus, policymakers on the losing side of a military struggle have a third alternative. At any time during a confrontation, they may attempt to coerce the opponent (and apparent victor) by beginning to implement, and thus to make credible, the threat to destroy the other's society implicit in the existence of nuclear forces. Of course, such a strategy would have to be pursued in full realization that the other side could respond in

[22] Of course, both sides may have fought to a stalemate, in which case neither antagonist could claim victory.

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kind, thereby leading to mutual destruction, but the risk of mutual devastation may well seem preferable to the certainty of unilateral defeat. As hope springs eternal, policymakers initiating such an alternative would no doubt expect that the apparent military victor, seeing the determination of his seemingly vanquished opponent, would move to end the conflict and settle for something less than all-out victory. In short, when faced with defeat, the prospect of, at best, a negotiated settlement and, at worst, mutual defeat may appear the "least worst" choice among a set of awful alternatives.

Whether or not this third alternative exists affects profoundly the utility of military superiority, because it drastically alters the character of risk in confrontations. In the face of this option, assessing risks is no longer a question only of measuring relative military strengths but must also include an assessment of the resolve of policymakers. The crucial question for policymakers who perceive themselves to be superior militarily is whether the party they threaten might still choose the third alternative, preferring a grave risk of mutual devastation to unilateral defeat.

Differing beliefs about the answer to this question are at the heart of the current debate over U.S. strategic doctrine and force posture. Those who believe that relatively small strategic forces are sufficient to protect the nation's interests and that nuclear superiority is meaningless, also argue that the decisive element is the maintenance of secure retaliatory capabilities. So long as such capabilities exist, they maintain, even if one nation is at a numerical disadvantage, a potential aggressor would be concerned about the implementation of the third alternative. This uncertainty, coupled with the unprecedented cost should it occur, it is argued, would deter any direct attack on the inferior nation's vital interests. Since everyone would recognize this, moreover, nuclear superiority could not be translated into political gain, as superiority would not provide a basis for effective nuclear threats.

Conversely, others hold that since an all-out retaliatory attack, while destroying the targeted society, would also ensure the certain destruction of one's own society in the counter-retaliation, no sane policymaker would choose to exercise such an option. Recognizing this fact, potential aggressors would not be deterred from initiating lower levels of conflict. In other words, it is argued, ultimate strategic capabilities cancel one another out, and return the balance of deterrence to projections of military verdicts short of all-out attacks.

Debate about the consequences of the putative vulnerability of U.S. land-based missiles illustrates these points. Those arguing that Soviet uncertainty about U.S. reaction to an attack against its land-based missile force is sufficient to deter such an attack maintain that Soviet leaders would fear an all-out retaliatory attack using sea-based missiles and bombers against Soviet civilian and military targets. Those who are more concerned about the vulnerability of land-based missiles, on the other hand, argue that the Soviets might convince themselves that, having just lost all its land-based missiles in an attack, the United States would not respond against Soviet cities because the president and his advisors would fear a Soviet counter-retaliation against American cities.

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Most importantly, neither side doubts the United States would have the option of initiating a chain of events possibly leading to mutual devastation or of attempting to coerce the Soviet Union after a strike against U.S. land-based missiles through nuclear attacks against Soviet targets. The question is how likely it is that the United States would begin such attacks or, more precisely, how likely it appears to Soviet leaders that U.S. policymakers might choose to do so. As a result, studies of decisions made before the existence of secure retaliatory capabilities and conclusions derived from these studies about the efficacy of nuclear diplomacy cannot offer much insight concerning the relevance of nuclear threats in the present era. Historical ambiguities aside, the relevance of the threats made during the Korean War to our understanding of the usefulness of nuclear superiority in the present era turns on the question of whether Soviet policymakers in 1953 thought they would have had the option of beginning an attack against U.S. cities if they and their clients were defeated on the battlefield.

## Soviet Alternatives

Assessing perceptions is necessarily difficult, for they may be only vaguely related to the "objective world" surrounding the perceivor. Nevertheless, it is useful to begin the discussion of alternatives perceived by Soviet policymakers in the spring of 1953 with an assessment of what Soviet strategic capabilities actually might have been.

Unfortunately, any estimate of the number of atomic weapons in the Soviet arsenal in 1953 is uncertain. Following its first atomic test explosion in the summer of 1949, the Soviet Union probably encountered the same kinds of start-up, production, and operational problems that plagued the United States in the first years of its atomic program. Indeed, data about weapon tests suggest the USSR's problems may have been even more severe: In the first three years of its atomic program, the United States exploded eight devices; by the end of 1952, three years after its first blast, the Soviet Union had detonated only three. Given that the United States probably had no more than 25–50 bombs as late as 1948, that is, two and a half years after its first explosion, it seems quite likely that the Soviet Union had only a few atomic weapons available when President Eisenhower threatened to expand the war in Korea.[23]

Fortunately, estimates of the Soviet Union's ability to deliver whatever atomic weapons it may have had operational are more certain. In 1944, three U.S. B-29s landed in Siberia after bombing raids against Japan and were examined in detail by Russian aircraft designers. The result was the Soviets' TU-4

[23] There are no firm data on the size of the U.S. arsenal in these early days, but it seems likely to have been quite small. See Gregg Herken, *The Winning Weapon* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980); Farooq Hussain, *The Impact of Weapons Test Restrictions* (International Institute of Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper Number 165, 1980); and George Quester, *Nuclear Diplomacy* (New York: Dunellen, 1970).

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*Bull*, of which several hundred had been produced by 1953. If launched from western Siberia on a thirteen-hour, one-way mission, the *Bull* could have reached the United States, but such an attack would have been confined to the western United States. The industrial and population centers in the east and in Midwestern states like Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio would have been out of range of Soviet aircraft.[24] Such an attack, if carried out with sufficient weapons, would surely have been terribly destructive, but it is manifestly not the kind of attack implicit in the third alternative—an attack that eventually could have led to the destruction of American society.

Objectively, then, Soviet policymakers in the early 1950s seem to have lacked a capability to respond to the potential use of U.S. atomic weapons in Korea, China, or the USSR, by threatening to destroy American society in retaliation. Did the Soviets nonetheless perceive their capabilities any differently? The answer to this question is less certain, but it does seem that Soviet perceptions fit the "objective" facts of the situation. It is worth noting, for example, that throughout the early 1950s, Soviet "strategic forces were oriented toward Eurasian operations rather than intercontinental strategic missions," indicating that Soviet leaders were not prepared to posture as if they had capabilities to strike targets in the United States itself.[25] There is also the testimony of Nikita Khrushchev who wrote in his memoirs, "Our potential enemy—our principal, our most dangerous enemy—was so far from us that we couldn't reach him with our air force."[26]

Clearly, then, the threats to expand the Korean War belonged to a bygone era, a time when policymakers confronted a smaller and less profound set of choices. To the extent the American nuclear threats were considered at all, Soviet leaders probably realized that the verdict would be rendered on the battlefield—in Korea itself or in a larger theater including China; they did not have the potential to vitiate an unfavorable battlefield verdict by threatening to attack and destroy the United States itself. Soviet leaders recognized that their fledgling strategic forces did not yet give them this option. Thus, if Soviet leaders took American threats to expand the war seriously and altered their behavior at the bargaining table accordingly, they did *not* do so because they feared U.S. leaders would believe they lacked the resolve to exercise their ultimate retaliatory capability pending a military defeat. American strategic capabilities could not have tipped the balance of resolve in 1953, as some postulate alleged Soviet strategic superiority in the mid-1980s would because the Soviet Union was not in a position to threaten mutual annihilation. Before it could even contemplate engaging in such a competition of risks, the Soviet Union had to have had the

[24] Robert P. Berman, *Soviet Airpower in Transition* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978); Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (New York: Praeger, 1962); Norman Polmar, *Strategic Weapons* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1975).

[25] Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe, 1945–70* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), p. 40.

[26] Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 516.

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means to threaten the United States with a devastating attack; in the spring of 1953, such capabilities had not yet been developed. Whatever difficult decisions Soviet policymakers had to make, they did not have to confront the central decision of the present era of secure retaliatory capabilities: When, if ever, does initiating a sequence of events, which may ultimately lead to the total destruction of both warring societies, become the least unattractive policy option?

## Conclusion

As has been seen, the danger of nuclear war was only a part of much broader American threats to expand the Korean War in 1953. That the United States might use atomic weapons was certainly an element of these warnings, but not in the specific and explicit way it is usually imagined to have been. Hindsight seems to have given the atomic threat a much more prominent role in President Eisenhower's strategy to end the war than it actually played at the time.

By threatening to expand the war, President Eisenhower was attempting to influence Chinese and, by extension, Soviet resolve; in effect, he was manipulating the risks they perceived in order to alter their negotiating position. This is what coercion is all about. But it is essential to be aware of the nature of the risk that President Eisenhower was attempting to manipulate, and this is represented by the set of possible policy alternatives from which the Soviet leaders would have had to choose. At no time did the president have to be concerned over whether the Soviets would render an unfavorable military verdict on the battlefield irrelevant by attempting to coerce the United States through nuclear attacks on American targets, thereby invoking the risk of ultimate destruction. No matter how attractive to Soviet authorities a pending military or political defeat might have made this ultimate option of mutual devastation, there was no danger that they would exercise it, as it was not in their grasp. The Korean threats belong to an earlier era.

The actual Chinese and Soviet reactions to the American threats are uncertain. The Chinese may have been influenced far less by American words, that is, American allusions to atomic bombs, than they were by such American deeds as the May bombings of the hydroelectric plants and irrigation dams on the Yalu River. Too, the Soviets may have been responding more to internal pressures and opportunities arising from Stalin's death than to anything the United States said or did. Disentangling these factors remains a formidable task for historians.

The lessons of President Eisenhower's nuclear threats come more easily. Whether a success or failure in 1953, these threats have little, if anything, to do with the usefulness of nuclear superiority in the present era. In the 1980s, when both sides have nuclear capabilities secure enough to withstand a first strike and devastate the opposing society in retaliation, the central question is whether policymakers might somehow find themselves in a position whereby beginning a course of action possibly leading to mutual destruction, but saving one side

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from certain defeat, might become the least unattractive alternative. This alternative did not exist in Korea; the Soviets' choice was concession at the negotiating table or daring the fortunes of war. A study of the Korean threats and decisions can offer little help in answering the questions that plague us today.

George Santayana warned of the danger of not remembering the past. It is perhaps even more dangerous to remember the past incorrectly. Nuclear warnings may have been a factor in ending the Korean War, but that was at a time before *both* sides could destroy each other in a nuclear exchange. The incident does not demonstrate the usefulness of strategic nuclear superiority at a time when both sides have thousands of nuclear weapons. If there is such a case, it has yet to be made.

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# LBJ and the Fortas Nomination for Chief Justice

JOHN MASSARO

The unsuccessful nominations of Associate Justice Abe Fortas to succeed Earl Warren as chief justice of the United States and Judge Homer Thornberry of the United States Court of Appeals to be associate justice marked a critical turning point in the history of the Supreme Court.[1] Had these nominations been confirmed by the Senate, especially Fortas's appointment as Chief Justice, much of the recent history of the Court would have been profoundly altered. One can speculate that from the prestigious perch of the chief justiceship, Fortas may have been able to weather the criticism of his association with Louis Wolfson and the Wolfson Family Foundation that culminated in forcing his resignation from the Court in May 1969.[2] Conceivably, Fortas would have gone on to lead the Court in the liberal tradition of Warren throughout the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations and, indeed, would have served for 14 years until his death in 1982.

[1] President Johnson withdrew the Fortas nomination on 4 October 1968 after senators favoring confirmation had failed to terminate a filibuster designed to block Senate consideration of the nomination. At that same time, Johnson also withdrew the nomination of Thornberry whom he had selected to succeed to Fortas's associate justice seat upon Senate approval of Fortas as chief justice.

[2] Three months after joining the Court in 1966, Fortas accepted $20,000 from a charitable foundation controlled by Wolfson, who at the time was under investigation by the Justice Department for illegal stock manipulation. Although Fortas returned the $20,000 eleven months after Wolfson had been indicted, opponents maintained the associate justice had placed himself in a conflict of interest situation by having accepted the fee in the first place. Fortas resigned from the Court on 14 May 1969 amid charges of judicial impropriety and the threat of impeachment stemming from the Wolfson affair.

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With Fortas confirmed as Warren's successor, it is uncertain whether Warren Burger would have been appointed to the Court, but it is reasonably certain that he would not now be the chief justice of the United States.[3] Speculating further, President Nixon may have been spared the humiliation of having two successive Supreme Court nominations rejected by the Senate.[4] Harry A. Blackmun may have stayed in his beloved Minnesota and never have written the Court's opinion in *Roe* v. *Wade*, the controversial 1973 abortion case.[5] Well into the Nixon administration, and perhaps even longer, the "Fortas Court" would in all probability have contained a bloc of liberal-to-moderate justices delaying, if not preventing, the court's gradual drift in a conservative direction.[6]

Theorizing about a mythical "Fortas Court" is not the goal of this article; nevertheless, the preceding speculation does illustrate how significant the defeat of the Fortas nomination has been in shaping the recent history of the Supreme Court. Court observers seeking the origin of the Burger Court will no doubt be drawn to the unsuccessful Fortas nomination. It is important, therefore, that a more detailed account of the factors leading to the defeat of the Fortas nomination be provided. Accordingly, this article will reexamine one of these factors by expanding upon previous analyses of the Fortas nomination by others[7] and by this writer,[8] and by drawing upon previously unpublished source material from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library in Austin, Texas.

Previous studies have indicated that two key factors played a crucial role in bringing about the Senate's refusal to confirm the Fortas nomination, the central one being the nominee's perceived liberal ideology. In general, many senators failed to support confirmation because they were not in accord with the basic philosophy they believed Fortas would rely upon in serving as chief justice.[9] A secondary factor, and the one to be reexamined here, was the failure of Presi-

[3] Burger was nominated by President Nixon in 1969 to replace Warren as chief justice, a vacancy that would not have occurred had Fortas's nomination to be chief justice been successful.

[4] Nixon's nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., of South Carolina to succeed Fortas following the latter's resignation from the Court in May 1969 was rejected by a 45–55 Senate margin on 21 November 1969. A short time later, Nixon's second attempt to fill the Fortas vacancy failed when the Senate voted 45–51 on 8 April 1970 to reject the nomination of G. Harrold Carswell of Florida.

[5] Blackmun was eventually appointed in 1970 to fill the Fortas vacancy.

[6] As late as 1975, the Supreme Court featured only two bona fide conservative justices, William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Confronting these conservatives would have been four liberals, William O. Douglas, William J. Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, and Abe Fortas, along with several moderate justices, Byron R. White, Potter Stewart, and perhaps Homer Thornberry. Indeed, the Court which sat during the 1980–81 term would have been identical to the 1975 Court with the exception of Douglas, who was replaced by the moderate John Paul Stevens.

[7] Several previous studies have examined the unsuccessful Fortas nomination. Among them are Robert Shogan, *A Question of Judgment: The Fortas Case and the Struggle for the Supreme Court* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1972), pp. 143–84, and John R. Schmidhauser and Larry L. Berg, *The Supreme Court and Congress* (New York: Free Press, 1972), pp. 100–28.

[8] John L. Massaro, " 'Fortascast:' Dark Clouds Over President Ford's Forthcoming Supreme Court Nominations," *Federal Bar Journal* 34 (Fall 1975):257–78.

[9] See especially Schmidhauser and Berg, *The Supreme Court and Congress*, pp. 123–28, and Massaro, " 'Fortascast,' " pp. 258–66.

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dent Johnson to exercise the astute management of the confirmation process necessary to gain Senate approval of the Fortas nomination.[10] While this article does not dispute that ideology and presidential management played key roles in the Fortas defeat, it does provide a more detailed account of several events which occurred during the Senate deliberations on the nomination and introduces new aspects of these events that lead to the conclusion that President Johnson's management of the nomination was a factor in its failure. Notable among these new details are Abe Fortas's apparently extensive involvement in the ill-conceived contingent "retirement" of Earl Warren; Attorney General Ramsey Clark's perhaps unwitting role in undermining the strategy Johnson had devised to gain confirmation of Fortas; and Senators Richard B. Russell's (D-Ga.) and Everett M. Dirksen's (R-Ill.) pivotal participation in the events leading to Fortas's defeat.

## Warren's "Retirement"

Perhaps the best strategy President Johnson could have adopted in attempting to gain Senate approval of a new chief justice in the waning days of his presidency was to adhere to a neutral, non-partisan stance in regard to staffing the Court. When Johnson surprisingly withdrew as a presidential candidate on 31 March 1968, he announced that the spirit of non-partisanship would be the beacon guiding his actions in his remaining days in office.[11]

If a few months later the president had approached the selection of Chief Justice Warren's replacement in the spirit of non-partisanship promised in his March 31 address, he may not have encountered such stiff opposition to his attempt to appoint Warren's successor. Rather than following this course, President Johnson soon conveyed to the Senate and to the public that his approach to selecting Warren's replacement would not be free from personal and partisan concerns.

On 26 June 1968, in announcing the chief justice's intention to retire at an unspecified future date, Johnson stipulated that Warren's resignation would not become effective until "such time as a successor is qualified."[12] The contingent nature of Warren's retirement upset many senators. Whether or not it was President Johnson's intention, he appeared to offer the Senate a choice—a dubious one to some senators—to confirm Fortas or have Warren postpone retirement and continue as chief justice. Senator Paul J. Fannin (R-Ariz.) denounced the contingent retirement plan as a cheap trick of "political maneuvering."[13] Senator Gordon Allott (R-Colo.) was reportedly livid at what he perceived to be a

[10] See Shogan, *A Question of Judgment*, p. 182, and Massaro, " 'Fortascast,' " pp. 271–76.
[11] *New York Times*, 1 April 1968, p. 1.
[12] Ibid., 27 June 1968, p. 30.
[13] U.S., Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record*, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1968, 114, pt. 16, p. 20452.

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"deep plot" designed to dictate to the Senate the choice of the next chief justice.[14]

It is difficult to determine the origin of the retirement scheme. Warren has insisted that his only intention in making his departure contingent upon his replacement's confirmation was to assure that the Court would not be left without a chief justice. The former chief justice noted that during his tenure on the Court, two incidents occurred requiring special sessions during the summer recess. With no assurance that something similar would not happen in the summer of 1968, Warren reportedly decided to leave the effective date of his retirement to the president. Warren insisted that this was his only reason for leaving the effective date of his retirement to President Johnson's discretion, and noted that he had "no further discussion or understanding" beyond this with the president.[15]

Despite this disclaimer, a White House memorandum describing a meeting between the chief justice and the president on 13 June 1968—the day Warren informed Johnson of his intention to retire—indicates there was further discussion between these two men on the matter of a chief justice designee. According to the memorandum, the departing chief justice urged President Johnson to replace him with someone whose views were similar to Warren's own.[16]

Evidence suggests the contingent retirement plan originated in discussions among Johnson, Warren, and Fortas shortly after Warren expressed his intention to leave the Court. Warren's 13 June 1968 letter to the president announcing his intention to retire as chief justice contained the key phrase, "effective at your [Johnson's] pleasure."[17] In accepting the letter, the president had the option of setting a definite retirement date. However, the president's 26 June 1968 letter to Warren accepting his retirement specified that it would not become effective until "such time as a successor is qualified."[18]

It has recently been discovered that a 24 June 1968 draft of the president's 26 June 1968 letter to Warren bears the initials "AF," which in all probability signifies Abe Fortas.[19] This earlier draft contains the following opening paragraph: "I acknowledge receipt of your retirement letter. I accept this with the greatest regret, to become effective (when your successor takes office?)"[20]

[14] Memorandum to President Lyndon B. Johnson from Mike Manatos, special assistant to the president, 2 July 1968, in the files of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. Unless otherwise noted, all references to communications and transcripts involving President Johnson and members of his White House staff are on file at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. Copies of these communications are also in the writer's own files.

[15] Letter to the author from Chief Justice Earl Warren, 10 December 1973.

[16] Memorandum for the record from James R. Jones, deputy special assistant to the president, 13 June 1968.

[17] Letter to President Lyndon B. Johnson from Chief Justice Earl Warren, 13 June 1968, reprinted in the *New York Times*, 27 June 1968, p. 30.

[18] Letter to Chief Justice Earl Warren from President Lyndon B. Johnson, 26 June 1968, reprinted in the *New York Times*, 27 June 1968, p. 30.

[19] Claudia Anderson, Archivist at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, has advised that the initials "AF" on White House communications at this time signified Abe Fortas.

[20] Draft of letter to Chief Justice Earl Warren from President Lyndon B. Johnson, 24 June 1968.

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That the June 24 draft of the letter—apparently drawn up by Fortas—contains a reference to a contingent retirement raises the possibility that the plan either originated with Fortas or at least involved the associate justice. It should be noted, however, that Fortas's reference to a contingent retirement for Warren is in the form of a question, indicating that even if the idea did originate with Fortas, final approval as well as ultimate responsibility for its adoption clearly rested with the president.

A plausible scenario is that upon learning of Warren's desire to leave the Court, Johnson met with Fortas and the chief justice early in June 1968. Fortas apparently assured the president he would accept the chief justice nomination, and Warren, no doubt, enthusiastically expressed his pleasure at the prospect of a Fortas-led Supreme Court. With the ends agreed upon, a discussion then ensued as to the best possible means of winning Senate confirmation of the nomination. Although the contingent retirement plan was considered as a method by which the White House could exert leverage on senators to support Fortas's nomination, final approval apparently was not given to the contingency scheme at that time. Shortly after the meeting, Fortas must have drafted a letter for the president by which Johnson would publicly accept Warren's decision to retire. As indicated above, Fortas raised the contingent retirement question in the draft he prepared for the president. In reviewing the draft, Johnson apparently gave final approval to the contingent retirement plan and implemented it in releasing to the public the 26 June 1968 letter in which he conditionally accepted Warren's retirement.

The charge of partisan maneuvering stemming from Warren's contingent retirement became more credible and drew even more adherents in the Senate largely because of the president's reluctance to alter the situation. At least two pro-Fortas senators advised the president to squelch the charge once and for all by requesting a definite date of retirement from Warren. On 11 July 1968 Senator Albert Gore (D-Tenn.) suggested to the president that he have another exchange of letters with the chief justice in order to lessen the growing partisan opposition to Fortas occasioned by the contingent retirement scheme.[21] The same course of action was also reportedly recommended to the president by Senator George Smathers (D-Fla.).[22] Johnson, however, declined to follow this suggestion and as a result, lost an opportunity to lessen some of the opposition raised against Fortas's nomination.

The controversy surrounding Warren's retirement helped erase any advantage Johnson may have gained by proclaiming his adherence to non-partisanship. Those anti-Fortas senators accused by the White House of playing partisan politics in using the threat of a filibuster to block a direct vote on the nomination were able to offset this accusation. They simply raised the creditable countercharge that it was the president himself who initially involved the Supreme Court in partisan politics when he resorted to the retirement scheme.[23]

[21] Letter to President Lyndon B. Johnson from Senator Albert Gore, 11 July 1968.

[22] *The New Republic*, 28 September 1968, p. 22.

[23] In this regard, opponents of the nomination could point to conclusions drawn by important

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This countercharge of partisan maneuvering may or may not have been justified. Indeed, some anti-Fortas senators who cited the contingent retirement plan in opposing confirmation may have used it as a shield to conceal the real motivations behind their disapproval. Nevertheless, that this issue could be employed by any senators in either a bona fide or bogus manner stemmed directly from Johnson's decision to go ahead with the contingent retirement plan and his refusal to do anything to lessen opposition occasioned by it. Thus, the adoption of the contingent retirement plan revealed "surprising clumsiness" on Johnson's part as it only served to tarnish the Fortas nomination and antagonize some of the senators considering it.[24]

## President Johnson and the Senate

President Johnson's most serious misjudgments in attempting to win confirmation of the Fortas nomination occurred in his dealings with the Senate. This conclusion is most surprising in view of the conventional wisdom that Lyndon Johnson understood the workings of the Senate better than did any other previous occupant of the White House. Notwithstanding his reputation for mastery over the Senate when he was majority leader, the evidence presented below suggests the president made two fundamental errors in his effort to gain the chief justiceship for Abe Fortas. First, Johnson relied almost exclusively on the judgment of a few select senators, notably his old Senate friends, Richard B. Russell (D-Ga.) and Everett M. Dirksen (R-Ill.). Secondly, and perhaps as a direct result of this limited reliance on a few senators, the president failed to assess the mood of the Senate correctly in regard to his nominations.

Before the Fortas and Thornberry nominations were announced, the president consulted with Senators Russell and Dirksen. According to one report, it was the president's understanding that he had commitments from both senators to support the Fortas and Thornberry nominations.[25]

As Johnson perceived the Senate, the support of these two senators was essential if the door leading to confirmation were to be unlocked. Russell's backing was counted upon to lessen the anticipated opposition of some southern senators to Fortas. Senator Dirksen's support was expected to offset any prospective opposition on the part of Senate Republicans.[26]

This approach soon backfired for several related reasons. The undue reliance on Russell's and Dirksen's assessments of the mood of the Senate toward the

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members of the president's own party as to the partisan considerations underlying Warren's "retirement." See Senator John L. McClellan's (D-Ark.) comments in U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Report Together with Individual Views to Accompany the Nomination of Abe Fortas*, Executive Report No. 8, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess.

[24] Shogan, *A Question of Judgment*, pp. 161, 182.

[25] Transcript of the oral history of Larry Temple, deputy special counsel to the president, tape #5, p. 23.

[26] Ibid.

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nominations caused the president to limit the prenomination screening of the nominees and to ignore advice and warnings proferred by other senators. In addition, evidence suggests that the president either misjudged the firmness of Russell's and Dirksen's commitments to support Fortas or acted in such a way as to alienate these two senators and lose their support or both. The latter especially appeared to be the case in the president's dealings with the Georgia Democrat.

### *Limited Senate Consultation*

Beyond consulting with Senators Russell, Dirksen, and perhaps Judiciary Chairman James O. Eastland (D-Miss.), there is little evidence that Johnson sought the views of any other senators before announcing the Fortas and Thornberry nominations. Indeed, one White House aide intimately involved in the effort to win confirmation of the Fortas nomination has testified to the president's almost exclusive reliance upon Senators Russell and Dirksen.[27]

Evidence indicates that Senator John L. McClellan (D-Ark.) was particularly incensed about not learning of the president's decision to nominate Fortas and Thornberry prior to public announcements of the nominations. The Arkansas Democrat expressed his anger to a White House aide charged with maintaining smooth relations with the Senate and seeking McClellan's support of the nominations: "I'm only the second ranking man on the Judiciary Committee, yet no one bothered to consult me."[28]

It is doubtful whether the conservative McClellan would have ever come around to supporting the Fortas nomination. Nevertheless, had the president consulted even briefly with him prior to the public announcements of the nominations, McClellan's aggressive opposition might have been softened.

More importantly, Johnson's failure to heed the advice of anyone other than Russell and Dirksen committed the White House to pursuing a confirmation strategy founded on unreliable information. Shortly before the nominations were announced, Judiciary Committee Chairman Eastland advised the president that the Senate would never confirm these nominees. According to the Mississippi Democrat, there would definitely be a filibuster against the Fortas nomination that could only end in defeat for the president. Eastland prophetically advised the president that despite Russell's and Dirksen's purported commitments to support the nominations, both senators would eventually oppose Fortas's confirmation.[29] This advice went unheeded, and the White House pursued

[27] Ibid., pp. 8–9.

[28] Memorandum for President Lyndon B. Johnson from Mike Manatos, special assistant to the president, 26 June 1968.

[29] Memorandum for President Lyndon B. Johnson from Mike Manatos, special assistant to the president, 25 June 1968. See also Lyndon Baines Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency 1963–1969* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), p. 547.

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the ill-fated strategy of basing hopes of Fortas's confirmation on the assumption of continued support from Dirksen and Russell.

### *The President and Senator Dirksen*

As previously noted, President Johnson relied upon Senator Dirksen's support of the Fortas nomination to offset any prospective opposition to confirmation by Senate Republicans. It might therefore have been expected that the president had made sure that the senator's support was solid and enduring before the nominations were submitted to the Senate. Contrary to this expectation, however, evidence suggests that the president went ahead with the nominations even though he was clearly aware that Senator Dirksen's support for confirmation was extremely tenuous. In this regard, there is Eastland's assessment—conveyed to the White House before the nominations were announced—of Dirksen's intent. More importantly, there is direct personal testimony from the president indicating his awareness of the shaky nature of Dirksen's pledge to support Fortas. Before the battle for confirmation had even begun, the president reportedly made the following prediction to several of his aides:

> Dirksen will leave us. . . . Just take my word for it. I know him. I know that Senate. If they get this thing drug [sic] out very long, we're going to get beat. Even Dirksen will leave us if we get this thing strung out very long.[30]

At first, the president's reliance on Dirksen's backing appeared to be a wise strategy. The Illinois Republican's early support for the Fortas nomination did indeed offset some GOP opposition to confirmation. The minority leader reportedly convinced Senator Roman L. Hruska (R-Neb.) not to endorse a GOP policy statement opposing all "lame-duck" nominations made by the departing president in the closing months of his administration.[31] The statement had been launched by Senator Griffin and signed by 19 Republicans. In addition, Dirksen was credited with persuading four of the signers of the statement—Wallace F. Bennett (Utah), Milton R. Young (N.D.), Hiram L. Fong (Hawaii), and Thruston B. Morton (Ky.)—to disavow it and support the nomination.[32] He was also given credit for derailing Griffin's effort to get the Credentials Committee of the GOP national convention to adopt a strong "anti-crony" resolution aimed at the nominations and for foiling the Michigan senator's bid to have the Republican Platform Committee take a formal position in opposition to Fortas's confirmation.[33]

Despite these early incidents, Dirksen gradually backed off from actively supporting the Fortas nomination and eventually voted against cloture. The *Chi-*

[30] Transcript of the oral history of Larry Temple, deputy special counsel to the president, p. 42.

[31] Memorandum from Mike Manatos, special assistant to the president, 2 July 1968.

[32] Memorandum for President Lyndon B. Johnson from Mike Manatos, special assistant to the president, 9 July 1968.

[33] Ibid., 29 July 1968.

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*cago Tribune* reported that Dirksen's "complete reversal" to a position opposing the breaking of the filibuster would "swing four or five Republicans to the anti-cloture side."[34] The *Christian Science Monitor* concluded that once the Illinois Republican announced his opposition to cloture, "few Fortas supporters in the Senate retained any hope at all that the associate justice could be confirmed."[35] Finally, Carolyn C. Agger Fortas, an astute lawyer and spouse of the chief justice nominee, confided to Lady Bird Johnson that Dirksen's turnabout on cloture had sounded the death knell for the nomination.[36]

Why did Senator Dirksen back off from supporting Fortas and vote against cloture? Ample grounds existed upon which senators could build a case against the nomination as Fortas was under attack on many fronts, including the impropriety of his advising Johnson on Vietnam and other matters while on the Court. Dirksen did not cite this instance of alleged impropriety but personally attributed his opposition to another of the many charges raised against the nomination, insisting he would not have supported it initially had he known of the $15,000 fee Fortas received from American University.[37]

Senator Dirksen also publicly based his opposition on Fortas's siding with the 6–3 majority in *Witherspoon* v. *Illinois*.[38] In *Witherspoon*, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional any sentence of death imposed or recommended by a jury chosen through a procedure in which potential jurors who voiced general objections to or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against the death penalty were excluded. Dirksen expressed concern that as a result of this decision 24 convicted murderers in Illinois—including Richard Speck, the 1966 slayer of eight Chicago nurses—would have their convictions reviewed and possibly set aside.[39]

Despite Dirksen's public comments, his disenchantment with the Fortas nomination appears to have been generated by other considerations. There is some indication that he did not feel strongly about either opposing or supporting the Fortas nomination. Whether the Fortas nomination was approved or disapproved, Dirksen believed it was essential to his own reputation as a power in the Senate that he appear to control the margin between victory and defeat for the White House.

Consequently, at the early stages of the confirmation battle when Senate approval of the nomination seemed a certainty, Dirksen lined up with the pro-Fortas forces. He actively lobbied in support of the nomination in order to leave the impression that Fortas's confirmation would be due to his efforts. Support of

[34] Ibid., 28 September 1968, pp. 1–2.

[35] Ibid., 2 October 1968, p. 6.

[36] Claudia Alto "Lady Bird" Johnson, *A White House Diary* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p. 713.

[37] *New York Times*, 28 September 1968, p. 30. See n. 62 below for details of the $15,000 fee incident.

[38] 391 U.S. 510 (1968).

[39] U.S., Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record*, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1968, 114, pt. 22, pp. 28932–33.

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this analysis can be drawn from the remarks of Senator John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.), who observed to a White House aide during the thick of the confirmation battle that Dirksen was "throwing a lot of sand in everybody's eyes and no doubt . . . would like to come out as the savior of the nomination after a while."[40] In addition, Senator Dirksen's repeated assurances to White House aides that "*we* will win this one"[41] early in the fight—when the pro-Fortas forces were still optimistic—appear to have been made primarily to enhance his reputation as a kingmaker in the Senate.

Senator Dirksen's approach to the Fortas nomination was simple and direct. Being confident the nomination would win Senate approval, he decided to get what he could out of the situation by working with the White House. Early in the confirmation process, there was nothing to lose by supporting a nomination expected to gain the Senate's consent easily.

The Illinois Republican had much to lose, however, after the nomination's long delay in the Senate and the rigid opposition of a coalition of southern conservatives and Republicans made confirmation extremely unlikely. With this turn of events, Dirksen found his reputation and power in the Senate seriously threatened by an intraparty revolt against his leadership. To continue to support the cloture motion and Fortas's confirmation in the face of likely defeat, Dirksen would have run the risk of providing Senator Griffin, the aggressive and ambitious leader of the anti-Fortas forces, with a springboard from which the latter could launch a serious challenge to Dirksen's position as minority leader. Dirksen was painfully aware that a party leader does not enhance his reputation for leadership by ending up on the losing side of an issue as important as the selection of a chief justice. Also worrying the minority leader was the substantial number of his GOP colleagues who, having broken rank by spurning his leadership on the nomination, were destined to find themselves on the winning side.

Thus, Senator Dirksen's public statements that he must oppose cloture because of the propriety issue and the *Witherspoon* decision appear to have been self-serving. According to his biographer, these public statements were simply "flimsy attempts to rationalize his change."[42] Rather, Dirksen switched to opposing cloture and Fortas's confirmation in order to detach himself from a losing cause and thereby avoid what he viewed as a costly personal political defeat.[43]

It is surprising that, being aware of the fragile nature of Dirksen's support, President Johnson nevertheless depended upon him to play a pivotal role in winning Senate confirmation of Fortas. Both the president and the senator failed to

[40] Memorandum to Mike Manatos, special assistant to the president, from Harry C. McPherson, Jr., special counsel to the president, 20 September 1968.

[41] Memorandum to President Lyndon B. Johnson from Mike Manatos, special assistant to the president, 2 July 1968 (emphasis added).

[42] Neil MacNeil, *Dirksen: Portrait of a Public Man* (New York: World Publishing Co., 1970), p. 336.

[43] *New York Times*, 29 September 1968, sect. IV, p. 7. See also MacNeil, *Dirksen*, p. 336.

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assess the mood of the Senate accurately in regard to the lack of depth and solidity of support for the Fortas nomination. They wrongly assumed that any modest Republican opposition to the nomination would instantly crumble in the face of pressure from the White House and the minority leader's office.

Johnson's failure to appreciate the depth and tenacity of the Republican opposition underlay his ill-fated strategy to link hopes for Fortas's confirmation to the continued support of Senator Dirksen. Broader prenomination consultations with senators other than Dirksen and Russell might have generated a more successful confirmation strategy. Conceivably, such consultations would have provided the president a more accurate assessment of the mood of the Senate, made manifest the critical necessity of balancing the Fortas nomination with a more suitable nominee than Thornberry, and alerted the White House to the pitfalls in pursuing a strategy in which Dirksen's support played such a crucial rule.

### *President Johnson and Senator Russell*

The role presidential management played in the Senate's refusal to confirm Fortas is also provided by examining an incident occurring during the battle for confirmation. This incident allegedly altered the longtime friendship which had existed between President Johnson and Democratic Senator Richard Russell of Georgia and led directly to the latter's decision to oppose the Fortas nomination.

As previously noted, the president was counting on Russell's support of the Fortas and Thornberry nominations to lessen some of the expected opposition of southern Democrats. Prior to the public announcements of the nominations, the president received what he considered a firm commitment from the Georgia Democrat to support both Fortas and Thornberry. According to the president, Russell, during a private prenomination meeting between the two old friends, stated, "I will support the nomination of Mr. Fortas for chief justice, but I will enthusiastically support Homer Thornberry."[44]

The story behind the chilling of the Johnson-Russell friendship and the latter's decision to oppose the Fortas nomination involves issues of presidential indecision and bureaucratic politics. The following account is based primarily upon the version provided by President Johnson's deputy special counsel, Larry D. Temple.

Early in 1968, Senator Russell recommended that Johnson nominate Alexander Lawrence to fill a vacancy on the federal court for Georgia's southern district. The president immediately asked Attorney General Ramsey Clark to do some preliminary checking on Lawrence.

The attorney general soon reported that although Lawrence enjoyed a reputation as one of Georgia's most talented lawyers, there were disturbing reports

[44] Johnson, *The Vantage Point*, p. 546.

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that he had made an allegedly racist speech in the late 1950s wherein he denounced the Supreme Court for the *Brown* decision. These reports had aroused the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and other organizations representing minority groups to oppose Lawrence's appointment as federal judge. Clark concluded he would not recommend Lawrence for the vacancy and urged the president not to make the nomination. Clark also noted that because of the purportedly racist speech, Lawrence would probably not be cleared by the American Bar Association (ABA) Committee responsible for screening and evaluating all potential nominees for the federal courts.

In response, Johnson told his attorney general that he did not want to make an appointment which would in any way undermine the federal judiciary's efforts to desegregate the South. However, because he also valued the judgment and friendship of Russell, he did not want to do anything to offend the Georgia Senator, as is evident in his instructions to Attorney General Clark:

> If there's any way at all we can posture this man [Lawrence] in a way that he can be appointed without hampering the judiciary, without doing anything to undermine the judiciary, I want to do it. I want to appoint this man.[45]

In June 1968, when the president received word of Chief Justice Warren's intention to leave the Court, a final decision on the Lawrence nomination had apparently still not been made. Russell's subordinates had been pressing the White House for a decision at the "earliest possible time."[46] Despite their efforts, however, the attorney general was purportedly still involved in checking out the nominee.

At about the same time, the president and Senator Russell had their first meeting to discuss the Fortas and Thornberry nominations. The delayed Lawrence nomination, no doubt, also entered into the discussion. Apparently a tacit understanding was reached between the two old friends that Senator Russell would support the Fortas and Thornberry nominations and the president would nominate Lawrence to the Georgia district court upon the completion of Attorney General Clark's prenomination screening and a favorable recommendation from the ABA.

Afterward Johnson again conferred with Attorney General Clark to ascertain the status of the Justice Department's screening of Lawrence. Clark informed the president once again that the investigation of the nominee had not yet been completed and reiterated that the nomination should not be made because of the adverse impact Lawrence's appointment would have on desegregation efforts in the South.

Reportedly angered by his attorney general's lack of enthusiasm and by the

[45] Transcript of the oral history of Larry Temple, deputy special counsel to the president, pp. 19–20.

[46] Memorandum to President Lyndon B. Johnson from Tom Johnson, assistant press secretary, 28 May 1968.

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stalled effort in screening the nomination, the president made the following comments to Clark:

> I told my friend Dick Russell that if there is a way to appoint that man [Lawrence], I want to do it. Now I know you don't want to appoint him. I know you're opposed to it, and I'm not telling you that I definitely am going to appoint him. I'm just telling you that I want to if there's any way that I can. I don't think you want to nominate him, but I do; and if there's a way to posture him where we can nominate him, I want to do that. Now go get after it, and see if there's a way to do that.[47]

Shortly after this meeting, two White House aides were sent to confer with Russell about the Fortas nomination. It is not clear what the Georgia Democrat had to say about Fortas at that meeting, but he reiterated his desire to see the Lawrence nomination forwarded to the Senate and that he "sure would like for it to be done pretty soon."[48]

Advised by his aides of Russell's growing impatience, the president again forwarded instructions to Attorney General Clark to speed up the Justice Department's investigation of Lawrence. It is the view of at least one White House insider that the attorney general was deliberately "dragging his feet" on the Lawrence issue.[49] According to this source, Clark was aware that when the president received the Justice Department's investigation report and the ABA recommendation, the Lawrence nomination would immediately be forwarded to the Senate. By deliberately slowing down the Justice Department's investigation, Clark hoped that something would happen to persuade the president not to make the nomination.[50]

On 1 July 1968, Senator Russell, his patience worn thin by the seemingly endless wait for word of Lawrence's nomination, fired off an angry letter to the president in which he recounted the long years of friendship which had existed between the two men and the great mutual respect they had for one another, and that throughout the years they had always dealt honestly with one another. Then Russell dropped the bombshell: He charged that the president had not dealt honestly and openly with him in regard to the Lawrence nomination.[51]

The letter went on to express the senator's conviction that the president was using the Lawrence appointment as a club over Russell's head to assure his support on the Fortas nomination and his belief that it was Johnson's intention to hold up the Lawrence appointment in order to see whether Russell would support Fortas. He was convinced that if he voted in support of the Fortas nomination, the Lawrence appointment would be immediately forthcoming, a realization of great disappointment to the senator.

The letter further noted the nature of the commitments made by the two old

[47] Transcript of the oral history of Larry Temple, deputy special counsel to the president, p. 24.
[48] Ibid., p. 29.
[49] Ibid., p. 25.
[50] Ibid., pp. 25, 29.
[51] Ibid., p. 30. The following description of the contents of the letter is taken from ibid., pp. 30–32.

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friends at their June 1968 meeting during which the Fortas, Thornberry, and Lawrence nominations were discussed. Russell's understanding was that he had pledged to support the Fortas nomination out of his trust and friendship for the president and it was never his intention to make a quid pro quo deal whereby Russell's support for Fortas was to be exchanged for Johnson's nomination of Lawrence. Because the president never told him at the meeting about a quid pro quo deal, he had no reason to doubt his understanding of the meeting. Russell in his letter now confided that he had recently come to the regrettable realization that the president believed such a deal had indeed been made. He wanted the president to know that he strongly resented being deceived by his old friend in the White House.

Russell's letter then turned to the implications his belated realization of Johnson's motives had for the Lawrence and Fortas nominations. He no longer cared whether the president made the Lawrence nomination, even though the president had unequivocally and unconditionally promised it at their June 1968 meeting. Russell no longer considered that pledge to be binding, and in the event the president still believed he had an obligation to appoint Lawrence, the Georgia Democrat was hereby notifying the president he was relieved of that commitment. Furthermore, Russell felt his pledge to support Fortas had been made under the false premise that the president was dealing openly and honestly. The president's alleged intention to strike a crass quid pro quo bargain on the Fortas and Lawrence nominations without informing him apparently offended the senator's sensitivities, and any commitments made between them he now considered void.

The president's immediate reaction upon receiving Russell's letter was outrage at Attorney General Clark. He telephoned Clark, read the letter to him, and reportedly made the following comment:

> Ramsey, I'm very unhappy. I think your foot-dragging on this has destroyed one of the great friendships I've had with one of the great men that has ever served this country. I'm unhappy about it.[52]

President Johnson also told the attorney general that Senator Russell's view concerning the Lawrence nomination as part of a quid pro quo deal to win support for Fortas was not accurate. The president insisted that the two nominations were not and never had been linked together in any deal. The only explanation the president and the attorney general had for Russell's view of the situation was that senators opposed to Fortas had concocted the theory of a quid pro quo deal and had managed to convince Senator Russell of its veracity. The president ended his conversation with the attorney general by expressing the belief that the White House still had a commitment to appoint Lawrence to the Georgia district court despite Russell's withdrawal of his pledge to support Fortas. Clark was instructed once again to forward a recommendation on the Lawrence nomination to the White House.

[52] Ibid., p. 33.

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Following this conversation, Johnson attempted to save the Fortas nomination and the friendship he believed had been fractured by the prolonged delay over the Lawrence appointment. The president dispatched a bevy of subordinates to the Georgia Democrat's office, yet despite their pleadings, all of them failed to convince the senator that the president had never intended to use the Lawrence appointment in a quid pro quo fashion.

More than a week went by before the president finally decided to take matters into his own hands. He personally called Senator Russell and reportedly said the following to him:

> Dick, I have your letter here in my hand. I don't think this letter reflects creditably upon you as a statesman. I don't think it reflects very well upon me as your President. I don't think it reflects very well on our long friendship. I just don't think that it is the kind of letter that I want to have in my file for historians to see. No, I don't want it in my file. . . . I'm going to send it back to you. I'm not going to make a copy of it. . . . I hope you'll destroy it. Whatever you do with it is your decision, because it's your letter. It's not mine. I don't want it . . .
>
> I'm going to tell you . . . that I don't look upon you as having any sort of commitment to me with regard to Justice Fortas or Homer Thornberry. I know that you will do as you've done since I've known you, and that is make the decision your conscience and judgment dictates at the time that is right for that decision. I'm not going to ask you what that decision is. I'm not going to send anybody to you. I'm not going to have anybody else ask you. I'll know what your decision is when I see the vote tallied. That's as soon as I want to know. . . . You say you don't feel like you have a commitment to me. I'm going to nominate your recommendation to be federal judge for the United States district court in Georgia, but it's not a quid pro quo. It wasn't when I first told you I was going to. It isn't now, and it isn't going to be. I never thought of the two together until you put them together in your letter. So I just want you to know I'm going to nominate your man, and I don't think you've got any commitment to me on Fortas. You do whatever you want to do on that, and I know it'll be the right decision.[53]

Soon after this conversation, Attorney General Clark finally recommended the Lawrence nomination, although not without voicing great misgivings about it. The president a short time later fulfilled what he believed was his commitment to Russell by immediately nominating Lawrence as a federal judge to serve on the Georgia district court. Despite Clark's misgivings, Johnson had grounds upon which to reconcile his own ardent support of civil rights to Lawrence's alleged racism. Given the president's limited remaining time in office and the pressing and time-consuming matter of the Vietnam War, the appointment of Lawrence to an important but still inferior court position could be viewed as part of the pragmatic compromise that had to be made to insure that the Supreme Court, the major and final judicial policymaker in regard to civil rights, would continue to be led by a chief justice highly supportive of racial equality. Although the Lawrence nomination won Senate approval with little opposition,

[53] Ibid., pp. 37–38. The letter was returned to Senator Russell, and there is not a copy of it in the files of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

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Senator Russell actively opposed Fortas's promotion to the chief justiceship and eventually voted against the cloture motion designed to permit the Senate to vote directly on the nomination.

Observers of the White House's unsuccessful effort to appoint Warren's successor have concluded that the events leading up to the Lawrence appointment directly account for Senator Russell's withdrawal of support for Fortas. In turn, the senator's refusal to back Fortas seriously undermined the White House efforts to gain Senate approval of the chief justice designee. The Georgia Democrat's defection from the pro-Fortas side has been described as the pivotal factor ending all hopes the White House had of heading off the filibuster launched against the nomination. In the opinion of one White House intimate, it was Senator Russell's "pique over the delay in the Alexander [Lawrence] nomination . . . that really finished off Fortas."[54] Others have estimated that Russell's opposition may have cost the pro-Fortas forces the votes of as many as 12 or more southern Democrats.[55]

Several aspects of the events surrounding Russell's break with the pro-Fortas forces reflect unfavorably on Johnson's management of the nomination. Given the key role Russell's continued support of Fortas had been assigned in the president's strategy for gaining Senate confirmation, the chief executive was remarkably complacent toward Attorney General Clark's obvious holding up of the Lawrence nomination. Contrary to many reports that the president would not tolerate unsubmissiveness on the part of his subordinates, it has been noted that in regard to judicial nominations, Johnson was most reticent in overruling his attorney general. By way of illustration, one White House aide has observed that President Johnson

> never nominated anyone that had not been recommended by the attorney general, and didn't think he could or would. People who don't understand Lyndon Johnson, or Ramsey Clark, or maybe a president and an attorney general probably wouldn't think that. I think people generally think that a president . . . is the boss and if he wants to nominate somebody, he can. If he wants a recommendation, all he has got to say is, "Now, you're my attorney general. You make that recommendation to me." That may have happened in other administrations with other presidents and other attorney generals, but I can say it didn't happen here.[56]

While it may have been President Johnson's customary approach not to overrule his attorney general on judicial nominations, the selection of a chief justice, especially in the closing months of his term, was clearly an extraordinary event demanding atypical actions on his part. The president must have realized how essential Russell's support of Fortas was to favorable Senate action on the nomination; he was obviously aware of Russell's strong interest in having Lawrence appointed to the Georgia district court without undue delay. Nevertheless, dur-

[54] Ibid., p. 34.

[55] Shogan, *A Question of Judgment*, p. 159.

[56] Transcript of the oral history of Larry Temple, deputy special counsel to the president, pp. 24–25.

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ing a critical time in the fight for Senate approval of his chief justice designee, Johnson needlessly placed the Fortas nomination in jeopardy by tacitly permitting Attorney General Clark to hold up the Lawrence appointment.

Given the crucial nature of Russell's support, the president should have been more aggressive in attempting to persuade Clark to recommend Lawrence favorably and to do so with the utmost haste. The president apparently never convinced his attorney general that Russell's support was the sine qua non of a successful Fortas nomination nor that the Lawrence appointment was the price the White House would have to pay to gain the Georgia Democrat's favor. If he had so convinced the attorney general, Clark may have been more willing to accept the Lawrence nomination.

In the event this information did not persuade the attorney general to recommend the Lawrence appointment immediately, the president should have exercised his power under the Constitution by sending the Lawrence nomination to the Senate without Clark's recommendation. While such an approach may have angered Clark and the president's liberal constituents, Abe Fortas's confirmation as Warren's successor would guarantee that the attorney general and other liberals would not remain disenchanted with the president, at least in regard to judicial nominations.

## The Effects of Losing Senatorial Support

The president had devised a strategy to gain the chief justiceship for Abe Fortas. A major element of that strategy was to prevent the forging of a coalition of conservative Democrats and conservative-to-moderate Republicans in opposition to the nomination. The continued support of Senators Russell and Dirksen was essential in forestalling the formation of that coalition. While the basic strategy was sound, the president failed to take into consideration the tenuous nature of Dirksen's commitment to support Fortas and did not anticipate the loss of Russell's backing due to difficulties stemming from the Lawrence nomination.

The loss of Russell's support was the first major blow to the strategy. Still, Dirksen's backing appeared sufficient to prevent the formation of the coalition, especially because Senator Russell did not plan to oppose the nomination actively. It was Russell's view that the Republican leadership was not actively opposing Fortas, and any GOP attempt to block the nomination in concert with conservative Democrats was bound to "just fall apart."[57] Although he opposed the Fortas nomination, Russell was still not about to take the lead in what appeared to him to be a futile effort to block confirmation.[58]

All of this changed, however, as soon as Russell was convinced that the 19

[57] Memorandum to President Lyndon B. Johnson from Mike Manatos, special assistant to the president, 9 July 1968.

[58] Shogan, *A Question of Judgment*, p. 159.

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rank-and-file Republicans who opposed the nomination from the outset were committed unshakably to blocking confirmation.[59] It is not clear whether Russell became convinced of this before or after Senator Dirksen switched to opposing cloture on the Fortas nomination. What is clear, however, is that the minority leader's wavering support of Fortas and his eventual decision not to help terminate the filibuster made Russell much more certain that the rank-and-file GOP opposition would remain solid. With Russell opposed to Fortas and Dirksen wavering (if not also opposed), there was no one powerful enough to prevent the forging of a coalition against the nomination. The president's strategy for confirmation was doomed to fail.

It is not possible to state definitely the factors leading to the Senate's refusal to confirm the nomination of Abe Fortas as chief justice of the United States. Given the ideological opposition of Senate conservatives and the "lame-duck" nature of the nomination, the battle to gain confirmation was bound to be difficult. Victory in this battle was far from impossible, however. Forty-five senators—a majority of those who participated in the cloture roll call on the nomination—voted in favor of terminating discussion and presumably favored confirmation. This indicates the presence of substantial pro-Fortas sentiment in the Senate.[60] Astute presidential management of the nomination could have marshalled this pro-Fortas support, avoided a filibuster against the nomination, and garnered sufficient votes to win confirmation.[61]

The opposition to Fortas's liberal ideology and the lame-duck nature of the nomination necessitated a virtuoso performance by President Johnson if Fortas were to succeed Warren; a substandard performance would certainly doom the nomination. Evidence drawn from the files of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library confirms the conclusion that President Johnson's performance was far from virtuoso. In following the contingent retirement scheme, in involving Fortas too intimately in the confirmation process, in allowing Attorney General Ramsey Clark to delay the Lawrence nomination, and in devising a strategy for confirmation linked to the tenuous support of Senators Russell and Dirksen, President Johnson sealed the defeat of the nomination.[62] Indeed, future schol-

[59] Ibid.

[60] For additional evidence of the presence of substantial support for Fortas in the Senate, see Massaro, " 'Fortascast,' " pp. 267–68.

[61] It should be noted that while a simple majority of those senators present and voting was required to confirm the nomination on a direct vote, a two-thirds majority of those senators present and voting would have been required to terminate a filibuster against the nomination.

[62] It should be noted that because of considerations of space, several incidents which point toward additional deficiencies in President Johnson's management of the confirmation process have not been addressed in this article. Among these incidents was the president's decision to couple the Fortas nomination with that of Homer Thornberry rather than with that of someone more attractive to senators opposed to Fortas. For example, the coupling of Fortas with a bona fide conservative and/or Republican nominee would have generated broader support for Johnson's chief justice nominee. Another series of incidents not addressed pertain to Johnson's unintended complicity in delaying Senate consideration of the Fortas nomination long enough for senators opposing confirmation to

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ars may conclude that it was poor presidential management rather than ideology that was the primary factor leading to the Senate's refusal to confirm Abe Fortas.

uncover and publicize Fortas's acceptance of a $15,000 fee for conducting a nine-week seminar at American University Law School during the summer of 1968. While the amount of the fee raised some eyebrows in the Senate, the manner in which the seminar was funded provided additional grounds for some senators' opposition to confirmation. Funds to support the seminar were raised by Fortas's close friend and former law partner, Paul A. Porter. He solicited contributions from five prominent businessmen who conceivably would be involved in litigation coming before the Supreme Court. According to special assistant Joseph Califano and other White House aides, the disclosure of the $15,000 fee supplied the death blow to Fortas's hopes for confirmation. For more complete coverage of these and other incidents, see Massaro, " 'Fortascast.' "

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# The Dispersion of Authority in the House of Representatives

THOMAS E. CAVANAGH

Since its publication in 1968, congressional scholars have considered Nelson Polsby's article on "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives" to be a singularly useful overview of the historical development of the House.[1] Polsby demonstrated that during the twentieth century, the House had become increasingly "bounded" in its membership, more "complex" in its internal organization, and more "automatic" and "universalistic" in its criteria for apportioning influence. Yet toward the end of the article, Polsby expressed doubt as to the existence of "an inflexibly narcissistic law of internal growth," and speculated that changes in the general political environment could reverse the process, as had previously occurred during and after the Civil War.

In some ways, it now appears that the institutionalization of the House peaked at about the time that Polsby's article appeared. The 1970s witnessed a considerable increase in membership turnover, and in successful challenges to seniority in determining committee and subcommittee chairmanships. However, the House has become even more complex in its organization, as reflected in the profusion of staff support and the proliferation of subcommittees. The divergence in the trends suggests a need to update Polsby's time series, and more importantly, to reexamine the concept of institutionalization as it has been applied to the House. The burden of this article is to take on both of these tasks, albeit with the caveat that the first is far more straightforward than the second.

[1] Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review* 62 (March 1968): 144–68. The quote is on p. 168.

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The trend in organizational complexity poses the major challenge to the assumption that Polsby's indicators all measure the same underlying phenomenon. Consequently, this article will concentrate on the organizational aspects of the House's evolution. The process of institutionalization ordinarily produces a specialization of functions and a more efficient division of labor.[2] Yet this growing complexity also implies a continual tension over the allocation of power to an organization's constantly evolving network of subunits. As these subunits acquire autonomy over their functional tasks, the institution must develop some method of integrating their activities.[3] This problem has a peculiar importance in the House. As Samuel P. Huntington has observed:

> Specialization of function and centralization of authority have been the dominant trends of twentieth-century institutional development. Congress, however, has adjusted only half-way. Through its committees and subcommittees it has provided effectively for specialization. . . . But . . . Congress lacks the central authority to integrate its specialized bodies. In a "rational" bureaucracy, authority varies inversely with specialization. Within Congress, authority usually varies directly with specialization.[4]

What traditionally restrained the House's centrifugal tendencies was the discretion enjoyed by the committee chairmen in determining the personnel, resources, jurisdictions, even existence of subcommittees. The party leadership facilitated House business through encouraging the norms of deference, reciprocity, and compromise in the dealings among committees—the dealings, that is, among a relatively small and stable oligarchy of committee chairmen. A degree of centralization was provided by the Rules, Appropriations, and Ways and Means Committees through their control over the legislative agenda. The rank-and-file members were generally content to "go along and get along," secure in the knowledge that electoral safety and the seniority system would, in David Mayhew's words, "convert turf into property" and permit them to share eventually in the fruits of power.[5]

As career longevity increased in the postwar House, however, so did the accumulated frustrations of the members awaiting their turn on the seniority ladder. The logjam was broken in the 1970s by a rapid influx of new members, who saw little personal or policy advantage to be gained from following the traditional norms of House behavior. They instead provided the impetus for a new form of universalism: a radical devolution of authority to the subcommittee level, permitting a distribution of influence to even the most junior members. As a result, the contemporary House faces a fragmentation of policy which has grown in-

[2] Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society,* trans. George Simpson (New York: Free Press, 1933), pp. 256–82.

[3] S. N. Eisenstadt, "Social Change, Differentiation and Evolution," *American Sociological Review* 29 (June 1964): 375–86.

[4] Samuel P. Huntington, "Congressional Reponses to the Twentieth Century," in David B. Truman, ed., *The Congress and America's Future* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 18.

[5] David R. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 96.

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creasingly severe as the dispersion of authority has become increasingly pronounced. The relationship between the House's complexity and its legislative capacity now appears to be curvilinear, that is, an excess of organizational complexity now appears to be detracting from the effectiveness of the House in the policy process.

To explain this evolution, one must attempt to establish a causal linkage among the components of institutionalization. This article will argue that the degree of boundedness, that is, stability in House membership and leadership, influences the norms apportioning influence within and among committees and subcommittees, while the degree of complexity determines the structural framework within which these norms are applied. This model will be developed by examining the descriptive data on the components of institutionalization, and then interrelating these trends to illuminate the structural evolution of the House during the 1970s.

## The Establishment of Boundaries

Let us begin our discussion, as did Polsby, by examining:

> . . . the differentiation of an organization from its environment. The establishment of boundaries in a political organization refers mostly to a channeling of career opportunities. In an undifferentiated organization, entry to and exit from membership is easy and frequent. Leaders emerge rapidly, lateral entry from outside positions of leadership is quite common, and persistence of leadership over time is rare. As an organization institutionalizes, it stabilizes its membership, entry is more difficult, and turnover is less frequent. Its leadership professionalizes and persists. Recruitment to leadership is more likely to occur from within, and the apprenticeship period lengthens. Thus the organization establishes and "hardens" its outer boundaries.[6]

Polsby then presented striking data to illustrate this trend in the House. He showed that from 1863 to 1963, the proportion of freshmen in the House decreased from 58.1 percent to 15.2 percent while the average member's tenure lengthened from 1.75 to 5.65 terms of office. Similarly, while William Pennington was elected Speaker in his first term in 1859, John W. McCormack had served 34 years before his elevation to that position in 1962.[7]

Both the membership and leadership indicators have reversed direction in the past decade. McCormack is such an extreme case that one should perhaps not make too much of the accession of Carl Albert and Thomas P. ("Tip") O'Neill after 24 years of service each. However, the wild three-way fight for majority leader in 1977 may indeed indicate that the once-automatic escalator for party leadership positions is no longer so automatic.

The turnover trend is unmistakable. The proportion of freshmen bottomed out at 8.4 percent in 1969, and has *averaged* 16.1 percent in the six subsequent

[6] Polsby, "Institutionalization," pp. 145–46.
[7] Ibid., pp. 146–53.

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FIGURE 1

*Mean Tenure of House Members, 82nd to 97th Congresses (1951–1981)*




**Sources of data:** Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review* 62 (March 1968), p. 146; calculations from *Congressional Directory*.

elections. So many freshmen have entered since 1971 that the mean length of service has declined from the record 5.94 terms attained in that year to 4.73 terms at present (Figure 1). Or, looked at another way, fully 48 percent of the current House first took office in 1977 or later. To be sure, contemporary incumbents are generally assured of reelection if they decide to run. Since 1969, however, more House seats have changed hands through retirements than through election defeats.[8] An increasing number of congressmen appear to be concluding that reelection requires more effort than it is worth, although it is close to automatic if one is willing to make that effort.

A number of factors are probably at work here. The electoral process is becoming more demanding in terms of both time and money. The increasing legis-

[8] John F. Bibby, Thomas E. Mann, and Norman J. Ornstein, *Vital Statistics on Congress, 1980* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), p. 14.

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lative workload, the fragmentation of policymaking, the post-Watergate distrust of politicians, and the failure of congressional salaries to keep pace with inflation all appear to be making the job less attractive.[9] A less obvious explanation is derived from actuarial statistics on House career longevity. As membership turnover declined during most of this century, the entering classes of freshmen became progressively smaller. As these classes aged, the pool of senior members therefore began to shrink. On this basis, writing as early as 1964, T. Richard Witmer predicted a fall-off in the number of senior members by the 93rd Congress, and "a corresponding increase in the availability of seats for first-term members."[10] This has indeed come to pass. The increase in the retirement rate may simply signify that the seats of older members are sufficiently safe that they generally need to leave only at their own volition.

## Decision-Making Criteria

Polsby also analyzed processes of internal decision-making in the House. An institutionalized organization, in his discussion:

> tends to use universalistic rather than particularistic criteria, and automatic rather than discretionary methods for conducting its internal business. Precedents and rules are followed; merit systems replace favoritism and nepotism; and impersonal codes supplant personal preferences as prescriptions for behavior.[11]

The seniority system and the disposition of contested elections were selected by Polsby to illistrate this tendency. The modern norms regarding the legalistic handling of election disputes appear to be well-entrenched in the House, although the Wyman-Durkin controversy in the Senate suggests their possible limits. However, the seniority system has clearly been weakened in recent years.

Violations of committee seniority in selecting committee chairmanship continue to be few and far between, but they have increased. The 1950s saw only one such violation, and the 1960s another, while the 1970s saw three violations, all in 1975. Additionally, two other chairmen, Wilbur Mills and Wayne Hays, would undoubtedly have been dethroned had they not resigned in the wake of personal scandal.

A more sensitive indicator is the number of violations of committee seniority in the selection of subcommittee chairmen, a time series not collected by Polsby. Thomas R. Wolanin has shown that the incidence of such violations decreased

[9] Joseph Cooper and William West, "The Congressional Career in the 1970s" in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered,* 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1981), pp. 83–106; and John R. Hibbing, "Voluntary Retirement from the U.S. House: The Costs of Congressional Service," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1 (February 1982): 57–74.

[10] T. Richard Witmer, "The Aging of the House," *Political Science Quarterly* 79 (December 1964): 537.

[11] Polsby, "Institutionalization," p. 145.

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TABLE 1

*Violations of Committee Seniority in House Subcommittee Chairmanships, 86th to 96th Congresses*

| Congress | Seniority Violations* | | Total Subcommittees** |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Compensated | Uncompensated | |
| 86 | 3 | 8 | 114 |
| 87 | 4 | 7 | 123 |
| 88 | 7 | 12 | 120 |
| 89 | 6 | 8 | 125 |
| 90 | 5 | 6 | 135 |
| 91 | 7 | 3 | 131 |
| | *Democratic Caucus Rules Changes* | | |
| 92 | 25 | 3 | 120 |
| 93 | 24 | 6 | 125 |
| 94 | 32 | 8 | 142 |
| 95 | 38 | 5 | 138 |
| 96 | 43 | 11 | 139 |

* A violation was counted for each chairmanship given which involved bypassing a more senior member. If a senior member was skipped for more than one chairmanship, he or she was counted only once. If a violation involved bypassing several members, some compensated and others not, it was considered an uncompensated violation.

** Includes all standing, temporary, and ad hoc subcommittees of all standing committees, except Budget Committee Task Forces.

Source: Subcommittee chairmanships and memberships in *Congressional Quarterly Almanac.*

steadily from the 80th through the 91st Congresses.[12] In analyzing the same period, Jack A. Goldstone borrowed the concept of "compensation" from another Polsby article. A member is said to be compensated if he was denied a subcommittee chairmanship due him under seniority, but was given the chairmanship of a different committee or subcommittee. With allowances for compensation, Goldstone found that 11 House committees followed the norm of committee seniority 100 percent of the time, and three others adhered to this norm between 94.1 and 96.5 percent of the time, when a change was made in subcommittee chairmen. The remaining three followed the norm of subcommittee seniority 100 percent of the time.[13]

This system was greatly affected by a Democratic caucus rule adopted just prior to the 92nd Congress, which limited each member to the chairmanship of

[12] Thomas R. Wolanin, "Committee Seniority and the Choice of House Subcommittee Chairmen: 80th-91st Congresses," *Journal of Politics* 36 (August 1974): 687-702.

[13] Jack A. Goldstone, "Subcommittee Chairmanships in the House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review* 69 (September 1975): 970-71. Goldstone analyzed only 17 committees because Rules and Ways and Means generally did not have subcommittees during this period. This concept of compensation is developed in Nelson W. Polsby, Miriam Gallaher, and Barry Spencer Rundquist, "The Growth of the Seniority System in the U.S. House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review* 63 (September 1969): 787-807.

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TABLE 2
*Tenure of House Standing Committee and Subcommittee Chairmen, 86th to 96th Congresses*

| Congress | *10 + Terms (N)* | *5 to 9 Terms (N)* | *1 to 4 Terms (N)* | *Total Chairmen (N)* | *Median Tenure (terms)* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 86 | 36 | 51 | 14 | 101 | 7.9 |
| 87 | 40 | 55 | 11 | 106 | 8.1 |
| 88 | 39 | 51 | 12 | 102 | 8.3 |
| 89 | 45 | 45 | 12 | 102 | 8.8 |
| 90 | 48 | 47 | 16 | 111 | 8.3 |
| 91 | 46 | 53 | 9 | 108 | 8.7 |
| 92 | 49 | 52 | 11 | 112 | 8.9 |
| 93 | 50 | 61 | 13 | 124 | 7.9 |
| 94 | 44 | 65 | 26 | 135 | 7.8 |
| 95 | 43 | 60 | 35 | 138 | 7.3 |
| 96 | 39 | 58 | 42 | 139 | 6.9 |

Sources: chairmanships from *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*; tenure from *Congressional Directory*.

one legislative subcommittee. In addition to dispersing power, this change had the immediate effect of institutionalizing the practice of compensation: while seven seniority violations were compensated in the 91st Congress, fully 25 were compensated in the 92nd. Beginnning in 1975, subcommittees were given the right to select their own chairmen (this had previously been left to the discretion of the committee chairmen), and Appropriations subcommittee chairmen were made subject to caucus approval. Uncompensated violations of seniority have been more frequent since the changes, rising from a low of three in the 92nd Congress to 11 in the 96th (Table 1). Taken in tandem with membership turnover and the increasing number of subcommittees, the rules changes have reduced the median waiting period for a chairmanship by about two terms since 1971 (Table 2).

Another aspect of automatic decision-making not treated by Polsby is the norm of deference to committee expertise on the floor. Although systematic data are unavailable, it is clear that the rejection of rules and the adoption of amendments to tax bills are on the increase. The number of appropriations amendments presented on the floor has been rising dramatically, from only 26 in 1965 to over 100 per year since 1974. Since the latter year, roughly half have succeeded![14] This is a far cry from the not-so-distant past when attempts to re-

[14] U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Committees, *Final Report of the Select Committee on Committees* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 86. Fenno's statistics on the appropriations for 36 bureaus, eight departments, and public works show a steady decline in both the proposal and passage of floor amendments to spending bills from 1947 to 1962. The modern low point may well have been in 1962, when Fenno counted only seven such amend-

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write money bills on the floor were greeted with scorn. Let us now move from the floor to the committee room to look more closely at the organizational evolution of the House.

## The Increase of House Committees

The bulk of Polsby's article is devoted to the growth in the organizational complexity of the House since its rather freewheeling beginnings. In Polsby's scheme, as an organization institutionalizes, "its functions are internally separated on some regular and explicit basis, its parts are not wholly interchangeable, and for at least some important purposes, its parts are interdependent. There is a division of labor in which roles are specified."[15] He sees the growth in internal complexity reflected "in the growth in the autonomy and importance of committees, in the growth of specialized agencies of party leadership, and in the general increase in the provision of various emoluments and auxiliary aids to members in the form of office space, salaries, allowances, staff aid and committee staffs."[16] The role of the party leadership is an important enough topic to warrant an extended discussion, and thus, the committee system and support services shall be examined first.

The relationship between complexity and institutionalization is a complex one, both descriptively and analytically. As Polsby notes, the number of committees is a troublesome indicator, because the streamlining of the committee system in 1946 had the effect of rationalizing jurisdictions and consolidating policy responsibilities.[17] Since 1946, the number of standing committees has crept gradually upward from 19 to the current total of 22. However, the total number of committee *seats* has increased more sharply, from 484 to 765. The number of standing subcommittees shows a somewhat irregular increase from a postwar low of 69 in the 82nd Congress to 146 in the 96th.[18] This compares to a total of 46 standing committees and 97 standing subcommittees on the eve of the reforms of the 79th Congress.[19] Thus, there are considerably more permanent jurisdictional entities in the House today (168) than in the days before the postwar consolidation (143).

The proliferation of subcommittees has had a severely negative impact on many aspects of House life, as detailed in the recent report of the Patterson Committee:

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ments offered and only one actually passed. Richard F. Fenno, *The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1966), pp. 451–52.

[15] Polsby, "Institutionalization."

[16] Ibid., p. 153.

[17] Ibid.

[18] U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Committees, *Final Report*, pp. 114, 499–508.

[19] Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, *Organization of Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1945), part 4, pp. 1041–43.

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> Specialization—traditionally an element of strength to the House—has been eroded as members juggle more and more committee and subcommittee assignments.
>
> Participation in subcommittee activities by members has suffered in the face of multiple assignments and the growing frequency of scheduling conflicts.
>
> The consideration of policy issues at the subcommittee level has increasingly been limited to the chairman and one or two colleagues, thereby denying the House the broader spectrum of experience required for sound legislation and effective oversight.
>
> The conflict resolution function of subcommittees has also been weakened as a result of this reduced rate of attendance and participation, a fact which is reflected in the growing number of amendments being offered to legistation after bills have been reported.
>
> Duplication of effort and jurisdictional overlap have been encouraged as the number and independence of subcommittees have grown, thereby fragmenting the policy process and handicapping the development of coherent, integrated public policy. . . .
>
> As their assignments have increased, members' time and attention have been stretched beyond the competence of even the most conscientious to manage effectively the work of their committees and subcommittees, requiring them to delegate more and more responsibility to committee and personal staff assistants.[20]

Clearly, there is an indication here that organizational complexity has reached such an excess in the House as to have become dysfunctional. The Obey Commission's data on meeting conflicts highlight this problem. From January to May 1977, on days when the House was in session, an average of 33.5 committee and subcommittee meetings were held *per day*. Thus, it is not surprising that on the average day, 38 percent of the congressmen had at least one meeting conflict. This proportion rose to 55 percent during the Tuesday-to-Thursday heart of the congressional work week, and to a staggering 91 percent during the ten busiest days of the session. Indeed, the schedule was so heavy during that same period that an average of 16.7 committee and subcommittee meetings *per day* were conducted during floor sessions.[21]

The members are very distracted by this constant shuttling back and forth from the committee room to the office to the floor several times a day, and the problem is getting progressively worse. Between 1956 and 1976, there was a doubling in the number of committee assignments, committee meetings, and hours the House was in session; at tripling of the number of quorum calls; and an eightfold increase in the number of record votes.[22]

[20] U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Committees, *Final Report*, pp. 304–05.

[21] U.S. House of Representatives, Commission on Administrative Review, *Administrative Reorganization and Legislative Management* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), vol. 2, pp. 28–30. See also Thomas J. O'Donnell, "Controlling Legislative Time" in Joseph Cooper and G. Calvin Mackenzie, eds., *The House at Work* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), pp. 127–50.

[22] Bibby et al., *Statistics*, pp. 60, 86; U.S. House of Representatives, Commission on Administrative Review, *Scheduling the Work of the House* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 26. The number of record votes, which reached an all-time high of 1,540 in the 95th Congress, dropped sharply to 1,276 in the 96th; see *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 20 Decem-

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With the vast increase in the congressional workload, members have become increasingly dependent on staff assistance to keep abreast of their responsibilities. Of course, one could also argue that the ready availability of staff resources has encouraged the generation of more legislative activity than would otherwise be possible. Whichever is the case, the contemporary correlation between staff and workload is indisputable. The number of committee employees rose from 193 in 1947 to 912 in 1973, and then doubled again to 1,959 in 1979 after the 1974 "Subcommittee Bill of Rights" guaranteeing that subcommittee chairmen would have access to their own staff resources.[23] Member staffs have grown apace, the maximum allotment per congressman increasing from five in 1946 to the current limit of 22 enacted in 1979.[24]

Fitting this exploding support system into the three House office buildings has led to a serious deterioration in working conditions. The feeling that "people don't work as efficiently as they could because they are too crowded" was cited as a "major problem" by 64 percent of the administrative assistants interviewed by the Obey Commission in 1977. "Sometimes our office gets so noisy that it's almost impossible to get anything done" was a description accorded "major problem" status by 56 percent. In such a work environment, a high degree of discontent is hardly surprising; the average House office has a staff turnover of 57 percent every two years.[25]

One way to reduce overcrowding is to farm out staff people to district offices. This solution has found increasing favor in recent years with the growth in constituent service activity among the younger members.[26] In fact, the number of staff members employed in Washington actually peaked in 1976 at a total of 6,828 and has since declined to 6,190 as of 1979. The number of district-based member employees, on the other hand, rose from 1,035 to 2,477 between 1970

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ber 1980, p. 3595. It is unclear what this signifies, although it may suggest the existence of a systemic limit on the capacity of the House to process the legislative workload.

[23] U.S. House of Representatives, Commission on Administrative Review, *Administrative Reorganization and Legislative Management* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), vol. 2, p. 43; Bibby et al., *Statistics*, p. 70.

[24] U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Committees, *Final Report*, p. 539.

[25] U.S. House of Representatives, Commission on Administrative Review, *Final Report of the Commission on Administrative Review* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), vol. 2, pp. 1044-46; *Administrative Reorganization and Legislative Management*, vol. 2, p. 99.

[26] As of 1978, the mean number of district employees was 2.7 for members elected prior to 1950, 3.9 for those elected from 1950 to 1958, 4.9 for those elected from 1960 to 1968, and 5.9 for those elected from 1970 to 1976; see Laurily Keir Epstein and Kathleen A. Frankovic, "Representatives and Their Constituents: The New Machine Politics," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 31 August-3 September 1979. See also Thomas E. Cavanagh, "Rational Allocation of Congressional Resources: Member Time and Staff Use in the House" in Douglas W. Rae and Theodore J. Eismeier, eds., *Public Policy and Public Choice* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979), pp. 209-47, and Morris P. Fiorina, *Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977).

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and 1979, and shows no sign of leveling off.[27] While this may help to expedite casework, it also results in a field operation which is largely free from the supervision of the Washington office, creating problems of staff coordination.

In sum, just as there has been a "swelling of the Presidency" in recent years,[28] so can one speak of a "swelling of the House." The most comprehensive way to guage this expansion is to note the awesome 1600 percent increase in total House expenditures since 1949 (Figure 2). As the House has grown more organizationally complex, it has become increasingly unmanageable. Policymaking is fragmented, the members are unable to handle their workload, and the staff has literally outrun the physical capacity of the office space available on Capitol Hill. Party leadership would appear to be the logical instrument for reimposing order on this institutional chaos.

## The Role of Party Leadership

One of the more remarkable trends of the twentieth-century House has been the isolation of the party leadership structure from the committee structure. During the heyday of party hegemony, the Speaker could control the floor agenda specifically through his chairmanship of the Rules Committee, and the policy process in general through his power to appoint chairmen and members of committees. The chairman of the Ways and Means Committee often doubled as the majority leader, further centralizing control over the House. This system was demolished in the decade following the revolt against "Uncle Joe" Cannon, which was at least partially sparked by his repeated violations of seniority well after his accession to the speakership.[29]

The norm of seniority owes much to the increasing longevity of House service, dating from the late nineteenth century. In a House where more than half the members were freshmen, and thus largely unfamiliar with both the substantive and procedural aspects of legislation, deference to the power of the Speaker was a workable solution to the problem of keeping the House functioning from year to year. As congressional careers became more predictable, however, there was a concomitant increase in member expectations concerning the internal distribution of influence. Therefore, as mean tenure increased, the proportion of committee chairmanships assigned in violation of seniority declined sharply. (In the period from the 50th through the 96th Congresses, if y is the percentage of

[27] U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Committees, *Final Report*, p. 540; Arthur G. Stevens, Jr., Daniel P. Mulhollan, and Paul S. Rundquist, "Congressional Structure and Representation," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 28–31 August 1980, p. 4.

[28] The "swelling of the Presidency" is discussed in Thomas E. Cronin, *The State of the Presidency* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1975), pp. 117–52.

[29] Polsby, Gallaher, and Rundquist, "Growth of Seniority System."

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FIGURE 2
*House Expenditures, 1949–1979*




**Sources of data:** U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on House Administration, *Studies Dealing With Budgetary, Staffing and Administrative Activities of the U.S. House of Representatives* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 15; John F. Bibby, Thomas E. Mann, and Norman J. Ornstein, *Vital Statistics on Congress, 1980* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), p. 77.

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chairmanships involving seniority violations, and x is the average number of terms served,[30] then $\hat{y} = 84.4 - 15.5\ x$.)

By the early 1920s, the Democrats on the Ways and Means Committee had gained control over the party's committee appointments. They used it to perpetuate a norm of seniority in committee leadership positions, with scant regard paid to party loyalty. Because the safest seats were in conservative southern districts, the committee leaders selected under this system were at times highly unresponsive to the party leadership and rank-and-file—"Judge" Howard Smith of Rules being the outstanding example. The Speaker had already lost the chairmanship of the Rules Committee following the revolt of 1910, and the majority leadership was separated from the Ways and Means chairmanship shortly thereafter. In short, well before the Democrats regained majority status in 1930, the career paths and identities of party leaders had become distinct from those of the committee leaders in the House.

With few institutional resources at their disposal, the party leaders fell back on the expedient of increasing the *size* of committees, thereby satisfying member demands for influence over policy while creating more chips to use in bargaining for the support of the rank-and-file.[31] Another strategy was to encourage the creation of additional subcommittees, thus opening up chairmanships for the pool of restive northern liberals who had been accumulating seniority since the New Deal. The proliferation of special, select, and ad hoc committees served the same purpose.

Nonetheless, there were severe morale problems among the younger Democrats. Access to additional committee assignments and even subcommittee chairmanships was of little value as long as power was effectively concentrated among the superannuated olilgarchy of committee chairmen. The influx of new members during the early 1970s provided the critical mass necessary to reorient the decision-making criteria which had thwarted the power and policy aspirations of liberal party loyalists for several decades.

The 1970s were thus marked by two major changes in the distribution of influence: a recentralization of control over personnel and procedure in the Democratic leadership and caucus, and a decentralization of control over policy activities in subcommittees. Currently, the Speaker appoints the majority members of the Rules Committee and chairs the Steering and Policy Committee, which acts as the Democrats' committee on committees. Its decisions are subject to the consent of the caucus which has also obtained the authority to bind the votes of party members of the Rules Committee. At the same time, subcommit-

[30] The data for mean terms were taken from Polsby, "Institutionalization," p. 146, and supplemented with calculations from the *Congressional Directory*. The raw data on seniority violations in Polsby, Gallaher, and Rundquist, "Growth of Seniority System," p. 792, were converted to percentages. There was one violation (4.8 percent) in the 90th Congress, and three (13.6 percent) in the 94th. The $r^2$ for the regression is .634.

[31] Louis P. Westefield, "Majority Party Leadership and the Committee System in the House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review* 68 (December 1974): 1593–1604.

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tees have been given substantial autonomy through the provisions for electing their own chairmen, regularizing jurisdictions within committees, and authorizing their chairmen to call meetings and hire staff.[32]

While this confluence of trends may seem contradictory, it in fact represents a top-and-bottom pincers movement intended to erode the power of the committee chairmen. Indeed, it can be seen as a kind of tacit bargain between the party leadership and the younger members offering increased leadership control over the party's organizational affairs in return for increased rank-and-file opportunities for policy entrepreneurship. In the process, the committee system that was the institutional bulwark of the House for most of this century has come unstuck.

What had given the committee system a semblance of coherence was the integrative role played by the three control committees. Ways and Means controlled taxation and committee personnel, Appropriations controlled spending, and Rules controlled access to the floor. All three committees have lost clout without any comparable control mechanisms replacing them. The Rules Committee has been subordinated from an autonomous "traffic cop" to an arm of the leadership. The Appropriations Committee has trouble fighting off amendments on the floor and must obtain caucus approval for its subcommittee chairmen. Most dramatically, Ways and Means has lost control over committee assignments, expanded from 25 to 37 members, and has been forced to divide into subcommittees. The potential emergence of the new Budget Committee as an autonomous power center has been crippled by the provisions enforcing rotation of membership and the selection of much of its membership from the two money committees as well as the Steering and Policy Committee.

On balance, these arrangements have increased the influence of both the party leadership and the less senior members, but for the House as a whole, they have resulted in a net dispersion of power and a creeping paralysis of the policy process. The rules opening committee and subcommittee sessions to the public have been of most benefit to interest group lobbyists, the only constituency with a consistent interest in the proceedings. This new arena of accountability has merely compounded the existing centrifugal tendencies.

## Conclusion

Reviewing our findings, it appears that the process of institutionalization in the House is a good deal more intricate than it appeared at the time of Polsby's article. The indicators for boundedness and automatic decision-making show a similar pattern, namely, a marked increase throughout most of the twentieth century, until a reversal began in the early 1970s. The rate of increase in the

[32] There is an excellent discussion of the recent development of the subcommittee system in Steven H. Haeberle, "The Institutionalization of the Subcommittee in the United States House of Representatives," *Journal of Politics* 40 (November 1978): 1054–65.

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House's organizational complexity, on the other hand, has accelerated during the past decade, promoting fragmentation rather than improving the division of labor.

This environment was the setting for a major realignment of power among the competing functional units within an increasingly complex House. The committee system's gerontocracy gave way to a system in which power was more equally shared with the party leadership, subcommittee chairmen, and rank-and-file members. The complexity of the House *per se* was less important to the outcome of this struggle than the shifts in the decision-making criteria apportioning influence within and among the House's constituent units. The proliferation of subcommittees was of little import until they were granted a measure of autonomy from committees. The increased membership turnover of the 1970s hastened this development, as well as eroding the seniority norm in the selection of committee and subcommittee chairmen.

A reformulation of Polsby's model suggests that the early 1970s marked a major turning point in the institutionalization of the House. Prior to this watershed, the key organizational characteristic of the House now appears to have been the relative autonomy of the committee leadership from other power centers, rather than the overall complexity of the House as an organization. On this basis, all of the politically salient characteristics of the House appear to be receding from the model of the institutionalized House presented in Polsby's article. During the coming decade, it should become apparent whether the current trend represents a temporary aberration or more lasting change in the structural framework of the House.*

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Dirksen Center Conference, "Understanding Congressional Leadership: The State of the Art," at Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C., 10–11 June 1980.

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# Support for Organized Labor in the House of Representatives: The 89th and 95th Congresses

MARCUS D. POHLMANN
GEORGE S. CRISCI

In the 1976 elections for the U.S. House of Representatives, organized labor contributed over $5 million and an average of 69 percent of its vote to Democratic candidates.[1] Of the 292 Democrats who were elected, 251 of them had received the endorsement of the AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Education (COPE).[2] Consequently, this support of elected congressional candidates, coupled with the election of a Democratic president who also owed much to labor,[3] created a situation similar to that of the 89th Congress, labeled by the AFL-CIO's Executive Council as "the most progressive Congress in history."[4]

[1] See Harrison H. Donnelly, "Campaign Spending: New Record Set in 1976," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 36 (21 January 1978), p. 119; and "GOP Not Likely to Control the House," *The Gallup Opinion Index* (September 1976), p. 11.

[2] See Mary Eisner Eccles, "Labor Fares Well in House," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 34 (6 November 1976): 3136-44. For further discussion of the relationship between organized labor and the Democratic Party, see J. David Greenstone, *Labor in American Politics* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1977), and Laura B. Weiss, "Tough Election Fights Forced Some Members to Moderate Their Stands," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 37 (2 June 1979): 1065-66.

[3] For example, labor members gave 63 percent of their votes to Carter, almost 13 percent over his national total. See George H. Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1972-1977* (Wilmington, Del.: American Institute of Public Opinion, 1978), p. 910.

[4] AFL-CIO Department of Legislation, *Labor Looks at the 89th Congress* 77H (Washington, D.C.: AFL-CIO, November 1966), p. 2.

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At that time, there was a Democrat in the White House and 295 Democrats in the House of Representatives. By analogy, labor should have been in an excellent position to garner desired legislation from the 95th Congress.

In February 1977, the AFL-CIO's Executive Council released its five major policy goals for the 95th Congress.[5] At the end of March, however, a series of events occurring within a three-day period had laid three of these goals to rest. First, on March 23, the Common-Site Picketing Bill was defeated in the House. More disturbing than the loss itself was that it had been passed by a comfortable margin during the less promising 94th Congress, and that its failure in the 95th removed a second more controversial goal, the repeal of Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, from any realistic consideration. Later that same week, President Carter announced a proposal to raise the minimum wage from $2.30 to $2.50 per hour, rather than the $3.00 demanded by the AFL-CIO.[6] All of this led House Majority Leader Jim Wright (D-Tex.) to the conclusion that, "Labor is going to have to make an awfully convincing case to get anything else through, both with Congress and the public."[7]

This article will focus on whether and in what way population shifts, changes in representatives' ideologies, partisanship, and presidential support, and the election of "New Democrats" have combined to undermine labor's support in the U.S. House of Representatives. Support for organized labor is measured by a "Labor Legislation Support" Score (LLS), which is the percentage that an individual Representative supported the labor position in certain key votes.

## Labor Legislation in the 89th and 95th Congresses: A Comparison

Table 1 demonstrates that labor was less able to pass key legislation in the 95th Congress than in the 89th. Actually, the table understates the decline, for both defeats suffered in the 89th Congress were subsequently reversed via House-

TABLE 1

*Success of Labor in Passing Legislation: 89th and 95th Congresses**

| *Congress* | *Successful* | *Unsuccessful* |
|---|---|---|
| 89th | 83.3% | 16.7% |
| | (10) | (2) |
| 95th | 73.5% | 26.5% |
| | (36) | (13) |

* Labor Legislation Support Score (LLS) votes only.

Source: Consolidated from *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* 1965, 1966, 1977, and 1978.

[5] "Meany Draws Shopping List," *Time*, 7 March 1977, pp. 43-44.

[6] Also, later in 1977, attempts to index the minimum wage by establishing it at 53 percent of average hourly earnings in manufacturing was rejected by the House.

[7] "Union's Sweet Hopes Turn Sour," *U.S. News and World Report*, 11 April 1977, p. 93.

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TABLE 2

*Pearson-r Correlation Matrices for the Labor Legislation Support (LLS), Liberalism (Lib.), Party Unity (P.U.), and Presidential Support Scores (P.S.) of Democrats in the 89th and 95th Congresses*

| | *Labor Legislation Support* | *Liberalism* | *Party Unity* | *Presidential Support* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *89TH CONGRESS* | | | | |
| Labor Legislation Support | - | - | - | - |
| Liberalism | .9271 | - | - | - |
| Party Unity | .9053 | .9132 | - | - |
| Presidential Support | .8894 | .8959 | .9895 | - |
| *95TH CONGRESS* | | | | |
| Labor Legislation Support | - | - | - | - |
| Liberalism | .7706 | - | - | - |
| Party Unity | .8980 | .8342 | - | - |
| Presidential Support | .8288 | .8460 | .9309 | - |

Source: Consolidated from *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, 1966 and 1978.

Senate conference committees. In other words, organized labor did not lose a single key vote in the 89th Congress. It is possible, of course, that labor leaders were simply more ambitious in the 95th; it is assumed, however, that a significant degree of realism is incorporated into labor's yearly legislative goals, if for no other reason than to rationalize a string of "losses" to rank and file. Why, then, was labor losing support?

### *Democratic Support*

Table 2 indicates that in both Congresses, Democratic support of organized labor was closely related to a legislator's degree of liberalism, party unity, and presidential support. The more liberal, loyal to party, and supportive of the party's president a Democratic legislator was, the more likely he or she was to vote with labor. Between 59 and 98 percent of the variation in LLS scores can be statistically explained by variation in one of the other three variables. Yet there are some differences between the two Congresses which deserve mention.

Support for labor, liberal issues, the Democratic Party, and Lyndon Johnson seems to have meant virtually the same thing in the 89th as it did in the 95th Congress. Focusing on the shifts occurring between the 89th and the 95th, however, a number of possible explanations arise. Loyalty to the Democratic Party continued to be a very good predictor of labor support, but liberalism became a noticeably less reliable indicator of party unity, presidential support, and especially, labor support. In part, this might have reflected a sense among liberals that the Democratic Party and its president had moved to the right ideologically. It may also reflect that "liberalism" had come to encompass far more than economic issues and included a variety of social and international issues,

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such as crime, civil rights, morality, and the peace movement.[8] Thus it was more likely that a congressperson's support of liberal labor-economic legislation would not relate as directly to his or her support of all other "liberal" issues. Lastly, where support for the president meant virtually the same thing as support for the Democratic Party in the 89th Congress, this was not as true in the 95th.[9] This may be so because Jimmy Carter lacked Lyndon Johnson's leadership abilities and congressional "connections," was not elected with anywhere near the same "coattails" Johnson enjoyed,[10] and also faced a more independently-oriented Congress. Consequently, given that party unity remained the most consistent indicator of labor support and that the correlation between presidential support and party unity declined, it was predictable that the relationship between presidential support and labor support would become weaker as well.

Nonetheless, despite these marginal shifts, the primary relationships remained. Labor support, based predominantly in the Democratic party, was quite closely linked to Democratic liberalism, party unity, and presidential support (for further verification, see Tables 3 and 4 below). Thus, given that each of these indices declined between the 89th and the 95th,[11] it is not too surprising to find that labor's success in Congress declined as well.

The last three relationships do not hold quite as neatly. Population shifts to the suburbs and the Sunbelt, as well as an increasing number of "New Democrats," were not as directly associated with decline in labor's congressional support. Losses in one category or sub-category seem to have been counterbalanced by gains elsewhere.

### *Decline in Support: Suburbanization, Population Shifts, and the "New Democrats"*

Table 3 indicates that labor support had declined in the suburbs at a time when the number of suburban districts had been growing considerably. Nevertheless, the suburbs were gaining districts at the expense of both the urban and rural areas, and although the suburban averages were slighty lower than the urban ones, they were far higher than the rural averages. Thus, the population shift

[8] For example, see Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg, *The Real Majority* (East Rutherford, N.J.: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1970).

[9] For example, see "Voting Support for Carter Remained Low During 1978 for Democratic President," *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* 34 (1978): 22-26; and Warren Moxley, "President vs. Congress: Carter's Troubles With Hill Reflect Historic Institutional Power Struggle," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 36 (28 January 1978), p. 236.

[10] For example, Carter carried only 220 congressional districts in 1976, compared with 292 for the House Democrats. Only 22 of the 292 Democrats received a smaller share of the vote than Carter, and only three trailed by 10 percent or more. Carter carried only 72 districts by a total of 60 percent of the vote, compared to the 208 representatives who accomplished that.

[11] Mean ADA scores dropped from 58.5 to 49.2; mean Party Unity scores from 78.6 to 72.9; and mean Presidential Support scores from 81.8 to 69.5.

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TABLE 3

*A Comparison of Average LLS Scores by Congress, Party, Section, Residence and Tenure of Representatives*

| | | *DEMOCRATS* | | | | *REPUBLICANS* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Snowbelt* | | *Sunbelt* | | *Snowbelt* | | *Sunbelt* |
| *Congress* | *Residence* | *New*[1] | *Old*[2] | *New* | *Old* | *New* | *Old* | *Total* |
| 89th | Urban | 96.5 (19) | 97.6 (49) | 71.8 (17) | 53.8 (15) | | | |
| | Suburban | 95.4 (11) | 99.2 (12) | 92.6 (5) | 80.0 (5) | 18.4 (8) | 31.6 (19) | |
| | Rural | 91.1 (35) | 85.7 (29) | 54.4 (18) | 27.4 (69) | 14.3* (65) | | 8.0** (36) |
| 95th | Urban | 89.5 (22) | 97.0 (34) | 75.7 (13) | 64.2 (31) | | | |
| | Suburban | 87.4 (37) | 91.6 (25) | 67.2 (13) | 74.8 (20) | 27.2 (15) | 17.4 (16) | |
| | Rural | 83.6 (22) | 81.4 (19) | 37.2 (21) | 40.2 (30) | 23.8* (46) | | 9.0** (51) |

* Figure includes all rural Republicans in the Snowbelt.

** Figure includes all Republicans in the Sunbelt.

[1] New: representative has served one or two terms.

[2] Old: representative has served more than two terms.

Sources: *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, 1965 and 1966; *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 1977 and 1978.

from the cities to the suburbs is seen to have corresponded to a slight decline in overall labor support. The gains in suburban districts at the expense of rural areas seems to have compensated for that loss.

As for the shift from the Snowbelt to the Sunbelt, it is too early to tell what ramifications this will have on labor support. Only nine seats had shifted to the Sunbelt between the 89th and 95th Congresses. Nevertheless, should the trend continue, labor could lose support in the process, for it is clear that the support scores of Sunbelt representatives have been well below those of their Snowbelt counterparts. The industrialization and urbanization of the South, however, along with the influx of northerners into the Sunbelt, are also likely to moderate traditional Sunbelt opposition to labor legislation.

Table 3 also indicates that "New Democrats" are less supportive of labor than their "older" colleagues, but even this distinction is somewhat blurred.[12] Newly elected Snowbelt Democrats were less supportive of labor in both the 95th and the 89th, while more recent arrivals from the Sunbelt tended to be more supportive in both congresses. In addition, by the 95th Congress, the distinction between the support scores of "new" and "old" Democrats had diminished among all but those representing Snowbelt cities. Lastly, the continued proliferation of these "new breed" representatives in both parties would appear to foreshadow problems for labor among "metropolitan"—urban and suburban—Democrats and rural Republicans in the Snowbelt, and suburban Democrats and rural Republicans in the Sunbelt. Yet these potential losses might well be offset by gains among traditionally less supportive groups, such as suburban Republicans in the Snowbelt and urban Democrats in the Sunbelt. Overall, then, the "young Turks" were voting more like their "elder" colleagues by the 95th, and any losses attributable to their ascendance in some places seemed to be counterbalanced by comparable gains in others.

Table 4 represents an attempt to summarize certain demographic characteristics of labor support, and to compare the support hierarchies of the two Congresses. Although the Democratic Party remained labor's bastion of support, there appeared to be some moderation of both Democratic support and Republican opposition. Labor support remained stronger in the Snowbelt, but there was also erosion here, offset by moderation in the Sunbelt. Not too surprisingly, metropolitan areas were more likely to spawn labor-supporting representatives than were their rural counterparts.

Overall, then, suburbanization, population shifts to the Sunbelt, and the increase in "New Democrats" did not seem to alter severely average labor support scores. Labor lost ground among old suburban and new Sunbelt Democrats, suburban and rural Sunbelt Democrats (particularly newer ones), urban Sunbelt Republicans, and old suburban Snowbelt Republicans. All of these were groups

[12] It should be remembered that a major reason for their more "moderate" voting records may well have been that many represented what had been traditionally Republican areas by having appealed to moderate Republicans and Independents. For example, see "Rapid Decline in Political Clout," *Time*, 11 April 1977, p. 55.

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TABLE 4
*A Comparison of Demographic Support Groups Across Congresses*

| *Ranking* | *89TH CONGRESS* | *95TH CONGRESS* |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Metropolitan Snowbelt Democrats | "Old" metropolitan Snowbelt Democrats |
| 2 | Rural Snowbelt Democrats | "New" Snowbelt Democrats |
| 3 | Suburban Sunbelt Democrats | "Old" rural Snowbelt Democrats |
| 4 | Urban Sunbelt Democrats | Metropolitan Sunbelt Democrats |
| 5 | Urban Snowbelt Republicans | Urban Snowbelt Republicans |
| 6 | Rural Sunbelt Democrats | Rural Sunbelt Democrats |
| 7 | Suburban Snowbelt Republicans | Suburban Snowbelt Republicans |
| 8 | Urban Sunbelt Republicans | Rural Snowbelt Republicans |
| 9 | Rural Snowbelt Republicans | Urban Sunbelt Republicans |
| 10 | Suburban/rural Sunbelt Republicans | Suburban/rural Sunbelt Republicans |

whose number of congressional seats was increasing. Nevertheless, labor support improved among urban Sunbelt Democrats, and old rural and urban, as well as new, Snowbelt Republicans. Thus, the end result of all these shifts indicates labor making slight gains among Sunbelt and Snowbelt Republicans, and these gains seem to have offset slight losses in the suburbs and among new Democrats in the Snowbelt.

## The Decline of Congressional Labor Support

Yet when all of the evidence is weighed, there is a paradox. Labor support continued to be closely tied to the strength of liberalism, party unity, and presidential support in the Democratic Party; and as these all declined, labor lost more votes in the 95th than they had in the 89th Congress. More difficult to explain is the apparently contradictory finding that average labor support scores and the number of pro-labor representatives changed very little, and if anything, they increased slightly.

This anomaly may be explained by introducing medians and standard deviations (see Table 5). First, labor support in the 89th Congress was statistically

TABLE 5
*A Comparison of the Mean, Median, and Standard Deviation of LLS Scores by Party and Congress*

| | *Democrats* | | | *Republicans* | | | *Total (HOUSE)* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Congress* | *Mean* | *Median* | *Standard Deviation* | *Mean* | *Median* | *Standard Deviation* | *Mean* | *Median* | *Standard Deviation* |
| 89th | 71.3 (290) | 95.2 | 43.5 | 17.9 (139) | 7.0 | 24.6 | 54.0 (429) | 61.0 | 46.2 |
| 95th | 75.2 (287) | 88.3 | 28.5 | 19.4 (146) | 9.9 | 21.6 | 56.3 (433) | 66.1 | 37.3 |

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FIGURE 1
*Distribution of LLS Scores by Party and Congress*




"skewed" because of the votes of some extreme anti-labor Democrats, mostly from the Sunbelt. Thus, the averages were deceivingly low, and moderation within this anti-labor group in the 95th Congress (as indicated by the smaller standard deviation) may well have contributed to the slight increases in those averages. There was also some erosion among labor supporters in the 95th Congress, and this may be seen in the simultaneous decline in median support scores among Democrats. Yet, although the total median score actually increased, this too is deceiving.

Figure 1 graphically demonstrates the change in the standard deviations among Democrats cited in Table 5. There was a clear moderation of both support and opposition, and this is reflected in notably smaller standard deviations and in the visible shift of representatives away from the two polar extremes and towards the middle. Indeed, the total mean and median did shift slightly to the right—towards more labor support. This occurred, however, within a larger trend towards moderation of position, and it represents a greater decline in opposition rather than an increase in support.

Consequently, what may well have happened was that labor began losing the close votes and particularly the more controversial ones, because its base of "solid support" had shrunk, and possibly because more labor support was coming on less controversial bills which would have passed.

Figure 2 lends support to this conclusion, for a congressperson was not really certain to be a Common Situs supporter unless he or she had an LLS score of 85

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FIGURE 2
*Labor Support on the Final Common Situs Vote by LLS Score*




percent or more. Thus, as the number of such staunch supporters declines, labor would seem to have a good bit to worry about.

Yet, if there is a bright spot in all if this gloom, it is that without court-ordered redistricting, the problem might have been worse. Before redistricting, the rural districts had a clear advantage. Of the 435 districts, 203 were rural. Of those 203, a total of 84 had populations that were more than 10 percent lower than the average district population of their state, while only 28 had populations that were 10 percent above the state average.[13] Fortunately for labor, these malapportioned, predominantly rural districts were eliminated, and greater representation was given to metropolitan areas—areas that were more supportive. If redistricting had not occurred, the situation could have proven disastrous for labor.

## Conclusion

The primary findings are that: (1) The proliferation of "New Democrats," suburban districts, and Sunbelt districts did not neatly relate to labor support, due to a variety of intermediary phenomena. (2) Labor support did continue to be closely tied to the strength of liberalism, party unity, and presidential support in the congressional Democratic Party. (3) Liberalism, party unity, and presidential support all declined among House Democrats, and labor lost far more key votes in the 95th Congress, even though the average labor support scores and

[13] Congressional Quarterly, Inc., *Congressional Districts of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1964), pp. 1787–98..

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the number of "pro-labor" representatives changed very little. (4) The apparent paradox of this change can be explained by looking at the distribution of labor support. Both the mean and median support scores mask an underlying moderation of extreme support and opposition, and this moderation seemed to cause labor to lose close votes, particularly the more controversial ones. Labor's solid support had shrunk, and more of its support was apparently directed toward less controversial bills that were destined to pass from the outset.

Yet, while the present condition of congressional support may be a source of great concern for organized labor, there may be even more trouble on the horizon if nonurban and Sunbelt districts continue to be less supportive as they continue to increase in number. As indicated above, it is difficult to counterbalance a loss of support with a softening of opposition.

As for the population trends, it would seem that there is little labor can do to stop them. Due to technological developments in transportation and communication, business and industry are no longer compelled to agglomerate in the central cities of the North. Thus, for a variety of economic reasons—room to expand, cheaper land, and lower taxes, for example—these firms will continue moving to the suburbs and Sunbelt, and with them will go large segments of the population.[14]

It must be remembered that the political effect of the mass migrations to the suburbs and Sunbelt will be reinforced by congressional redistricting after the 1980 census has been tallied. According to *Congressional Quarterly*, Democrats hold 47 of the 50 districts that lost five percent or more of their populations between 1970 and 1976. Forty-six of the 50 are urban districts, and 39 of these urban districts are in the Snowbelt.[15] A similar migration appears to be continuing along sectional lines. The 1970 redistricting brought nine congressional districts from the Snowbelt to the Sunbelt. Recent figures indicate that an additional 17 districts will follow after the 1980 census.[16] Thus, there is a good possibility that a number of labor's strongest supporting districts will be altered to labor's detriment.

What can organized labor do to begin countering these trends or their potential effects on congressional support?

First of all, while regrouping, labor needs to focus attention on maintaining what it has already gained from Congress. For example, any attempts to restrict freedoms granted by the Wagner Act ought to be thwarted. Here, labor would simply be trying to retain the "status quo," and such "negative lobbying" generally has a greater chance for success.[17]

[14] For example, see Kirkpatrick Sale, "Six Pillars of the Southern Rim," in Roger Alcaly and David Mermelstein, eds., *The Fiscal Crisis of the American Cities* (New York: Vintage, 1977).

[15] Christopher Buchanan, "GOP Hopes for Seat at Redistricting Table," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 36 (29 July 1978), p. 1935.

[16] See Phil Duncan, "Redistricting Moving Slowly in Most States," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 39 (14 November 1981), p. 2237.

[17] Randall B. Ripley, *Congress: Process and Policy* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1975), p. 212.

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TABLE 6
*Harris Index of Registered Democrats' "Alienation," 1966–1976*

| | *1966* | *1969* | *1971* | *1972* | *1973* | *1974* | *1976* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| "Feels Disenchanted" | 29% | 36% | 40% | 46% | 55% | 59% | 61% |

Source: Harris Surveys and ABC News.

Labor needs to put more emphasis on unionizing white collar workers. Such a campaign, if successful, would help broaden their base, particularly in the suburbs. With the increasing migration of people and industry to the Sunbelt, labor must also increase the number of unionized workers in this section of the country. This will continue to be a difficult task, however, since many of these states have "right-to-work" laws, and the chances of repealing Section 14(b) of the Taft–Hartley Act seem remote. Nonetheless, strategic use of labor's over $500 billion in pension fund investments could help bring pressure to bear on conservative legislators and recalcitrant Sunbelt industries.[18]

Lastly, the Democratic party appears increasingly less able to hold its congressional ranks in line, and its congressional members are not nearly as liberal and as pro-labor as they once were. Thus, it may well be time for labor to take the lead in developing a new vision as well as forging a new "progressive alliance" to carry the banner of the Democratic party. As Table 6 indicates, Americans have become deeply alienated from "things as they are," and consequently appear ready for new leadership. There is no reason organized labor cannot be on the forefront of a movement to rekindle faith in government in general and the Democratic party in particular, by helping to generate progressive public policies. Based on a theme of helping people gain control over the decisions which affect their lives, this package could include full employment, day care, a guaranteed annual income, national health care, campaign financing limits, liberalized voter registration requirements, and possibly even worker ownership and management of firms.

## Appendix: Methodology

This analysis focuses specifically upon House support for labor legislation in the 89th and 95th Congresses. The reason for choosing the House was suggested by Leroy N. Rieselbach: ". . . the congressional districts, being more demographically homogeneous than entire states, [seem] better suited to test the association between constituency characteristics and voting behavior."[19]

The 89th and 95th Congresses were chosen because each had both the Legislative and Executive Branches controlled by Democrats. Also they had a similar number of Democrats (295–292) and Northern Democrats (194–201), with the latter having been tradition-

[18] For examples of such strategy, see Jeremy Rifkin and Randy Barber, *The North Will Rise Again: Pensions and Power in the '80s* (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1978).

[19] Leroy N. Rieselbach, "The Congressional Vote on Foreign Aid, 1939–1958," *American Political Science Review* 58 (1964), p. 577.

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ally more supportive of labor than Democrats from the South. Since a close relationship does exist between organized labor and the Democratic party, such a control is needed; otherwise, it can simply be theorized that support for labor has fallen because there are fewer (Northern) Democrats in the House. Both Congresses were in session during the first half of a Democratic presidential administration, meaning they were in session before the traditional midterm election "backlash" that generally brings an electoral shift towards the party not in the White House.

In order to compare labor support found in the 89th and 95th Congresses, a "Labor Legislation Score" (LLS) was devised. This index represents a revision of the traditionally used AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education (COPE) rating, because the latter includes social issues that are not directly related to labor legislation—positions on issues of civil rights and civil liberties, deregulation of natural gas prices, and so forth. The AFL-CIO rating also does not "weight" the issues according to significance and does not include a number of votes on amendments designed to alter significantly the labor legislation as does the LLS.

The LLS Score, then, is an indicator of congressional support for labor legislation only. The term "labor legislation" was borrowed from the AFL-CIO publication *Labor Looks at Congress*. Those issues placed under the heading "labor legislation" in this publication served as the basis for the LLS score.

Specific roll-call votes were chosen if they were votes on "labor legislation" used in the determination of the COPE scores; if they were listed in *Labor Looks at Congress* as "key votes"; and if a majority of Northern Democrats voted against a majority of Republicans or a majority of Northern Democrats voted against a majority of Southern Democrats. The last criterion was added in order to limit analysis to "contested" votes. What was assumed was that the absence of either inter- or intraparty competition reflected a consensus among legislators that the particular piece of legislation involved the national interest and not just the interest of organized labor.

points were also awarded to certain votes: Every vote that appeared on the COPE scorecard as a "top ten vote" received *two points*. The fact that these particular votes were selected out of all the labor legislation votes was interpreted to mean they were most important to labor. Every vote that was listed in the COPE scorecard but was not included in their "top ten" was given *one and one-half points*. Every vote that was listed as a "key vote" by the AFL-CIO in *Labor Looks at Congress* received *one point*. The reasoning here is that these votes were not important enough to be included in the COPE scorecard, but they were probably still more important than any votes that were not included in the publication.

Using these guidelines, the number of points that could be awarded to a particular vote ranged from one-half to three points. When a representative supported labor's position on a vote, he or she was awarded the points given to that vote. A representative's LLS was calculated by first adding the total number of points received for supporting labor's position, dividing this score by the maximum number of points possible had he or she supported labor every time, rounding the decimal fraction to the nearest hundredth, and finally, multiplying by 100.

The data derived from the above-mentioned formula was then used to test the following hypotheses: (1) as the number of suburban districts increased, the support for organized labor should have decreased; (2) as the number of Sunbelt districts increased, support for organized labor should have decreased; (3) the most recently elected Democrats would have lower labor support scores; (4) as Democrats became less ideologically "lib-

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eral," labor support would fall; (5) as party cohesiveness among Democrats declined, labor support would also decline; and (6) as presidential influence over Congress declined, the level of labor support would also decline.

For the first three hypotheses, LLS scores were cross-tabulated with characteristics of both the representatives and their constituencies. These characteristics included the representative's political party, the number of terms he or she had served, and the residential (urban, suburban, rural), and sectional[20]—Snowbelt or Sunbelt—characteristics of his or her district. Arithmetic means were used to facilitate comparisons, and representatives were categorized as being either "anti-labor" (0–35 points), "moderate" (36–70 points), or "pro-labor" (71–100 points).

A district's classification as urban, suburban, or rural depended upon which residential pattern held a percentage majority in that district. The percentages were obtained from *Congressional Districts in the '70s* (1974) and *Congressional Districts of the United States* (1964).

For the last three hypotheses, LLS scores were correlated with the scores measuring party cohesiveness, presidential influence, and liberal support. Correlation coefficients were used to determine the direction and strength of these statistical relationships.

Compiled by *Congressional Quarterly*, a "Party Unity Score" is the percentage of times a representative voted with the majority of his or her party against the majority of the other party. Nonetheless, these scores have been adjusted further for the purposes of this study by taking Party Unity Scores and dividing them by the sum of those scores plus the Party Opposition Scores. The latter represented the percentage of time the representative voted against the majority of his or her party.

Also compiled by *Congressional Quarterly*, a "Presidential Support Score" is the percentage of times a representative voted with the president on those votes in which the president took a clear-cut position. And once again, these scores have been adjusted in the manner noted immediately above.

This last manipulation has been done because if a representative fails to vote, both his support and opposition scores are lowered. This process can create problems, especially when a representative fails to vote a number of times. For example, suppose representative A supported the president's position on half the votes in which he or she participated. If the representative participated in only half of the "presidential support votes," the resulting Presidential Support and Presidential Opposition scores would not be 50–50, but 25–25. Using just one of the scores would misrepresent the representative's level of presidential support. Using the quotient of one score divided by the sum of both removes this problem. That score, in this example "fifty," more accurately tells us what we need to know—that the representative supports the president half of the time.

Lastly, the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) Score has been chosen as an estimate of the "liberalism" reflected in a congressperson's voting record. This has been

[20] The states are classified by section as follows: *Snowbelt*—Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. *Sunbelt*—Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia.

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done, while at the same time acknowledging that like any other "ideology," liberalism is complex and has been defined quite differently by different analysts over time.[21]

Information on the congressional districts was found in two sources, *The Congressional Districts of the United States*,[22] for the 89th Congress, and *Congressional Districts in the 1970s*[23] for the 95th.

The method of analysis was based upon two previous studies of congressional support: one by Demetrios Caraley (on urban aid)[24] and the other by Leroy Rieselbach (on foreign aid).[25]

[21] For example, see Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1955); Harry Girvetz, *The Evolution of Liberalism* (New York: Collier, 1963); Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1969); or Kenneth and Patricia Dolbeare, *American Ideologies* (Chicago, Ill.: Rand McNally, 1976), chs. 1–5.

[22] Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1964.

[23] 2nd edition (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1974).

[24] *The Carter Congress and Urban Aid*, unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting, American Political Science Association, New York, 1978; and "Congressional Politics and Urban Aid," in Demetrios Caraley, ed., *American Political Institutions in the 1970s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 312–36.

[25] Rieselbach, "The Congressional Vote."

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# Attacks on Nuclear Reactors: The Implications of Israel's Strike on Osiraq

BENNETT RAMBERG

Israel's surprise attack in Iraq's Osiraq nuclear research center shattered the world's atomic agenda in unforeseen and potentially dangerous ways. Until then, few observers had imagined that a nation might try to stop the spread of nuclear weapons by bombing an adversary's reactors, but the June 1981 raid set such a precedent. Whether Israel was right to have launched its strike against Iraq is in some ways irrelevant. The fact remains that the vulnerability of nuclear facilities to military destruction is itself a new and volatile element in world politics. Such vulnerability is significant because of the nature of the target. Installations with large radioactive inventories that can be released into the environment are themselves potential weapons of mass destruction. Fortunately, the world was spared this radiation specter in the Israeli attack because Iraq's facility was not yet fueled, and even if it had been in operation, contamination resulting from destruction might not have been significant given the small size of the plant.[1] Had the destroyed installation been a nuclear power

[1] The Iraqi plant was designed to provide 40 megawatts of heat, which distinguished it from its French twin which produces 70 megawatts. See Richard Wilson, *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 July 1981, p. 23. There has been some debate over how extensive the contamination would have been had the reactor been in operation. The Congressional Research Service concluded that contamination would in the main be limited to the reactor site. Save for pieces of the core, the problem would not

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station, which is not uncommonly more than 60 times larger (indeed, Baghdad plans one), severe consequences would have resulted. Thousands of square miles might have been contaminated. Regrettably, the strategic implications of such acts have received little attention in the global nuclear energy debate.[2] This article reviews the problem generically, examines the strategic implications in two cases, the Middle East and Europe, and suggests remedies to conventional weapons attacks.

## Vulnerability of Nuclear Facilities

Approximately 260 nuclear power plants are now in operation in 22 countries with a like number under construction, and by the end of this century, over 40 nations may be producing electricity with atomic power. These large, commer-

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be significant. See Warren H. Donnelly, "Possible Contamination of Baghdad From Bombing of the Iraqi Reactor," *The Israeli Air Strike*, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1981, p. 156. Frank von Hipple and Jan Beyea, nuclear physicists who have written several reactor accident consequence studies under the auspices of Princeton University's Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, reviewed the Congressional report and concluded that Donnelly's estimates were inaccurate because he analogized the effects of radium for fission products (telephone conversation with Jan Beyea, 30 April 1982). Steve Ramos, a Nuclear Regulatory Commission official who formerly directed the safety program for U.S. research reactors, contended that "significant" radioactive fallout from such facilities would not extend beyond two miles. See Elliot Marshall, "Iraqi Nuclear Program Halted by Bombing," *Science* 210 (31 October 1980), p. 508. Herbert Kouts of the Brookhaven National Laboratory estimated that the radiation danger would be insignificant beyond 1,000 feet around the plant, while Herbert Goldstein of Columbia suggested that, based on International Atomic Energy Agency calculations, some radiation would reach the Iraqi capital, whereas lethal doses might prevail near the reactor. See *Physics Today* 33 (August 1981), pp. 53 and 56.

[2] This fact is underscored by the failure of even the most comprehensive analyses of nuclear energy policy to mention the subject. Among such studies are the American Physical Society Study Group on Light-Water Reactor Safety, *Review of Modern Physics* (Summer 1975, Supplement No. 1); Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group, *Nuclear Power Issues and Choices* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1977); U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, *U.S. Nuclear Power Export Activities*, ERDA 1542 (Springfield, Va.: National Technical Information Service, 1976); and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, *Reactor Safety Study*, WASH 1400 (Springfield, Va.: National Technical Information Service, 1975). The implications of nuclear weapons destruction in the United States have, however, been reviewed periodically at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The most recently published work is Conrad V. Chester and Rowena O. Chester, "Civil Defense Implications of the U.S. Nuclear Power Industry During a Large Nuclear War in the Year 2000," *Nuclear Technology* 31 (December 1976): 326–38. See also Steven A. Fetter and Kosta Tsipis, "Catastrophic Releases of Radioactivity," *Scientific American* 244 (April 1981): 41–47, and Steve Fetter and Kosta Tsipis, "Catastrophic Nuclear Radiation Releases," Report No. 5 (Cambridge, Mass.: Program in Science and Technology for International Security, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, September 1980). Assessment of conventional weapons destruction will be found in Chester L. Cooper, "Nuclear Hostages," *Foreign Policy* 32 (1978): 125–35; H. W. Lewis, et al., *Risk Assessment Review Group Report of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission*, NUREG/CR-4000 (Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1978), p. 45; and Bennett Ramberg, *Destruction of Nuclear Energy Facilities in War: The Problem and the Implications* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1980).

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cial reactors contain copious amounts of radioactive material. As long as there are no major coolant pipe breaks, reactor vessel ruptures, or mismatches of power and coolant due to excessive fission or undercooling, the most common atomic plant—the light water reactor—operates without posing a hazard to public health. To prevent accidents, manufacturers rely on equipment of high integrity, and in the case of American and European stations (but not most Soviet plants), there are emergency core cooling systems, redundant pumps, emergency external power diesel generators, and reinforced concrete containment buildings.

Notwithstanding the care with which most reactors are built, U.S. government studies document their vulnerability to willful destruction through disruption of coolant mechanisms both inside and outside the containment building.[3] Israel's successful attack demonstrated the destructibility of a large research reactor with some safety characteristics, namely, several feet of concrete biological shielding immediately surrounding the reactor, similar to a commercial plant. Keeping in mind that the Israeli military capability is not unique, reactor vulnerability is likely to increase in the decade ahead as precision-guided munitions—some fused with shaped charges capable of destroying the hardest containments—are introduced into the arsenals of many countries.[4]

What would be the consequences of a successful conventional weapons attack? Conceivably, they could equal those of the worst accidental meltdown in terms of radiation discharged.[5] As distinct from conventional or nuclear weapons, the effects of which can be calculated reliably, the emission of radioactivity from reactors is subject to a number of variables including (but not limited to) the quantity, composition, and rate of deposition of materials. Assuming recent Nuclear Regulatory Commission accident studies (June 1981) are well founded, military destruction can result in moderate to major releases of radioactivity

[3] Consultant Workshop, Sandia Laboratories, *Summary Report on Workshop on Sabotage Protection in Nuclear Power Plant Design*, SAND 76-0637 (Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1977); Dean C. Kaul and Edward S. Sachs, *Adversary Actions in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: I. Reference Events and Their Consequences*, SAI-121-612-7803 (Schaumburg, Ill.: Science Applications, 1977); and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, *Reactor Safety Study*, Appendix VI, pp. 2-1-2-4.

[4] The United States has in its arsenal conventional munitions capable of penetrating 10 meters of concrete. See Cecil I. Hudson and Peter H. Hass, "New Technologies: The Prospects," in Johan J. Holst and Uwe Nerlich, eds., *Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: New Aims* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), p. 128. For the effectiveness of other conventional weapons against hard targets, see Tom Gervasi, *Arsenal of Democracy: American Weapons Available for Export* (New York: Grove Press, 1977). A discussion of the proliferation of precision guided munitions will be found in Anne Hessing Cahn, et al., *Controlling Future Arms Trade in the 1980s* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977).

[5] Telephone conversation with staff of Sandia Laboratories who conducted a technical study on conventional weapons destruction of nuclear facilities. According to this source, conventional weapons could not release more radiation than the worst accident. See also Kaul and Sachs, *Adversary Actions*, tables C1-C4. Note that if the core is broken apart and scattered by conventional weapons, releases of radioactivity into the environment may not be as significant as the meltdown of an intact core. Jan Beyea alerted me to this in an 18 August 1981 telephone conversation.

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TABLE 1
*Nuclear Energy Contamination Projections for One 880-Mwe Reactor*

| | *Initial Restricted Area (in square miles[a])* | | *Long-Term Contamination* (in square miles[b])* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Release Type* | *for habitation* | *for agriculture* | *for habitation* | *for agriculture* |
| Moderate (10% cesiums) | | | | |
| 3-month-old core | 75 | 420 | 6-75 | 3-55 |
| mature core[c] | 550 | 2,600 | 60-550 | 25-300 |
| Major (PWR 2)[d] | | | | |
| 3-month-old core | 1,400 | 3,700 | 65-650 | 20-450 |
| mature core[c] | 3,300-5,300[e] | 18,000 | 550-4,300 | 240-3,300 |

* After 10 years habitation.

[a] The computation of these areas assumes that occupation would be restricted if the resident population would receive in excess of a 10-rem whole body radiation dose over 30 years, which is associated with a risk of .05 to .5 percent chance of cancer death. Within 50 miles from the reactor where more intense irradiation is likely these percentiles will increase several times. See Beyea, p. B-11.

[b] The higher number assumes a tenfold stricter criterion than that defined in note a. This corresponds to a one-third increase over natural background radiation.

[c] A mature core is one that has been in operation 3 to 18 months.

[d] The *Reactor Safety Study*, Appendix VI, pp. 2-1-2-4 defines the PWR 2 (pressurized water reactor release 2) in relation to other releases.

[e] The lower figure derives from the *Reactor Safety Study*, Appendix VI, Fig. 13-35.

Source: Derived from Jan Beyea, *Some Long Term Consequences of Hypothetical Major Releases of Radioactivity to the Atmosphere From Three Mile Island*, PU/CEES No. 109 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, December 1980), p. B-13. The releases noted here are draw from accident scenarios applicable to conventional weapons sabotage.

into the environment.[6] A moderate release from a reactor the size of Three Mile Island—880 megawatts of electricity (Mwe)—that has been operating for more than three months could contaminate 500 square miles; a major release might affect three to 5,000 square miles requiring occupation restrictions over a significant fraction that could last decades as the effectiveness of decontamination is

[6] There is controversy in the technical literature over whether major releases of radioactivity are possible in accident scenarios, which military destruction could induce. The nuclear industry argues that the Three Mile Island accident (along with experiments in small test reactors where a large fraction of the nuclear core was destroyed) suggests that when water and steam are present, a significant fraction of the most dangerous radioactivity is contained therein. This could reduce by a factor of 10 radiation exposure estimates forming the basis for emergency planning in the event of a nuclear accident. At the same time, the industry acknowledges that the absence of water—a dry containment—allows the release of significant radiation if the containment is breached. For elaboration, see Milton Levenson, "A Perspective," *Nuclear Technology* 53 (May 1981), pp. 97-98; M. Levenson and F. Rahn, "Realistic Estimates of the Consequences of Nuclear Accidents," ibid., pp. 99-108; and H. H. Morewitz, "Fission Product and Aerosol Behavior Following Degraded Core Accidents," ibid., pp. 120-132. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recently examined these contentions and concluded that the consequences from small reactor incidents may be "of very limited value." The NRC acknowledged that the *Reactor Safety Study* may have overpredicted "certain" accident sequences (for example, a steam explosion), but that, in general, its estimates are re-

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very uncertain.[7] Since nations often cluster several reactors, the problems would be compounded if the contents of more than one were discharged as is conceivable in military scenarios. Additional problems would arise through release of the inventories of spent fuel customarily located at reactor sites. Table I elaborates the consequences for one reactor.

The medical effects of atmospheric emissions of radioactivity are the result of exposures through inhalation, radiation deposited on the ground, and consumption of contaminated food. The early lethality of irradiation, that is, death within 60 days, would depend upon the effectiveness of prophylactic measures, namely, evacuation, sheltering, and medical care for the exposed. If these are instituted promptly, casualties will be minimal; delay increases the danger. For example, 24 hour residence in the contaminated region could result in early fatalities as far as 20 miles out in a wedge-shaped zone that may be several miles wide at its outermost reaches.[8] Generally, the closer one is to the source of emission, the greater the likelihood of exposure to unacceptable radiation. The possibility of early fatalities would be diminished at all distances in unstable weather; winds, for example, dilute airborne radioactivity. Unfortunately, except in a few regions, climate cannot be relied upon to ameliorate radiation.

Late cancers will likely dominate medical effects in the hundreds to thousands of square miles covered by low-level radiation beyond the zone defined above. Failure to impose habitation restrictions—a difficult undertaking given the extent of contamination—could result in a less than one to a several percent increase in cancers, depending upon the intensity of irradiation. The number of deaths would depend upon the exposed population. In densely inhabited regions, late cancer fatalities could range in the tens of thousands, assuming that

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liable. See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, *Technical Bases for Estimating Fission Product Behavior During LWR Accidents*, NUREG-0772 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 1981), pp. i–iii; F.6. The NRC conclusions are adhered to in this article.

[7] Jan Beyea, *Some Long-Term Consequences of Hypothetical Major Releases of Radioactivity to the Atmosphere from Three Mile Island*, PU/CEES No. 109 (Princeton, N.J.: Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton University, December 1980), pp. 12 and B–13. In a telephone conversation with Beyea (18 August 1981), he reconfirmed the relevance of his estimates to conventional weapon scenarios.

[8] This 20-mile calculation assumes a release in very stable weather, that is, little wind. Supportive medical attention will reduce the zone of concern to under 15 miles. For calculations that take these and other variables into account, see Jan Beyea, "In the Matter of Long Island Lighting Company (Jamesport Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2)," Direct Testimony of Dr. Jan Beyea (New York: New York State Board on Electric Generation Siting and the Environment, Case No. 8003, May 1977, mimeo), tables 3c, 3d, and 6; David C. Aldrich and Peter E. Magrath, *Examination of Offsight Radiological Emergency Measures for Nuclear Reactor Accidents Involving a Core Melt*, SAND 78-0454, (Albuquerque, N.M.: Sandia Laboratories, 1978); and Environmental Protection Agency Task Force on Emergency Planning, *Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants*, EPA 520/1-78-016 (Springfield, Va.: National Technical Information Service, December 1978).

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the much debated cancer induction models, notably the linear hypothesis, are reliable.[9] A like number could bear genetic effects in future generations.

In addition to reactors, such nuclear support facilities as fuel fabrication, reprocessing, and waste storage installations may be attractive military targets. Of these, high radioactive liquid wastes resulting from the industrial process of extracting uranium and plutonium from spent fuel are of greatest concern. With the voluminous residues of many reactors, these depositories are vulnerable to military sabotage, which could result in the contamination of tens of thousands of square miles with low-level radiation.[10]

Nuclear weapons bombardment poses another problem. Although the immediate lethal effects of atomic bombs are many times greater than those that result from the conventional release of radiation from a nuclear facility, the addition of the reactor inventory to one such bomb can extend its early lethal effects by one-third. Furthermore, given that nuclear energy radiation is much longer lived than that of the bomb, such radiation spread by a one megaton weapon could contaminate 25,000 square miles with long-lived radiation—an area 20 times larger than that normally contaminated by the bomb alone.[11]

## Strategic Implications

The consequences of nuclear facility destruction beg a rationale, and certainly Israel provided one: the necessity to preempt an adversary's acquisition of atomic weapons, for Israel believed that Iraq's plant was a guise for a weapons program. There are other rationales as well. In order to cripple an antagonist's industrial capabilities for waging war, combatants have targeted enemy energy sources, as was the case in Israel's 1982 incursion into Lebanon, in the Iran–Iraq conflict, in the 1973 Arab–Israeli war, in Vietnam, in Korea, and in the European and Asian theaters in World War II. Combatants also have destroyed the environment for military purposes. The Dutch destroyed their dikes during the Second World War in order to hamper the Germans; the Chinese did likewise in the late 1930s to impede the Japanese. The Soviet Union practiced a scorched earth policy for the same reason. During the Vietnam War, the United States used herbicides to destroy enemy defensive cover and to improve target identification. In addition, combatants might destroy nuclear power stations because they represent one of the greatest concentrations of capital investment a country is likely to possess. Then, too, an aggressor may experience failures in command

[9] Jan Beyea, *Some Long-Term Consequences*. For a review of the debate over the effects of low-level radiation, see Eliot Marshall, "New A-Bomb Data Shown to Radiation Experts," *Science* 212 (1981): 1364–65.

[10] Jan Beyea, "The Effects of Releases to the Atmosphere of Radioactivity from Hypothetical Large-Scale Accidents at the Proposed Gorleben Waste Treatment Facility," report to the government of Lower Saxony, Federal Republic of Germany, as part of "Gorleben International Review," February 1979, p. 10.

[11] Fetter and Tsipis, "Catastrophic Releases."

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and control and execute accidental bombings, or parties with a stake in an ongoing conflict might consider sabotaging a facility to escalate the conflict.[12]

Still another rationale is coercion. Large populations in many countries have become acutely concerned about possible radioactive releases from nuclear power plant accidents, and a belligerent could capitalize on this fear for coercive purposes. Chester Cooper, assistant director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory's Institute for Energy Analysis, speculated that in certain Third World situations, this coercion could have the "positive" effect of containing belligerence by allowing weak states to threaten strong ones with unacceptable damage.[13] Recent events in the Middle East, however, suggest that the presence of nuclear energy among opponents may exacerbate rather than enhance stability. Certainly the costs of war would increase should plants be destroyed.

The success of such coercion lies in the target nation's psychological sensitivity to nuclear contamination. Sensitivity is a product of different cognitive factors including estimates of the physical consequences and of faith in countermeasures. Leaders will approach this matter differently. Some may not consider the problem significant and may optimistically argue that numerous variables act on facility radiation, thereby reducing its effectiveness as a weapon. Among such arguments is that population centers and valued land may not be in the vicinity of the facility, or that installations may be downwind from valued locations. Meteorological conditions are likely to promote rapid wind dilution or washing out of radiation via rainfall. The numerous safety features of the threatened plants could be stressed as well as available shelters and relocation plans. Regard for the adversary military capability may be low. Finally, contamination estimates may show few immediate effects and long-term consequences that can be dealt with reasonably. The absence of blast, heat, and intense radiation characteristic of an atomic bomb may further reinforce this sentiment.

On the other hand, some leaders and their compatriots may be hypersensitive about the prospect of contamination from nuclear facilities. Those nations most concerned would be the most easily manipulated and possibly the most disposed to take drastic measures to reduce their vulnerability. Threats of retaliation in kind are one option. Another option would be nuclear weapons. Case studies can illuminate these points.

### *The Middle East*

Nuclear power in the Middle East is currently limited to five small research reactors in Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Israel. None of these reactors—including the largest, Israel's Dimona installation, producing 25 megawatts of heat—poses a significant contamination hazard given their size. There are plans, however, to

[12] Some of these rationale were brought to my attention by Theodore Taylor and crystallized in his unpublished manuscript, "Reactor Safety Considerations Related to Sabotage and Wartime Bombardment of Nuclear Power Plants" (1968).

[13] Cooper, "Nuclear Hostages."

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introduce 600 to 900 megawatt (electric) power stations into the region. Cairo currently is being courted by salesmen of nuclear firms in France, West Germany, Canada, and the United States. Libya has expressed interest and has negotiated with the Soviet Union to purchase a facility. Colonel Moammar Qaddafi is being wooed by the French who have offered a power reactor to Iraq as well. The future of Israel's program is uncertain. Jerusalem's failure to sign the nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty resulted in American refusal to sell reactors despite promises made in 1974. Israel is considering other vendors, building a reactor of its own, or turning to other energy sources. Kuwait and Syria are reviewing the nuclear option. Iran, the only country to have begun construction of two atomic power stations, suspended its program with the fall of the Shah but is contemplating completion of one plant.[14]

While concern has focused on the manipulation of Middle Eastern atomic plants for nuclear weapons,[15] little attention was given to their military destruction until the Israeli bombardment. As other states in the region modernize their armed forces during the decade ahead, a number may acquire the ability to destroy atomic stations.

The consequences of military destruction could be grave. Because Israel is such a small country, a large fraction of it would be put at risk wherever future construction takes place. (A Mediterranean site 20 miles south of Tel Aviv was once under consideration; a more recent plan suggests a Negev location along the proposed Dead Sea Canal, perhaps underground.) Egypt confronts a potential hazard that is less acute but nonetheless could be significant. Safety concerns compelled the Egyptian government in 1981 to abandon a site at Sidi Kreir, 36 miles west of Alexandria. Plans now call for construction of up to nine plants by the year 2000 to be built about 80 miles west of Egypt's second largest city. Even at this distance, Alexandria and the densely populated Nile Delta could possibly be contaminated, although variable winds could carry fallout to largely uninhabited regions in the south.

In these and other instances, the timing of nuclear energy generation may also have strategic implications. Some Israelis advocate placing nuclear power on line before the end of the 1980s. Should such a plant be the first or only large

[14] For a review of nuclear energy plans in the Middle East, see Henry S. Rowen and Richard Brody, "The Middle East," in Joseph A. Yager, ed., *Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1980), pp. 203–37; Mohammed El-Sayed Selim, "Egypt," and Bijan Mossavar-Rahamani, "Iran," in James Everett Katz and Onkar S. Marwah, eds., *Nuclear Power in Developing Countries*, (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982), pp. 135–60 and 201–20; "France: Possibility of Sale to Israel," and "Iran May Complete One Reactor," *Nuclear News* 25 (1982), pp. 62–63 and 60.

[15] For a review of the proliferation implications of the attack, see U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. *Hearings on the Israeli Air Strike*. 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 1981; Richard Betts, "Nuclear Proliferation after Osirak," *Arms Control Today* 11 (1981), pp. 1–2, 8; and Lewis A. Dunn, *Controlling the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982); and Shai Feldman, "The Bombing of Osiraq—Revisited," *International Security* 7 (1982): 114–42.

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station in the region, and assuming the Arabs, including the Palestinians, are able to release its contents, widespread damage could be inflicted with a few well-placed bombs. Thus, Israel might be vulnerable to a new mode of Arab intimidation. If radioactivity were released during conflict, Israel may have difficulty identifying the attacker for purposes of retaliation since Jerusalem has numerous adversaries. Further, should the antagonist be uncovered, retaliation in kind would be impossible unless the belligerent had a facility. In this case, Israel might instead turn to nuclear weapons.

Should Egypt be the first to acquire a nuclear power plant, it would expose itself to manipulation not only by Israel, but perhaps by Arab antagonists—notably Libya—as well. Likewise, development of nuclear energy by Iraq, Iran, or Libya would expose each to intimidation by its adversaries. If the antagonists acquired equally vulnerable installations simultaneously, stability might result if each were equally sensitive to the problem and there were no other significant asymmetries diminishing vulnerability and consequences.

The implications of these Middle Eastern considerations are important to countries outside the region as well. Should Israel acquire a nuclear power station, its vulnerability might force the United States to play a more active deterrent role to reassure Jerusalem. Iraq, a sometime Soviet client, might seek Soviet support against either Iranian or Israeli intimidation. Greater regional involvement by either superpower raises the risk of future confrontation between them.

### *Europe and the Soviet Union*

As distinct from the Middle East, antagonists in Europe today already have the capacity to inflict massive damage using nuclear weapons. It might appear at first glance that the strategic consequences of military actions against the 200 or more nuclear installations existing in or planned for the continent would be marginal. Closer scrutiny of the issue suggests otherwise.

At the present time, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces are positioned to confront a conventional Soviet assault in the belief that at the outset of a European war, the USSR might forego the use of nuclear weapons and try to overwhelm the West with its conventional weapons alone.[16] In maintaining a strong conventional posture, NATO hopes it will be able to repel Warsaw Pact forces without having to resort to nuclear weapons.

The focal point of any such conflict is likely to be West Germany, which has more than 30 nuclear plants and support facilities operating or planned. Their destruction for any of the reasons discussed earlier could have significant implications for the course of war. Many of these plants are located along invasion routes; their successful bombardment by Soviet conventional forces would in-

[16] John M. Collins and Anthony H. Cordesman, *Imbalance of Power: An Analysis of Shifting U.S.-Soviet Military Strengths* (San Rafael, Calif., Presidio Press, 1978), p. 242.

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troduce radiation into the conflict. To be sure, the Soviet Union might be self-deterred, given prevailing westerly winds that would carry the fallout over Eastern Europe, although the Soviets might not be overly concerned about the fate of their allies. (Indeed, the West Germans could threaten destruction of their own facilities along their eastern frontier in an attempt to deter war. However, activation of that threat runs the risk of self-contamination and escalation.) Nevertheless, should destruction occur, the complexion of the war would change. NATO would have to decide to respond in kind or possibly to threaten to use nuclear weapons to stop the Soviets. Either course could escalate the conflict. The West might instead ignore the destruction, but this could encourage further Soviet aggression.

The Soviet Union is similarly vulnerable, with over 40 nuclear power plants of its own in operation or under construction. This figure does not include an unknown number of facilities contributing to their nuclear weapons program. Soviet vulnerability is enhanced by the absence of containment structures over most of their reactors. While current American strategic targeting doctrine already calls for destruction of Soviet electrical generators, rhetorical emphasis by the U.S. Department of Defense on the implications of Soviet vulnerability—particularly for post-attack recovery—could enhance the American deterrence posture. The targeting of facilities also could be used in coercive diplomatic and military strategy, if the Soviet plants are located near military bases.

Targeting of facilities might prove more attractive for countries that have limited nuclear arsenals and are less certain they can inflict unacceptable damage to deter Soviet coercion. Britain and France might enhance the credibility of their nuclear forces vis-à-vis the Soviets if they threatened to turn a portion of their atomic weapons arsenal against Soviet facilities, or if they acquired a cruise missile or highly reliable bomber capable of penetrating the Soviet Union's defenses with conventional warheads. More significantly, the non-nuclear deterrent capabilities of West Germany and the other NATO parties could be elevated with conventional armed cruise and ballistic missiles capable of bombarding reactors. With such weapons, these countries for the first time would be able to inflict what may be unacceptable damage upon the Soviet Union, thereby reinforcing deterrence by making any Soviet notion of "winning" a European war seem less likely. In one sense this conventional capability might be less provocative than the present, politically-sensitive alternative—the Pershing II missile, with its first-strike threat against Soviet command and control and other military facilities in the European USSR.

There may be several objections to this strategy, however. Some may argue that the simplest Soviet response would be to target nuclear installations located within NATO as a counterdeterrent. Others may contend that the proposed policy is contrary to the 20-year trend of reducing collateral damage through the development of nuclear weapons with low yields and greater accuracy. Still others may assert that, given Soviet objections to new weapons development directed against them in the past, which resulted in East-West tension and fired local western populations into opposition, similar consequences are likely should

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the West, particularly non-nuclear states, adopt the policy and acquire the capacity to carry it out. Soviet concerns might be reinforced by the belief that though destruction of atomic plants has limited offensive utility, the threat could still change the psychological balance of power in Europe and limit Russian maneuverability in fulfilling its national objectives. Some might also be apprehensive about the proliferation of delivery systems to fulfill the targeting strategy, notably cruise missiles that could carry nuclear as well as conventional warheads.

Although worth considering, each of these objections is flawed. Collectively, they fail to appreciate that Soviet military doctrine denies nuclear war can be controlled. Although the Soviets could limit military operations in Europe to conventional weapons, both military exercises and developing capabilities suggest that the Soviets are also prepared to use large nuclear weapons "without any scruples concerning collateral damage and casualties," in the words of John Collins, a senior Congressional Research Service analyst.[17] With three 150-kiloton warheads per launcher (the atomic bombs dropped over Japan were 10 to 20 kilotons), the ongoing Soviet SS-20 missile deployment now threatening Europe reinforces this contention. As for possible Soviet objections to the nuclear energy targeting strategy, it is incumbent upon the West, not the Soviets, to determine its requirements for defense.

Still, renunciation of the strategy would be in the West's interest if it appeared to undermine seriously relations with the Russians. An alternative would be to threaten adoption of the facility targeting policy to extract Soviet concessions, for example, to make Moscow more accomodating in European force reduction talks. The final option would be for NATO to embrace the strategy, notwithstanding likely Soviet objections. NATO is already hostage to Soviet nuclear weapons. For Western Europe, having limited nuclear weapons with which to respond and an American ally, which Kissinger suggests should not be too heavily relied upon,[18] adoption of the nuclear reactor targeting strategy would introduce a new strategic element which could complicate Soviet risk calculations sufficiently to enhance deterrence.

## Remedies

Middle Eastern and European scenarios can apply to other regions as well, namely, Korea, South Asia, Taiwan, southern Africa, and the United States.[19] The implications of nuclear facility vulnerability in wartime should stimulate the search for alternatives that enhance stability. Equally compelling is the risk of early death, cancer, genetic disease, and associated traumatization. Assuming that nations continue to rely upon nuclear power for their energy needs, the

[17] Ibid., p. 327.

[18] Henry Kissinger, "The Future of NATO," *Washington Quarterly* 2 (Autumn 1979): 3-17.

[19] For elaboration, see Ramberg, *Destruction of Nuclear Energy*, ch. 3

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following discussion presents several nonexclusive avenues for controlling the dangers of nuclear facility destruction in war. These include controlling national behavior through international law, minimizing the consequences of facility destruction through civil defense, different modes of facility siting, improvement of methods and procedures, and better international management of nuclear development.

### *International Law*

Legal restraint is clearly not the most reliable option for minimizing the military threat posed to nuclear energy facilities, but it does offer a relatively expeditious as well as an inexpensive means to begin addressing the problem by establishing a clear standard of behavior where one does not now exist. This standard may offer some modicum of restraint, which in time can be supplemented by other more authoritative alternatives that require more time for implementation.

The law of war prescribes norms of international conduct; it "attempts to reconcile minimum morality with the practical realities of war"[20] through treaties, customary practice, and perhaps resolutions by the United Nations General Assembly. At present, only the 1977 Protocol Addition to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 addresses the legitimacy of nuclear facility destruction in war. This document is a mixture of ambiguity and contradiction. Article 56 addresses the permissibility of attacks against "nuclear electrical generating stations" in the broader context of "installations containing dangerous forces," including dams and dikes. Paragraph 1 declares that such works and installations "shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population." The prohibition also extends to military objects located in the vicinity of these works "if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population." Stipulations that the losses must be severe for the prohibition to be applicable raise the question of what constitutes severity. This point is further complicated in that irradiation might not result in death until years after exposure. Thus, rather than being a clear prohibition, the paragraph's ambiguity may conceivably be used to justify attack on a nuclear energy station.

Paragraph 2(b) further diminishes the strength of the prohibition: "The special protection against attack provided by paragraph 1 shall cease (b) for a nuclear electrical generating station only if it provides electrical power in regular,

[20] Richard A. Falk, "Environmental Warfare and Ecocide: A Legal Perspective," in Richard A. Falk, ed., *The Vietnam War and International Law: The Concluding Phase* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 290. For elaboration, see Bennett Ramberg, "Destruction of Nuclear Energy Facilities in War: A Proposal for Legal Restraint," *World Order Studies Occasional Paper 7* (Princeton, N.J.: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1978).

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significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support."

In effect, this inclusion allows an adversary to decide whether a nuclear facility provides "regular, significant, and direct support of military operations." Such a rationalization can usually be found. Paragraph 3 appears to minimize the implications of this exceptional clause by stipulating, "If the protection ceases . . . all practical precautions shall be taken to avoid the release of the dangerous forces." This qualification is not an adequate safeguard.

The Geneva Protocol's treatment of nuclear facilities can be criticized further for a lack of comprehensiveness. It specifically addresses only one segment of the nuclear fuel cycle, namely, nuclear electrical generating stations. Large inventories of radioactivity, however, are located in other fuel cycle installations: nuclear spent fuel storage, reprocessing plants, waste storage, and fuel fabrication facilities. If the prohibition is to be comprehensive, these plants must be included. Still another fault lies in the protocol's failure to address the permissibility of threats to destroy nuclear facilities. If their destruction is prohibited, consistency requires that the threat of destruction be prohibited in the codification.

Unfortunately, this codification is not compensated by related conventions, specifically, the 1977 international environmental modification agreement and the treaty to ban the use of radiological weapons that is under negotiation in the United Nations Geneva-based Committee on Disarmament. In 1981, the Geneva Committee attempted to remedy the situation. Sweden forwarded a proposal that attacks on all nuclear energy and weapons reactors be prohibited.[21] The Israeli attack added further impetus to negotiate a convention in this regard.[22] Would this prohibition be effective? We cannot be overly sanguine. At the very least, such an agreement would provide a common standard in an area that would otherwise depend on prudent judgment. Such an accord would gain partisans inside and outside bureaucracies who would act as pressure groups to assure observance.[23]

### *Military and Civil Defense*

Although international law may provide some protection, there have been too many violations of other such measures for optimism. Therefore, diminishing the vulnerability of nuclear energy installations is critical. One way is to enhance

[21] "Memorandum Submitted by the Delegation of Sweden on Certain Aspects of a Convention Prohibiting Radiological Warfare," CD/RW/WP.19 (Geneva: Committee on Disarmament, 16 March 1981).

[22] United Nations, *Report of the Committee on Disarmament*, 36th Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27) (New York: United Nations, 1981), pp. 66–75, 106–7. See also Victor L. Issraelyan and Charles C. Flowerree, "Radiological Weapons Control: A Soviet and US Perspective," *Occasional Paper 29* (Muscatine, Ia.: Stanley Foundation, 1982).

[23] Abram Chayes, "An Inquiry into Workings of Arms Control Agreements," *Harvard Law Review* 135 (March 1975): 907–32.

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military defense, including ability to intercept and destroy hostile forces before they can inflict damage. Although nuclear facilities have not been constructed with wartime bombardment in mind, their massive containment structures do provide some protection against attack. Additionally, fences, alarms, cameras, and armed guards impede small groups of intruders bent on theft or sabotage. None of these prophylactic measures, however, is sufficient against lethal weapons.

Although not foolproof, alternative measures could improve point defenses. In a time of crisis, military units could be stationed around installations to prevent assaults. Anti-aircraft and artillery could be situated to suppress bombardment. In the future, more sophisticated means of attack will require novel modes of defense. Homing missiles against cruise missiles, steel palings, and tons of steel pellets lofted by explosives intended to protect missile silos might be applicable in the defense of nuclear energy facilities.[24]

Because military defense is imperfect—indeed, Iraq's reactor was defended—civil defense is critical. The programs of Sweden and Switzerland are exemplary.[25] Most impressively, the well-organized Swiss program includes shelters, which during the 1980s will be able to accommodate the entire population against many effects of nuclear weapons or facility releases. This program is supplemented by underground hospitals and stores of government and military supplies. Sweden's civil defense planning is notable for efforts to protect the economy by placing underground some industries, electrical power plants and food stocks, as well as hospitals and command centers. The Swedes also have considered the removal of radioactive inventories from reactors and other installations to deep underground sites during crises. The population shelter program, although not as extensive as that of the Swiss, centers on a relocation plan to remove 90 percent of urban population to areas up to 250 miles distant before or during the outbreak of war. Several successful relocation exercises have been carried out.

In comparison, programs of other countries are underdeveloped.[26] At the very least, governments should educate populations in the vicinity of nuclear plants about the dangers of radiation and about prophylactic measures. Evacuation routes should be planned, populations advised, and exercises practiced. Radiation shelters should be constructed for persons living close to nuclear installations. If shelters are not feasible, people should become acquainted with such

[24] Richard L. Garwin, "Effective Military Technology for the 1980s," *International Security* 1 (1976), pp. 53-56.

[25] Curtis E. Harvey, "Civil Defense Abroad in Review," in Eugene P. Wigner, ed., *Survival and the Bomb: Methods of Civil Defense* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969), pp. 159-62; Walter H. Murphey and Bjorn Klinge, "Civil Defense Abroad," in Eugene P. Wigner, *Who Speaks for Civil Defense?* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), pp. 76-80; and Swedish Government Committee on Radioactive Waste, *Spent Nuclear Fuel and Radioactive Waste*, SOU 1976: 32 (Stockholm: Swedish Government Committee on Radioactive Waste, 1976), pp. 64-65.

[26] Harvey, "Civil Defense," pp. 149-77, and Murphey and Kling, "Civil Defense Abroad," pp. 75-86.

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expedient protective measures as remaining indoors and covering nose and mouth with a cloth during the passage of the radioactive cloud. In addition, every household should have a supply of potassium iodine tablets which will block the intake of radioactive iodine. They might also stock anti-nausea pills and breathing masks. Finally, civil defense planning should include steps to deal with long-term radiation contamination. If these measures were undertaken in conjunction with military defense, both the immediate and long-term casualties could be reduced, perhaps significantly.

### *Facility Siting*

Most nations recognize facility siting as an important factor in protecting populations from accidental releases. Reactors are built 15 to 20 miles from urban areas, and support facilities are sited in even more remote regions. Residential populations are banned entirely for several miles around facilities. To minimize public exposure to contaminants, these distances could be extended. Increased costs, however, especially in transmission of electricity, would result. Finding acceptable siting locations is another problem, and in small countries with high population densities such as Isreal or those in Western Europe, the problem is formidable. In others, including the Soviet Union, South Africa, Egypt, and Pakistan, all of which have remote regions, this option may be more attractive.

Remote siting need not be limited to land; facilities can be placed on large lakes, inland seas, or oceans. Power plants could be built on floating platforms surrounded by breakwaters, on floating vessels anchored to the marine floor, on artificial islands, or even undersea. However, there would be higher transmission costs for reactors, unique construction costs, and exposure to dangers peculiar to such siting environments including ship collisions, accidental explosions, and naval bombardment vulnerability.[27]

Underground placement is another siting option. Although it will not prevent a nuclear facility from releasing radioactivity via penetrations connecting the plant to the surface, it could reduce facility vulnerability. It affords several other advantages as well. Underground installations might be better able to withstand earthquakes and would also be immune to storms, explosions, and aircraft crashes. Rock formations able to contain releases would obviate the need for reinforced concrete containment vessels. Such facilities would not protrude from the landscape, thereby preserving aesthetic values, and land sites could be used for other purposes. Economic transmission costs can be realized if power plants are well situated and allow waste heat to be put to industrial uses.

[27] Studies that examine the marine option include George Yadigaroglu and Stephen O. Andersen, "Novel Siting Solutions for Nuclear Power Plants," *Nuclear Safety* 15 (1974), pp. 654–57, and Otto H. Klepper and Truman D. Anderson, "Siting Considerations for Future Offshore Nuclear Energy Stations," *Nuclear Technology* 22 (1974), pp. 160–69.

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Finally, construction time can be shortened in the controlled environment of a cavern not exposed to the idiosyncracies of weather.[28]

Against such benefits, drawbacks must be weighed. Precise construction costs are unknown. One study ventured to say that burial of a power plant could add as much as 40 percent to its price.[29] The siting may pose operational difficulties. Since subterranean installations are likely to be very compact, inspection and maintenance would be more difficult than in a surface facility. Furthermore, ground water seepage may pose unique corrosion problems.

### *Increasing Plant Safety*

Nuclear facilities and material can be made more resistant to radioactive releases. Some reactors are safer than others; heavy water reactors, high temperature gas reactors, and molten salt breeder plants can withstand the loss of coolant better than the widely used light water reactors.[30] Improved containment would provide additional safety. For example, a filtration system connected via a duct to the containment building would significantly reduce radioactivity entering the atmosphere.[31] Its performance in a wartime scenario would depend on the extensiveness of reactor destruction and the survivability of the filter system itself.

Inherent safety principles also can apply to other aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, notably, to high-level liquid wastes. Retention of wastes in liquid form makes them particularly susceptible to release when deprived of coolant. Further, there is a more acute problem in leaks resulting from containment rupture, a peril underscored by several such incidents due to corrosion. Fortunately, solidification into a glass-like substance makes migration unlikely except for water-induced leaching or vaporization of products as a consequence of a nuclear explosion. The commercial reprocessing plant built in Barnwell, South Carolina, called for glassification after one year's cooling. This period could be reduced to three months if the liquid is first converted to a granular state allowing better heat dissipation.

### *International Management of Nuclear Energy*

International management can provide some alternatives for addressing the nuclear facility wartime problem. Precedent exists in the International Atomic En-

[28]. There is some experience in situating research reactors underground in Norway, Sweden, France, and Switzerland. B. M. Watson, et al., *Underground Power Plant Siting* (Pasadena, Calif.: Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, 1972). See also J. H. Crowley, et al., "Underground Nuclear Plant Siting: A Technical and Safety Assessment," *Nuclear Safety* 15 (1974), p. 531.

[29] *Nucleonics Week*, 28 July 1977.

[30] Taylor, "Reactor Safety Considerations," pp. 11–13 and private communication from Conrad Chester of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 9 April 1980.

[31] David Okrent, et al., *Post-Accident Filtration as a Means of Improving Containment Effectiveness* (Los Angeles: School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, University of California, 1977).

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ergy Agency's responsibility to monitor nuclear material in most countries and in its advisory guidelines on methods to prevent sabotage and insure safe operation. In addition, nuclear exporters have devised common criteria to insure their products are used for peaceful purposes.

Because destruction of nuclear installations in war affects global security, international institutions should exercise controls. The International Atomic Energy Agency should establish a working group to suggest guidelines that address the problem. A permanent standing committee might be created to advise nations about threats. Given the historical trend toward greater international institutional involvement to minimize nuclear dangers, creation of an authoritative international body may be warranted. Such a body would anticipate and regulate nuclear risks including national and subnational diversion of nuclear material for weapons purposes, the vulnerability of facilities to subnational sabotage, and the safe operation of plants, as well as wartime vulnerability.[32] Whether more authoritative institutions are either desirable or attainable in view of the reluctance of nations to surrender sovereignty to international bureaucracies which might not reflect their interest is a matter that can be solved only in international negotiation and bargaining. Formulation of guidelines alone is probably the course of least resistance and is consistent with International Atomic Energy Agency practice.

## Conclusion

Save for the elimination of nuclear energy—the practicality of which is hotly debated—none of the remedies to nuclear facility destruction in war are foolproof. They offer marginal means to reduce facility vulnerability in conventional weapons conflict and to ameliorate the radiological consequences should destruction take place. They are likely to be ineffective in nuclear war. A conundrum therefore results because the temptation to employ threats or actions against nuclear facilities adds a significant dimension to the problem of maintaining peace and minimizing the consequences of war. Given the potential to contaminate large areas, military destruction or threatened destruction may have significant implications for regional security. The Israeli bombardment of Iraq's nuclear facility suggests that the vulnerability of atomic plants to military action should be included in nuclear energy risk calculations and strategic planning.*

[32] For elaboration, see Bennett Ramberg, "Preventive Medicine for Global Nuclear Energy Risks," paper delivered to the California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, July 1979.

* The author wishes to thank Jan Beyea for technical advice in the preparation of this article.

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# Book Reviews

Earl Warren: A Public Life *by G. Edward White. New York, Oxford University Press, 1982. 429 pp. $25.00.*

The appointment of Earl Warren as Chief Justice of the United States was the most crucial event during President Eisenhower's relatively quiescent White House years. Warren initiated a constitutional revolution in three major areas—race relations, reappointment, and rules of criminal procedure. Once again the Court functioned as "a continuing constitutional convention," not, as formerly, on behalf of economic interests but in furtherance of human rights. Measures that could not have been accomplished, even by resorting to the amendment process, were achieved by nine men, appointed for life and politically unaccountable.

President Eisenhower soon regretted his decision as "the biggest damn fool mistake I ever made." He expressed disappointment to Warren himself, evoking from the Chief Justice a query about what he "would do with the Communists in America." "I would kill the SOB's," snapped the president. Warren generously inferred that Ike was "merely petulant, not definite" (p. 248).

As the title suggests, White's book is an account of a public life and not a conventional biography. Professor of law at the University of Virginia, he draws material chiefly from published sources. Chief Justice Warren, like his successor, was adamantly opposed to opening Court papers for scholarly perusal. Apparently the author did not have access to Warren's papers, except as he may have had occasion to examine them during his clerkship with the Chief Justice.

White's original goal was an "extensive essay." He expanded it after realizing that Warren's phenomenal success could be understood only in light of his political career in California, first as a prosecutor, and later as governor, including an unprecedented third term.

In his political classic, *The Prince,* Machiavelli considers fortune "the arbiter of one half of our actions, but she still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less." Warren's life is a striking illustration. After a varied career in California politics, he inti-



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mated interest in a Supreme Court appointment. Eisenhower and Attorney General Brownell entertained certain doubts as to Warren's judicial qualifications. Warren himself was painfully aware of his inadequacies. Ironically, he possessed talents and experience more useful as Chief Justice than associate. In California, he had learned firsthand how to reconcile differences. Fate alone dictated the first opening—the fortuitous circumstance of Chief Justice Vinson's sudden death.

Fortune smiled again when the first case in which Warren presided was the historic *Brown* decision. The case had already been argued in the sharply divided Vinson Court. Vinson had hesitated to overturn the half-century-old "separate but equal" doctrine. Thus, a complex set of circumstances was provided with which the new Chief Justice was especially well-equipped to deal. Another stroke of good fortune was the presence of Justice Frankfurter, ready and willing as always to assist a newcomer and thereby enhance his own power and prestige. To make doubly certain the Chief Justice got off on the right foot, Frankfurter donated his talented law clerk, Gerald Gunther. Warren exploited this relationship to the limit and the result was well-nigh miraculous. In spite of the strong public opposition certain to be aroused, the decision was unanimous. Naturally the lion's share of the credit went to the new Chief Justice. Frankfurter was outraged. In a letter to Learned Hand, he minimized the plaudits accorded Warren as "hogwash" (p. 168).

*Brown* marked the beginning of the end of the Warren–Frankfurter honeymoon. Early in 1956, Frankfurter begged Hand to "stop flagellating your soul about that Earl Warren. Of course, he ain't got no distinction nohow" (p. 180). Differences finally erupted in open court, reflecting adversely on both.

The author devotes a lengthy chapter to Warren's performance as chairman of the commission appointed to investigate the assassination of President Kennedy. It is not a success story for the Chief Justice's administrative talents foundered and the proceedings suffered from his inclination to cut corners in order to get the job done.

Warren also exhibited a petty side. He harbored grudges and reacted impulsively to criticism as when he abruptly resigned from the American Bar Association. In Chapter 7, the author details Warren's mostly negative "reacting to Felix Frankfurter" (pp. 172–90). The nub of Warren's resentment of Frankfurter's insulting and patronizing attitude was the conviction that if he had qualified as a "scholar on the bench" (one writer's label for the Harvard law teacher), his enduring impact would have been like Frankfurter's—negligible and inconsequential. Warren did not share Edmund Burke's self-effacing dictum: "Our antagonist is our helper."

White's analysis is penetrating, his literary style engaging. He brings to his task an evident desire to understand and appreciate rather than condemn or glorify. On occasion this approaches credulity. To regard the Constitution, for example, as primarily the embodiment of ethical imperatives and constitutional law and as "lessons in civics" does not square easily with legal orthodoxy.

Nevertheless, White places the Chief Justice in the nebulous category of "great man" which Justice Holmes likened to being at a "ganglion in the nerves of society . . . a strategic point in the campaign of history and part of his greatness consists in his being *there*." Warren was not only *there*, seated in the Court's center chair; his contributions were extraordinary. He rated reapportionment reform, which marked the sharpest break

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with Frankfurter, his most significant achievement, contending that "one man, one vote" might have rendered *Brown* unnecessary.

In sum, Earl Warren was a "great man, not only for what he embodied but also for what he accomplished" (p. 369).

ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON
*Princeton University*

The American Experiment, Volume 1: The Vineyard of Liberty *by James MacGregor Burns. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1982. 741 pp. $22.95.*

This is the first installment of a three-volume history of the United States from the time of the Constitutional Convention to the present. James MacGregor Burns addresses many questions in this book, but three themes dominate: the divergent ideas that pre-Civil War Americans held about liberty, equality, the role of government, and the very nature and purpose of the Union; the interrelationship between the constitutional structure established in 1787 and the emerging party system; and the quality of leadership—national, state, and local—throughout the period before 1860. The latter theme, especially, has been central to all of Burns's studies.

Written with exceptional style and wit, this book synthesizes a vast amount of primary and secondary material. Most of the factual information is familiar, and Burns's debt to the work of other historians and political scientists is evident. But this remains very much a personal work; the author's special concerns dominate every chapter.

Burns examines the first 75 years of American national history, moving from the ideas and accomplishments of those who wrote the Federal Constitution to the crisis of leadership, partisan politics, and sectional interests that led to the Civil War. Interspersed with the political analysis is a series of sketches of individuals and groups, as well as of cities, states, and regions, that played key roles in the political, economic, social, and intellectual developments of the period. These sketches are intentionally impressionistic; they allow Burns to give the reader a glimpse of the vast, diverse, and often chaotic society with which the leaders of the time had to deal.

Burns has entitled his study *The American Experiment* for good reason. Not only was the United States the first modern nation to break away from the empire of a European colonial power, but it was also founded on an ideology of republicanism and offered an opportunity to determine whether popular government in a geographically extended republic could accomplish two basic purposes: "to advance the general welfare while protecting individual rights" (p. 115). These purposes are not always compatible: A vigorous government capable of implementing positive programs always poses a threat to the rights and interests of individuals and minorities.

Burns has an abiding preference for a political system that allows leaders to use power actively to promote liberty and justice, and not simply to provide devices to control and check that power. He also believes that the Americans' ideological commitment to popular government after Independence obliged their leaders to work on behalf of all segments

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of society. According to the author, the U.S. government before the Civil War largely succeeded in satisfying the needs of white males, but largely failed to meet those of a vast number of Americans—women, slaves, Indians, and newly-arrived immigrants. The Federal Constitution, despite the enlarged vision of its framers, embodied an essentially negative conception of government: It was designed to curb potential tyrannies of the governors and of the people. Burns argues that the emergence of a national party system offered politicians the opportunity, within this constitutional framework, to form governing majorities which could "translate popular needs and aspirations into public policy and social change" (p. 367). The failure of that party system to do so—resulting from intraparty fragmentation and the lack of coherent philosophies, positive programs, and imaginative ("transcending") leadership—was a central cause of the Civil War.

There is a tension here that is central to all of Burns's studies. One can envisage an ideal form of popular majority rule, embracing a respect for minority rights *and* a need for positive and progressive action in behalf of *all* segments of society. On the other hand, there is the weight of history, those innumerable factors that prevent leaders from accomplishing this. It is Burns's strength that he is able to write about both at once, to present a personal vision of effective popular government—with which, of course, not all readers will agree—and also to show the forces that work against it.

This book is both instructive and highly entertaining. Burns has not written a textbook; this is a sweeping work of selective historical analysis. It addresses a perennial problem of popular politics, that is, the ways by which to devise a program of positive action for a pluralistic and contentious society.

DOUGLAS M. ARNOLD
*Yale University*

Years of Upheaval *by Henry Kissinger. Boston, Mass., Little, Brown and Co., 1982. 1283 pp. $24.95.*

A statesman's memoirs are, by definition, self-serving. We do not turn to them for confessions of error, misperception, or ignorance. Henry Kissinger's are no exception to this rule. Where his differ, however, is in their extraordinary sense of drama. Like their author, these memoirs convey a sense of authority heightened by an aura of intrigue. Despite their enormous length—this 1200-odd page volume, coming after its 1500-page predecessor, covers only the 19 months of Nixon's aborted second term, with the Ford presidency still to come—they are as lively as they are informative. This is a better-written book than its predecessor: less digressive, richer in the character portraits which Kissinger paints with such mastery, and not nearly so pontifical. This volume is a historical work of the first importance, an indispensable source-book not only of the policies of the Nixon administration, but of the forces that govern American diplomacy in the era of the Cold War.

For this reason Kissinger's books—this one, its predecessor, and its eventual successor—must be read with great care, because they are enormously rich in the detail of policymaking and negotiation. His account of shuttle diplomacy and the Sinai settlement

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alone provide the raw material for hundreds of courses and dissertations. His present account of the other great events of his reign—the Paris accords on Vietnam, the broken dialogue with Europe, the overthrow of Allende in Chile, and the Watergate crisis—are rich in valuable insight and information.

Care must also be taken in evaluating this presentation, however, because Kissinger is such an articulate and persuasive advocate of his own cause. He has written these memoirs not only to justify his performance to his contemporaries, but to provide a frame of reference for the future. He wants to ensure that history will interpret events not through the eyes of critics and skeptics, but as he has recorded them. This is why these books are so grotesquely long. Kissinger barbs every antagonist, refutes every critic, and describes every event with an air of authority designed to sweep away any other interpretation. He knows that people have short memories, that the voices of his critics eventually grow faint, and that there are young people for whom Vietnam, Cambodia and Chile are only what they read in history books. With his eye on the verdict of posterity, Kissinger has arranged the past in a pattern that reflects his view of events and is meant to justify those views to future readers.

For those who approach this book with a necessary circumspection, it is a great lode of riches, for it reveals not only Kissinger's mind, but his method of operations. He is contemptuous of human rights as a factor in foreign policy; of Congress which he views as an impediment to presidential authority; and of minor players in the great power game (such as Europe and Cuba). He considers public opinion a beast which should be ignored where possible and tamed where necessary. For him, Watergate summed up everything that was wrong with the American system of government: not the abuses of power that forced Nixon to resign, but the interference in the process of statecraft by a meddlesome public, Congress, and press.

Future generations will probably be less awestruck by Kissinger than his contemporaries, and also less appalled. What these pages make clear is that for all his scholarly trappings and pontifical tones, he is less a conceptualizer than a brilliant improviser and negotiator. He was a manipulator of people, of events, even of facts. He was ruthless in his approach to power, whether his victims were his hapless bureaucratic rivals or the doomed peoples of Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, he could also charm, wheedle, and connive with an awesome skill that made him unique in the Nixon years, a skill which makes him still a force to be reckoned with today.

RONALD STEEL
*Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*

Greed Is Not Enough: Reaganomics *by Robert Lekachman. New York, Pantheon, 1982. 213 pp. $13.50.*

Progress, we have often been told, comes about when Young Turk irreverence clashes with entrenched conventional wisdom. In economics, as in modern economies, nothing works as we have been told. Robert Lekachman, Distinguished Professor at the City University of New York, should, by all rights, be complacently defending positions devel-

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oped a generation ago against the onslaught of young critics. Yet his voice is breezy, youthful, and optimistic, while his targets, some barely half his age, are old fogies desperately holding onto discarded doctrines.

If economics were a science, this book would never have been written. Theoretically, John Maynard Keynes and Joseph A. Schumpeter exposed the classical and neoclassical theory of perfect competition some time ago. Empirically, the Great Depression indicated to the satisfaction of most that free markets either do not exist or do not work. But economics, while claiming scientific status, is too closely connected to wealth and power to be unaffected by the demands of ideology. Supply-side economics did not achieve its current popularity for scientific reasons. It has reached the spotlight because its message was attractive to important people. For this reason alone, this latest ideological manifestation (neo-neoclassical economics) requires an ideological critique, and Lekachman's is the most entertaining and intelligent to be offered so far.

Lekachman offers high irony and arch commentary to offset the more plodding and uninspired claims of the economists of the Reagan administration. After a quick review of the promises made by supply-side economics, he moves on to a discussion of the Reagan tax cut, budget projections, and military generosity, concluding, in a chapter entitled "Will It Work?" that the whole business will not. While Lekachman is convincing in his critique, I am sure that not even he expected Reaganomics to be exposed so rapidly. By the time Lekachman's book appeared, the honeymoon was over, and that *Greed Is Not Enough* made the best-seller list (if, alas, for only one week) is some indication of its relevance.

Supply-side economics, in a word, is a bad joke, and Lekachman's great skill is revealing the punch line. Unfortunately, easy targets do not provide great insights. Because supply-side economics is a willful attempt on the part of very intelligent human beings to deny the wisdom of accumulated experience, critique inevitably moves down to the level of what is being criticized. As a polemic, the volume is wonderful, as analysis, it has its limits. With all due respect, I would like to mention two.

Reaganomics was appealing because of a sense of desperation, a feeling that every other scheme available had been tried and found wanting. Yet, especially when compared to European societies, very little imaginative economic policy in the United States was ever tried. Political economy, in short, needs to understand why some policies are *not* put on the agenda, not only why others are. Conservatives may be right that Keynesian economics and regulation failed, but the reason is that politically strong forms were not adopted. Lekachman, in my opinion, fails to analyze sufficiently the faults of the old liberalism, which is why his explanation of the attraction of the new conservatism is underdeveloped.

Similarly, at the end of his book Lekachman offers a program of revival for the left. It is a good and decent program, one that would work better than anything tried under Reaganomics. But we also need to know how to figure out a political strategy by which more innovative ideas would be taken seriously, and on that point, not enough is offered here.

These are quibbles, a political writer's complaints about economists' concerns. The book is everything we have come to expect from as witty and perceptive an observer as Lekachman. He has a sane approach to an increasingly bizarre subject. In a society with

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more rational priorities, he would be Lord Lekachman, preaching the voice of experience and restraint. In America he is a dissenter, often ignored by his own profession. For the rest of the dissenters out there, he is an inspiring addition to the ranks.

ALAN WOLFE
*Queens College*

MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975 *by Chalmers Johnson. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1982. 393 pp. $28.50.*

There are, unfortunately, few books on Japanese politics and economics that deserve to be widely recommended to nonspecialists from either discipline, let alone to the generally informed public. Happily, Chalmers Johnson's excellent study is one of those rare gems that will demand attention from wide audiences. It is a sparkling addition to scholarship and literacy.

Practitioners of many different arts with multiple motivations have sought to explain Japan's economic success. Rejecting the most prevalent explanations, Johnson offers a compelling, and by far the most politically comprehensive, explanation I have seen to date. Japan's growth, he argues, has been the consequence neither of simple state direction, à la communism or socialism, nor of rampant laissez-faire market capitalism. Instead, he argues, it is the result of a fluctuating mix of public direction and market mechanisms which he labels "state directed capitalism."

A subsidiary theme running throughout the book is that the policies and institutions that contributed so much to the success of this state directed capitalism during the 1950s and 1960s were largely in place as early as the 1930s and 1940s and were reinvigorated, rather than squelched, under the U.S. Occupation (1945–52). Most explicitly, he argues, it was the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and its predecessors, the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce (MAC) (1881–1925), the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) (1925–43), and the Ministry of Munitions (1943–45) that were most directly responsible for formulating and executing an industrial policy that combined strong state initiatives with market incentives. Staffed as these agencies were by a continuous line of development-oriented bureaucrats such as Yoshino Shinji, Kishi Nobusuke, Yamamoto Takayuki, and Sahashi Shigeru, institutional and policy continuities were complemented by continuities in personnel.

Six of the book's eight chapters present the political history of these institutions. All are rich in personalities, events, and interpretations. The story they tell is of the early establishment of broad state controls over the economy designed to offset the disadvantage of Japan's late industrialization, but without the loss of private initiative and incentives. Recovery after World War II was followed by explicit state policies that targeted specific industries deemed critical to national economic development and helped to make them internationally competitive. This led into the high-speed economic growth policies of the 1960s and early 1970s. Administrative guidance, a broad label for a mélange of bureau-

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cratic devices that ran the gamut from mild suggestions to direct threats, was critical to MITI's ability to promote mergers and cartels, reshape entire industrial sectors, and prepare Japanese industry to compete effectively when the nation's trade and capital markets were liberalized. Johnson also makes a compelling case that, for the period since 1973, such liberalization has in fact taken place, even though MITI's "cosmopolitan nationalists" have in many instances used their bureaucratic powers to undermine the spirit behind this liberalization.

Unlike many today, Johnson is skeptical of the extent to which the Japanese experience can be duplicated in other countries. History, institutions, personalities, and policies have been too uniquely combined. Yet he does stress the merits of a small, cohesive, and talented bureaucratic agency, such as MITI, for any country anxious to create a coordinated industrial or economic policy.

Two drawbacks grow out of the sources of the book's great strengths. The book is rich with the politics of intra-bureaucratic rivalries and battles between MITI and other political organizations over spheres of influence. Consequently, even though Johnson takes meticulous care to ground his study in a broader history and politics and to focus on MITI's role in economic growth, there is no escaping the feeling that MITI and its predecessors were the prime movers in the political history of the country. Yet throughout much of the politics of the 50 years Johnson examines, they were little more than bit players on a stage dominated by others. Such is the pitfall of any good institutional study.

Second, economic explanations are too often frustratingly dehumanized and depoliticized. Johnson convincingly demonstrates that politics and personalities were unmistakably vital to whatever success Japan's economy experienced. For a book on economic growth, however, the force of Johnson's justifiably political argument leaves the book with remarkably little attention paid to economic factors.

Despite such drawbacks, this is a book that is very rich in information, texture, and insight. It will undoubtedly continue to be widely read long into the future and will also stand as a pillar of scholarship to be emulated by the best minds in several fields. It is a delight to read.

T. J. PEMPEL
*Cornell University*

Coping with U.S.-Japanese Economic Conflicts *edited by I. M. Destler and Hideo Sato. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1982. 293 pp. $24.95.*

Trade disputes during the 1970s tested the Japanese-American alliance politically and economically. Fortunately, through prolonged and relatively successful management, conflicts were controlled, if not always resolved. Of the five cases discussed in this work, the auto problem became more difficult after 1980. Furthermore, the basic causes of bilateral trade problems remained: the whopping American trade deficit with Japan ($18 billion in 1981) and the nature of trade (America's predominant agricultural and forestry products against competitive manufactures).

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This book analyzes conflicts in the steel, automobile, and agricultural industries, in the Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Company (NTT), and in macroeconomic diplomacy. In each case, the statement of the problem, the interests of both sides, the history of contacts and negotiations between the parties, and the basic political and economic issues and their ramifications in both countries are set forth in detail. The collaboration of Japanese and American authors produces a double-sided presentation which makes for fairness and objectivity. The result is a textbook in international negotiating procedures, highlighting errors and merits, as well as differences in the cultural approaches of the respective participants.

Steel and automobiles dominate. In 1976, American steel imports from Japan amounted to 52 percent of all steel imports, which had risen to 18 percent of total American domestic consumption. The U.S. steel industry clamored for redress. After a series of actions and counteractions, and rising unemployment, the "trigger price mechanism" (TPM) was devised in 1978 whereby imported steel selling below Japanese steel production costs (the "trigger price") would bring dumping charges. Reinstated in September 1980, the TPM seemed to defuse the steel issue.

By 1979, three out of four imported automobiles (76.3 percent) were made in Japan. American auto manufacturers, misjudging a surge in demand for small cars, fought to stem the tide of Japanese imports, urging "voluntary" restraints and establishment of Japanese factories in the United States. Honda built a plant, and Nissan decided to construct a small truck factory. On 1 May 1981, the Japanese limited exports to the United States to 1.68 million vehicles for each of two years. In 1982, the United Auto Workers (UAW) asked Japan to extend the limitation to 1983 "and beyond."

The problems of NTT and beef and citrus, smaller in magnitude, were no less acute. "Telecommunications," according to one quoted American official, "is the ticket on the twenty-first century express, and both we and the Japanese want to ride first class" (p. 208). Finally some access to NTT procurement was obtained. Beef and citrus were more politically sensitive issues, especially for the powerful agricultural lobby in Japan. The issue was not settled, with still another meeting scheduled for October 1982.

The story of Japanese–American trade problems delineates the methods, stances, and talents of negotiators. Pressure became a salient issue for Americans: to use or not to use. Misunderstandings arose when American volubility met Japanese silence. All of these considerations and many more have figured in the scenarios. Fortunately the cast of characters included outstanding negotiators, such as former Ambassador Nobuhiko Ushiba and former Foreign Minister Saburo Okita on the Japanese side and Robert Strauss and Henry Owen among the Americans. These case studies illuminate our crucial relationship with Japan.

JOHN K. EMMERSON
*Hoover Institution, Stanford University*

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Oil: The Missed Opportunity, or Naft and Shaft *by Aubrey Jones. New York, Universe Books, 1982. 238 pp. $27.50.*

Although numerous books on the new international politics and economics of oil have appeared in the past decade, most have dealt with the effects of oil price increases and shrinking supplies upon industrialized, oil-consuming nations. Few have done what Aubrey Jones attempts to do in analyzing the current situation from the viewpoint of the oil-producing countries, which seek simultaneously to sell oil and to use the revenues derived for their own industrial development. Jones writes that "seen through the eyes of the oil-producing countries, they are being drained of their oil at a rate which threatens their future development" (p. 9)—hence the use of the terms "naft" and "shaft," derived from the Arabic words for "oil" and "suction." Although oil has given part of the developing world an opportunity to develop, both the industrialized nations and most OPEC countries have failed to understand that development requires not only money but also the educational, communications, and engineering skills necessary to establish an infrastructure capable of effective planning for development.

In assessing what forces or institutions determine the rate of oil production and what present depletion rates imply for oil-producing nations' efforts at industrialization, Jones examines differing attitudes toward oil depletion and investment of oil revenues into building a diversified industrial base within the United States, Canada, Venezuela, Ecuador, Mexico, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Algeria, and the United Kingdom. As for OPEC, Jones contends that the West erred in viewing it as a simple economic cartel and ignored its aims as a political coalition determined to reverse the history of private oil companies' failure to contribute significantly to the internal development of Third World oil-producing countries. One of the insights of the book is its recognition that future rates of oil production, as well as the success of oil-producing nations' attempts at development, depend on more than just the economics of supply and demand; they depend also on the resolution of social, political, ethnic, and religious divisions both within each oil-producing country and among OPEC countries. Despite these divisions, however, Jones foresees an even more cohesive OPEC in the future, if that organization is to achieve its wider (non-price) objectives of controlling the rates of depletion of its member states' oil and assisting in their industrializaton.

Jones concludes on a pessimistic note by suggesting that attempts at large-scale development may be doomed to fail for many reasons: the length of time required to create the social and political changes which are a precondition for development; the lack of effort by most oil-producing nations to slow their present rates of depletion and lack of enthusiasm among oil-consuming countries for curtailing their oil consumption; and the slowness of most OPEC members to absorb Western high technology. He also points to the unwillingness of both private oil companies and most Western governments to transfer the technology needed to help oil-producing countries slow their own depletion and develop alternative energy sources for a diversified industrial economy. As for the oil-consuming nations, Jones forecasts that, despite the current temporary glut in world oil supplies, "the day of oil shortage will arrive earlier than has hitherto been predicted" (p. 9) and that oil's real price will continue to rise.

Each chapter of the book is thoroughly documented with recent statistics on oil prices

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and production levels for each country discussed. Moreover, the author demonstrates a broad grasp not only of economics but also of politics and history—a welcome change from some earlier studies of oil by economists with a narrower focus. Jones's book is an impressive addition to the literature on the political economy of oil.

JAMES R. TEMPLES
*Bradley University*

Reforming the Reforms: A Critical Analysis of the Presidential Selection Process *by James W. Ceaser. Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger, 1982. 201 pp. $16.50.*

Following his learned criticism of the plebiscitary ideology in *Presidential Selection* (1979), Ceaser has written another useful work in the same field. This time he concentrates on the actual reforms of the 1970s, including their operation in 1980, and especially on proposed counter-reforms. As before, plebiscitary developments are linked to Progressive principles, notably Woodrow Wilson's, and contrasted unfavorably with Martin Van Buren's preference for representative nominating conventions. The new book's historical review, however, is brief. Its focus, as indicated by the title, is on the ways in which presidential nominating rules might be changed so as to restore a measure of peer review. Ceaser appreciates the difficulties in accomplishing that purpose, and his analysis is cautious, well-informed, and judicious.

The book's merits make for a valuable contribution to the already numerous discussions of presidential nominations by scholars, conferences, and commissions that have lately become increasingly critical of the post-1968 reforms. As Ceaser notes, "the spirit of reform has subsided" (p. 10), and policymakers, as well as political scientists, can consider representative alternatives to direct democracy. In fact, while his book was being published, the Democratic National Committee not only considered such alternatives, but also adopted modest versions intended to dilute the predominant impact of candidate-committed delegates chosen in primaries. Ceaser's work is thus clearly in the mainstream.

Despite brevity and topicality, the book carefully summarizes each party's nominating process and provides helpful tabulations of presidential primaries, delegate selection methods, and relevant party rules. An entirely appropriate emphasis is on the commitment by 1980 of the great majority of delegates to presidential candidates as a result of popular choices registered mainly in primaries but also in participatory caucuses. Consistent with this emphasis is a view of proportional representation as important chiefly because of the way it forces delegate commitments, and of quota-like provisions being of limited significance because group representatives, like other delegates, are bound to candidate preferences expressed by primary or caucus voters. Equally incisive but more unusual is Ceaser's treatment of the McGovern–Fraser Commission's indignation concerning the selection of delegates in the year before the 1968 convention. That practice—understandably incompatible with the reformers' desire to represent popular choices among election-year candidates—is for Ceaser neither procedurally objectionable nor

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generally unsuitable as a means of obtaining representation for uncommitted party regulars. Indeed, the "untimely selection of delegates" is a counter-reform Ceaser suggests for the Democratic party (p. 150).

Like the suggestion just noted, Ceaser's other preferences appear to be for limited changes that national parties or state parties and legislatures could adopt. He is dubious about national legislation in the area of presidential nominations and is specifically critical of broad proposals like Everett Ladd's and Terry Sanford's whether or not they involve congressional action. Although favorably disposed to caucus selection of more delegates, Ceaser does not seek ideological activist domination of such delegation. He wants instead the representation of party office-holders and other leaders.

Ceaser's discussion may often seem to concern principally the Democratic party. The Republican party itself had not adopted many of the post-1968 reforms, and it won two of the three presidential elections following the crucial plebiscitary change that affected its nominating process much as it had the Democrats'. In particular, after Reagan's successful 1980 campaign, Republicans might be tempted to find virtues in the popular participatory system, perhaps in a more rationalized form. After all, the direct primary is accepted in both parties as the means for nominating candidates for almost all nonpresidential offices.

LEON D. EPSTEIN
*University of Wisconsin-Madison*

The Baroque Arsenal *by Mary Kaldor. New York, Hill and Wang, 1981. 294 pp. $14.95.*

This book is about, among other things, the complexity and expense of U.S. armaments. "Baroque" refers to the "perpetual improvements [to weapons] that fall within the established traditions of the armed services and the armourers" (p. 4). In Mary Kaldor's view, since World War II America's increasingly sophisticated tanks and aircraft have become "less and less relevant to modern warfare, while cost and complexity [have] become military handicaps" (p. 5).

Yet Kaldor's chief concern is less the weapons than the industry that spawns them. Today's baroque tanks and airplanes are produced by what were once America's strongest industries, the automobile and aircraft industries. The enormous output of these companies helped win the second World War, but as a consequence the nation's armed forces have been wedded to them ever since. Thus, in a "ritualistic replay of World War II," the armed services and their industrial partners produce ever more complex versions of the same weapons (p. 95).

This has made the firms themselves inefficient and unimaginative, with perverse effects on the U.S. economy. It is not simply that America's core industries are now decayed but also that their growth after World War II "absorbed resources that might otherwise have been used for domestic investment and attracted industrial energies that might have been deployed elsewhere" (p. 96). Decay in the defense sector thus lies at the heart of the nation's economic malaise.

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Meanwhile, the Soviet military is aping the United States, with much the same economic and military results. Elsewhere, too, through its arms exports, the United States has been "able to fashion foreign armies in its own image" (p. 142), thereby exporting decay to them. Worse, because the import of arms and arms industries "may represent the main impetus behind industrialization" (p. 149) in less developed countries, their overall development has been subverted. Kaldor thus blames the defense industry for much of the turmoil that accompanies economic development. Indeed, rarely does someone sneeze in Mary Kaldor's world save at the behest of America's defense industries. Reductionism carried to this extreme invites skepticism, of course, and in this case, skepticism is well warranted.

Today's weapons may be baroque by Kaldor's definition, for example, but how much is the industry itself responsible? The tendency for large military organizations to pursue endless improvements in traditional weapons is well documented, but it has been going on for much longer than there has been a defense industry of any consequence. Significantly, it is often the industry that pushes for simpler systems, as was the case with the YF-16, while the armed services themselves publish increasingly complex requirements. Industry's role in creating baroque weaponry is probably less than Kaldor asserts.

Similiarly less significant than Kaldor indicates is the industry's role in the American economy. Defense firms hardly dominate the Fortune 500. Most large firms, including those in the automobile industry, eschew defense contracts if they can, for there is too much paperwork and overhead for relatively low profits. Until it sold its tank facility to General Dynamics, Chrysler was the exception to this rule, but Chrysler's tank plant was a quite distinct entity alongside the rest of the firm.

Finally, can defense exports possibly be held responsible for development and decay in less developed countries? The export of truly baroque weaponry began in earnest only after the 1973 Middle East war. The export of technology capable of producing these weapons has hardly begun. Surely better culprits can be found to explain inefficiency and turmoil in less-developed countries.

Kaldor would have done better to stick with her initial premise. She has the right syndrome, and "baroque" is a good word for it. But she has failed to grasp either the causes or the consequences of the accumulation of baroque weapons. Instead, she jumps too quickly to grander themes and ends up treating none of them very convincingly.

THOMAS L. MCNAUGHER
*The Brookings Institution*

Nuclear Illusion and Reality *by Solly Zuckerman. New York, Viking Press, 1982. 154 pp. $10.95.*

Lord Zuckerman, a senior adviser to British governments on science and military affairs since World War II offers a well-informed, but opinionated, survey of current Western planning on nuclear weapons. His very clearly written book offers a definite set of prescriptions, including pledges and policies of non-first use of nuclear weapons, some substantial reductions in the numbers of these weapons, and an avoidance of any investment

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in such new and supposedly refined applications of nuclear weapons as precisely targeted counterforce missiles, limited nuclear warfare scenarios, or ABM (anti-ballistic missile) protection of civilian populations.

Having seen the precision and elegance of weapons technology exaggerated many times in the past, Zuckerman is skeptical as to whether nuclear weapons can ever be brought to the battlefield in a way benefiting the side using them. He advocates instead a greater reliance on conventional military preparations, a position he has taken ever since the 1950s.

The book offers capsulized summaries of the positions and publications of many other commentators in the field. These summaries are quite fair-minded in tracking some of the shifts and inconsistencies in others' positions. Consequently, the book amounts to a very valuable and readable overview of the strategic debate which has preoccupied Western defense planners since 1945.

Being a statement of one man's perspective, however, the book may be found incomplete or unsatisfying at points in its logic of strategic choice. While advocating a reliance on conventional defenses, it does not endorse the substantial increase in military spending that many analysts fear would necessarily be a part of this. Zuckerman also does not endorse British nuclear disarmament, even while painting most realistically the costs of continued nuclear weapons proliferation by an increasing number of nuclear powers.

Possibly the most worrisome prospect, not really addressed at all in the Zuckerman analysis, is the chance that the substantial Soviet and American nuclear disarmament advocated in the book would increase, rather than decrease, the appetite for nuclear weapons in places like Brazil, South Africa, Australia, and South Korea.

Not much attention is given to any inherent limits concerning what can be achieved by arms control, to any "dove's dilemmas." Lord Zuckerman's analysis throughout instead emphasizes the mistakes that he sees and the pathology of current strategy; he interestingly blames his colleagues in science and technology, more than the professional military, for the "nuclear illusions."

GEORGE H. QUESTER
*University of Maryland*

War and Change in World Politics *by Robert Gilpin. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1981. 272 pp. $19.95.*

Hegemonic change and hegemonic war, and much more the former than the latter, are Robert Gilpin's concerns in this volume. The book is notable for its author's use of the concepts of microeconomics and rational choice theory to account for the behavior of great states and their challengers and his use of the methods of historical sociology to put our contemporary states system in a genuinely comparative context. Gilpin has read widely and throughtfully, and future analysts of big changes in the world political system will find that he has asked important questions and given provisional answers. There is a wide-ranging and useful bibliography.

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Arnold Toynbee and E. H. Carr have evidently influenced Gilpin's thinking strongly. The life-cycle image in Toynbee's monumental *Study of History* of the vigorous youth, maturation, senescence, and death of empires and civilizations pervades Gilpin's reflections as to why the top dogs in world politics in any given era cannot stay top dogs indefinitely. Klaus Knorr once suggested a somewhat different approach when he remarked that it is more interesting to study why the Roman Empire took so many centuries to decline than why it ultimately fell. Intuitively, one must believe that if an undesired change can be held off long enough, it will be a wholly different and unforeseeable change with which one's descendants will be trying to deal.

In a world of scarce resources, ever-lengthening wish-lists, dynamic technology, uneven development, and unpredictable fluctuations in willingness to sacrifice, the game of world politics will go on. The next thousand years are certain to see big and not yet predictable changes in the pecking order among nations. This does not mean either that any given state must flounder helplessly until it sinks or breaks up or that its ultimate destination is written in the stars. There was no historical necessity for tiny Brandenburg to grow into mighty Germany or for mighty Germany almost to win but finally lose the Thirty-One Years' War of 1914–45. Neither did it have to happen that the Pax Brittanica in the Ocean World be succeeded by a Pax Americana in the early years of this century without an Anglo–American War to mark the change. The direction, rate, and cost of big change are subject to some control by skillful statesmen.

The most sophisticated have-versus-have-not theorist of hegemonic change in our time is E. H. Carr, whom Robert Gilpin largely accepts but, I think, partially misreads. Carr's great book, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, was first published in 1939 and contained a number of approving references to Munich and to the appeasement of Hitler which were deleted from the post-World War II edition which Gilpin cites throughout. Carr's wartime book, *The Conditions of Peace*, now mercifully neglected, and his more sensible *Nationalism and After* also need to be read as one assesses the prescriptive utility of this archetypal political realist. The center of Carr's interest was certainly in the transition from one hegemonial power to another, but that other was the before September 1939 Hitler's Germany and there are at least hints that in the first years after 1945 it was Stalin's Soviet Union. It is only because we know how World War II turned out that it is plausible to impute to the Carr of 1939, as Gilpin does twice (pp. 198 and 234), a view that the crisis of *The Twenty Years' Crisis* was a crisis of transition from a world dominated by Britain to one dominated by the United States.

Maybe the problem is with the notion of hegomonial power itself. In some eras and some state systems, including our own era and our own system, there is more than one top dog, and the biggest changes cannot be well understood by always explaining them in terms of transitions from one top dog to another.

WILLIAM T. R. FOX
*Columbia University*

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The Global Politics of Arms Sales *by Andrew J. Pierre. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1982. 351 pp. Cloth, $20.00; paper, $5.95.*

As the author asserts at the outset, the sale of armaments has become "foreign policy writ large," a theme pervading this excellent treatment of a subject that has grown greatly in importance in international political relationships in the last decade.

Included in this volume is an enumeration and critical assessment of the major rationales for arms sales: the exercise of influence and leverage by a producer over a recipient; the achievement of regional security and stability; the role of conventional arms offered by suppliers, especially if they themselves are nuclear powers, as an alternative to nuclear proliferation on the part of recipient states; and the efforts of states, especially Great Britain and France, to maintain viable national armaments industries by the extended markets and lower unit costs supposedly offered by large-scale arms sales abroad. From the superpower perspective, arms sales have become a crucially important segment of competition by "proxy." For the Soviet Union, arms sales constitute what the author terms the primary foreign policy instrument available in its global confrontation with the United States.

Central to the study is a comparison of the world's four leading arms sellers—the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Britain—together with a regional survey that encompasses the recipients in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, and the Asian-Pacific area. Each of these themes and topics is treated with the necessary depth and with an understanding of the complexity inherent in arms sales and purchases as they relate to the other dimensions of statecraft and national interest. The analysis is based upon the development of a comprehensive data base on arms sales, together with extensive research conducted by the author during a several-year period in the United States and abroad.

Among the author's major conclusions is the contention that the diffusion of power, represented principally by the sales of arms, is producing a more pluralistic and regionally-oriented world. This thesis is related, in turn, to the finding that arms sales, in themselves, do not provide the supplier with a dependable form of leverage over the recipient. By its very nature, it would seem, the diffusion of power of which the sale of arms is symptomatic increases the potential for independent defense and foreign policies on the part of recipients. The author sees the need for international mechanisms to manage the flow of arms into and within various regions. A series of policy proposals are set forth: regular consultations among suppliers; the establishment of East-West "rules of the game"; and the creation of both qualitative and quantitative restraints. Although regional military balances, and hence arms sales policies at the regional level, will be of growing importance, the prospects for limiting arms sales are dimmed by the likely persistence of conflicts, especially with the Third World, that have their roots in factors other than the sale of armaments. As the author properly asserts, it is not arms sales that give rise to conflict, but rather conflictual relationships that lead states to acquire weapons, although the kinds of weapons available are likely to affect the manner in which wars are fought. Not only does the likelihood loom large that states will continue to purchase large numbers of increasingly sophisticated weapons, but that the capacity for indigenous arms

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production will grow—a theme treated in depth and that is central to the principal thesis of this volume.

ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR.
*The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy*

Controlling the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s *by Lewis A. Dunn. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1982. 209 pp. Cloth, $21.00; paper, $6.95.*

Overall, this book is a useful one, particularly if viewed as an intelligent effort in an almost untouched field: the ways to continue to control the spread of nuclear weapons while adjusting to a world in which there will be some spread. It recognizes that proliferation is a dangerous process which can be limited by proper policies on the part of the United States. It also recognizes that there will be sensitive tradeoffs between policies designed to limit the number of new nuclear weapons states and the arsenals of those new weapons states, to ameliorate the effects of whatever proliferation does occur, and to accomplish the wide range of U.S. non-proliferation goals. We cannot choose between pursuing alternate policies; we must balance among them.

Perhaps partially as a consequence of being an original work in this field, the book falls uneasily between being a serious study and a survey course. Too often, it becomes a "book of lists," with suggestions ranging from the sensible to the impossible (for example, a requirement for "high confidence intelligence" on would-be proliferators' "intentions," p. 137). In so doing it loses its sense of priorities and relationships among choices.

More particularly, Dunn underestimates the importance of technical constraints among the set of other measures to limit proliferation. Certainly they cannot stand alone, but the spread of separated plutonium would make a joke of other efforts. That plutonium is from multinational reprocessing centers or is safeguarded does not make it safe as Dunn seems at times to suggest (pp. 97–98, 101, 131). Basically, one fuel load for a breeder reactor contains several hundred bombs' worth of plutonium. Technical barriers cannot make weapons acquisition impossible, but they are necessary for making it expensive and obvious.

An inconsistency in Dunn's analysis surrounds his relatively benign view of states' covert acquisition of primitive nuclear arsenals (pp. 106, 136). As Dunn recognizes, a key factor contributing to the stability of the U.S.–Soviet balance was the development of nuclear forces secure from enemy first strikes, and safe from accidents and from capture by terrorists or rogue commanders. Secure, survivable, and redundant forces and force-related command-control communications are not likely to come with covert stockpiles. Once a state has gained nuclear weapons, the most dangerous thing may be for it to stand against a primitive force, useful only for first strikes.

This relates directly to an issue Dunn addresses: Should we provide new weapons states with aid in nuclear weapons $S^3$ (safety–security–survivability)? As Dunn recognizes, there

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are both practical and theoretical dilemmas here. This is likely to be an issue of increasing importance which will probably have to be decided on a case-by-case basis.

A useful opening section of the book is a history of past proliferators, that is, an analysis of what motivated the Soviet, British, French, and Chinese nuclear weapons programs. While brief and occasionally simplistic, it is a very helpful section. It would be more helpful, however, in light of the subject of the book, if the analysis were extended to examine the reactions of the existing nuclear powers to these past newcomers and what lessons can be learned for future reference. The Chinese-Soviet case is particularly interesting since it involves the only case of direct clashes between two nuclear powers, the 1969 Ussuri River incidents.

While the book has flaws, many of them flow from what makes it a most useful, intelligent, and primary piece in what is likely to become an increasingly important field: adjusting to a limited degree of nuclear weapons proliferation while continuing to constrain their further spread.

RICHARD I. BRODY
*Pan Heuristics*

The Dynamics of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy *edited by Natalie Kaufman Hevener. New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Books, 1981. 374 pp. $19.95.*

In the volume's opening chapter, Paul Kattenburg lays heavy emphasis on time, arguing that a "moral foreign policy" is tied to "prevailing ethical and value standards," and that "values, as well as the identification of events as the manifestations of particular values, are constantly in flux" (p. 20). No better proof of the historical relativity of human rights discourse—although not of the deeper concerns that inform it—is likely to be found than this assortment of 14 essays, all written during the first 18 months of the Carter administration.

The chief problem in the book is not with the issues addressed, but that the South Carolina colloquia-based volume is somewhat idiosyncratic in emphasis. Thus, there are two overlapping pieces on the rights of national minorities in international law (by Robert Wirsing and Walker Connor), two more focused on the institutional role of Congress in guaranteeing human rights (by Robert Boettcher and Robert Lillich), and a third pair (by Louis Sohn and Bruno Bitker) devoted largely to the Carter administration push for ratification of pending human rights conventions. On the other hand, questions such as religious freedom, the right to emigrate, and the political competency of the U.N. Human Rights Commission are touched on only tangentially, and the vital question of human rights in this hemisphere is addressed summarily in one short article by Martin Weinstein.

Another difficulty is with the emphasis throughout on President Carter's stance and the stance of the 95th Congress on issues that have shifted and assumed significant new interpretive contexts. Treatment of the aforementioned human rights ratification drive is a case in point. It failed utterly, and it is not likely to be revived again soon. Carter's political weakness and the conservatism of the Reagan administration have transformed the

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domestic universe of decision-making. The global screen has also changed as a result of events in Afghanistan, Iran, Lebanon, Zimbabwe, Poland, Cuba, Nicaragua, Argentina, Haiti, El Salvador, and the Falklands—to name only some of the places where cataclysmic events have changed the human rights landscape. Weinstein's article on the U.S. response to political repression in the Western Hemisphere, with its heavy emphasis on Southern Cone relations, is not irrelevant, yet it addresses none of the recent developments in the Caribbean Basin. Robert Borosage's article on the "Domestic Consequences of U.S. Human Rights Policy," which has as one of its principal theses that "the cold war . . . seems to have been reborn in the first year of [Carter's] administration" (p. 56), has been transmogrified into diatribe by Carter's subsequent "centrist" approach to events in Nicaragua and Cuba, his strong advocacy of the SALT II negotiations, and, most importantly, by the current administration's "hard line."

Of course some issues, like nuclear arms control and apartheid, are perennial. The article by Marcus Raskin and Ann Wilcox on the first topic provides a good, if impassioned, summary of international law principles that relate to nuclear disarmament. C. Clyde Ferguson's evaluation of U.S. and U.N. policy toward South Africa is too summary an account, but still relevant. David Weissbrodt's analysis of the role of non-governmental organizations in policymaking provides an adequate survey of a team that has expanded since 1977 but still employs many of the same players.

The best essays in the book, however, are those that are the most general: Richard Falk's evaluation of the ideological, cyclical coalitions that influence policymaking; Kattenburg's effort to find a moral basis for foreign policy in a relativistic world; and Wirsing's painstaking account of the origins and the problematic future of minority protection as a principle of international law. These set a standard that the rest of the volume does not reach.

JOHN A. SCANLAN
*Notre Dame Law School*

Government Oversight and Evaluability Assessment (It Is Always More Expensive When the Carpenter Types) *by Joe N. Nay and Peg Kay. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1982. 243 pp. $28.95.*

Evaluability assessment as a distinct approach to government oversight and program evaluation was developed by the Program Evaluation Group at the Urban Institute in the early 1970s. By 1975 the General Accounting Office (GAO) legitimized the approach by incorporating it into their evaluation and audit procedures, and application of the approach spread throughout the federal bureaucracy.

Evaluability assessment has at its core the normative view that evaluations ". . . must be usable, useful, and used" (p. 229), and that sufficient substantive and methodological knowledge is available to accomplish this. The utility of evaluations requires negotiating with policy-makers and program managers to identify explicit goals and measurable criteria of program performance, and that comprehensive, rigorous evaluations be con-

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ducted only of programs amenable to such efforts. A major procedure requires assessing the "real" expectations of "stake-holders," including policy staff, program managers and staff, and practitioners at the client delivery level.

The evaluation process involves the codification of *pre-evaluation* activities, which include a description of management's program objectives in measurable terms; assessment of the extent to which the program has been implemented; and appraisal of the explicitness of the program's success criteria. Also involved in the process are determination of the opportunities available to collect relevant information; assessment of management's authority and responsibilities to implement evaluation activities; appraisal of the prospects for utilization; and assessment of the extent to which utilization could enhance program performance. These assessment tasks should be carried out in an iterative manner with feedback and negotiation sessions serving the purpose of defining, refining, and explicating objectives, program procedures, evaluation perspectives, and utilization prospects.

Closely related to this pre-evaluation assessment process is the idea that the costs of evaluations can be minimized through "sequential purchase of information." Essentially, this means that "successive decision points are used to decide what part of the possible work—and how much of it—is to be purchased between one decision point and the next" (p. 195). Thus, if a decision-maker feels that enough information is available, or that certain findings do not justify the continuation of the evaluation, the purchase of information is stopped, resulting in considerable savings.

No wonder that evaluability assessment has been quickly adopted by the federal bureaucracy. It offers a pragmatic, snapshot, relatively inexpensive bureaucratic solution to the inherent complexities of evaluation research. At the same time, it provides a rationale for in-house evaluations, minimizing the roles of outsiders and enhancing the discretion of management over the conduct of evaluation research. Evaluability assessments cannot be carried out by relatively detached social scientists. They call for the involvement and advocacy of persons with high stakes in the agency or the program and with sufficient bureaucratic-political skills to negotiate with management the direction and components of the evaluation—its objectives, units of analysis, research design, and types of data to be collected. Under these circumstances, the chances for evaluation utilization increase, but this comes at the very high cost of internal and external validity. Indeed, mis-utilization is no less of a problem than under-utilization and perhaps even more so in an era of fiscal retrenchment.

The emergence of evaluation as a social scientific field has been closely associated with the realization that public bureaucracies cannot evaluate themselves. The evaluability assessment approach, lucidly and vividly presented in this book, has to be judged in this context.

DAVID NACHMIAS
*University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee*

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Controlling the New Inflation *by Thomas J. Dougherty. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1981. 171 pp. $19.95.*

This book was written against the background of the high inflation rates of 1979 and 1980. That in 1982 the inflation rate has dropped significantly does not make the central question moot. The villain is not dead, just groggy from the planned recession, gas-saving cars, and good harvests. When the upward swing of the business cycle once more occurs here and abroad, the inflation threat will reappear and we should be prepared to meet it with less painful devices than high interest rates.

The "new inflation" centers, Dougherty says, in the prices of necessities: food, energy, housing, and health. These expenditures amount to 60 to 70 percent of the spending of most families and a much higher percentage for the poor. They are the major stimuli to the wage-price spiral and ought to be attacked directly instead of using a shotgun approach that wounds too many in trying to kill inflation.

The author's proposed methods are unorthodox, though most of them have been tried or espoused before. The stated purpose of his book "is to rekindle interest in a now unfashionable anti-inflation tool—wage and price controls" and to suggest sectoral reforms in the four areas where the new inflation hits the hardest (p. 2). The author is well aware of the arguments against mandatory controls, but insists that if not prolonged beyond six months or so, a freeze can do much more good than harm, particularly in dampening adverse inflationary expectations.

After two chapters defending mandatory controls and showing that they can be made to work, the author devotes separate chapters to his proposals for curbing inflation in the prices of necessities.

Few will dispute the disastrous effect of oligopolistic OPEC pricing and Arab oil embargoes in the 1970s. The probability of similar price jolts in the future require planning defensive action now. Dougherty proposes stand-by allocation and coupon rationing authority as an emergency first step, followed by price rationing based on the combination of an excise tax, tax credits, and transfer payments to needy consumers. Domestic production of oil and gas will decline by 1990 even though prices rise. Therefore, it is necessary to develop synfuels and to use more solar energy.

Less conspicuous are the inflationary effects of jolts to food prices caused by crop failures, especially grain harvests abroad. To reduce these the author would establish a National Grain Stabilization Board with "standby authority to assume exclusive control of export grain sales" (p. 80). Board revenues could be used to help farmers in bad years and aid consumers through a novel tax-based incomes policy (TIP) of cash subsidies paid through voluntarily participating retail stores.

If a future inflationary recession hits the housing industry, Dougherty suggests holding down mortgage costs in three ways: require holders of mutual funds and money funds to invest an increasing percentage of their portfolios in building construction loans; stimulate the use of equity-sharing mortgages to shrink initial monthly payments; require all mortgage lenders to maintain reserves with the Federal Home Loan Bank and provide that these reserves earn higher interest rates if the loans are used for "necessity housing" rather than for "luxury housing."

The rapid rise in health costs is due to the spread of Medicare, Medicaid, and private

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prepaid health insurance, according to Dougherty, where the sick and their doctors have little incentive to reduce the amount of medical services per patient. Hospital cost control could be achieved by a complicated combination of ceilings on each hospital's total revenue and its revenue per patient while providing financial incentives to increase efficiency in purchasing and using hospital equipment.

The practical difficulties in getting enough support for Dougherty's proposals to be enacted into law seem insuperable in a Reaganomics atmosphere. Discusssion of their merits should begin, however. The book ought to be required reading in courses on comtemporary economic problems, even though it won't soon replace George Gilder on the president's desk or be widely read on Capitol Hill.

ROBERT B. PETTENGILL
*State University of New York, Albany*

The Role of Economic Advisers in Developing Countries *by Lauchlin Currie. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1981. 270 pp. $27.50.*

Lauchlin Currie has had a fascinating career as an economist for over 50 years. A Canadian by birth, he was educated at the London School of Economics and Harvard. His first job as a professional economist was as a lecturer at Harvard in 1929. He was denied tenure there because he advocated public spending as a stimulant to recovery—a belief abhorrent to the senior members of the Economics Department. From 1934 to 1939, he worked at the Federal Reserve Board with Marriner Eccles, and others associated with the New Deal, to devise monetary and fiscal policies to stimulate the economy. In 1939, Lauchlin Currie was appointed economic adviser to the president—the first economist to be so designated. He served President Franklin D. Roosevelt until 1945, when he left the government to enter private business. In 1949, he conducted an economic survey of Colombia for the World Bank—the first country study by that institution—and was then invited by the Colombian government to stay on as adviser. He has been associated with that country even since, currently as adviser to the National Planning Agency.

Currie brings a wealth of experience to the subject of economic advice giving (and receiving). His perspective is unique: he has had experience as economic adviser both in an advanced country (the United States) and in developing countries (with heavy concentration in Colombia). He has clear and strong views about what constitutes "good" economic advice, which he defines as a judicious mixture of idealism and intellectual judgment. A major part of the disagreement concerning the "quality" of advice arises from rapid changes in the field of economics, especially as it is applied to development, since the end of World War II. There is still considerable disagreement about what set of policies, development strategies, and so forth, are most conducive to bringing about a rapid transformation of economies in countries just beginning industrial development. Currie favors the idea of development of infrastructure for accelerating growth and a policy framework which allows for the play of market forces. It may well be, however, as Currie believes, that local conditions—social, cultural, and political—have a far greater bearing

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on the success or failure of an economic program than we have been willing to admit in the economics profession.

Currie begins and ends his book with a discussion of the state of economic knowledge underlying economic advice-giving. His views are clearly and forcefully stated. One can find little fault with either his review or his critique of economic knowledge in this context. His examples of policymaking and advice-giving are derived largely from the experience of Colombia with which he is most intimately familiar. Students of Colombia should find his description and analysis of the planning process there a very useful and sobering experience. Others should benefit from the many insights that the author has to offer about the perils, and pleasures, of advising developing countries on appropriate policies for rapid and sustained progress.

One minor quibble: The description and analysis of some of the episodes are just too short. Fewer topics done in greater depth would have enhanced the value of this book. (Incidentally, a minor typographical error appears throughout book: the name of Ragnar Nurkse is misspelled as Nurske.) All in all, however, this book is a valuable addition to the growing literature on the practice of development and the role of economic advisers in it—even if their advice is not always followed by the advisees.

KRISHAN SAINI
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Speech and Law in a Free Society *by Franklyn S. Haiman. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1981. 499 pp. $22.50.*

Like opinions of justices of the Supreme Court, books or articles on freedom of speech and the press reflect competing philosophies or ideologies. Writers like Walter Berns prize order and civility above unrestrained expression and tend to distinguish between speech and conduct; others—Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Alexander Meiklejohn, and Thomas I. Emerson, for example—tend to give expression a wider latitude, but even these admit to some restraints. Franklyn S. Haiman, professor of communication studies at Northwestern University and national secretary of the American Civil Liberties Union, rejects the thesis of Berns and goes well beyond the others in his advocacy of unrestrained expression with minimum limits.

The central purpose of this book is "to seek a coherent set of guiding principles" for resolving conflicts "between freedom of expression and the competing interests with which it may clash" (p. 425). Four basic principles are stated in Haiman's conclusion. Harm done by an act of expression or communication, as he calls it, must "be direct, immediate, irreparable, and of a serious material nature" (p. 425); otherwise the remedy is more speech. Second, unless influenced by "deception, physical coercion, or an impairment of normal capacities, individuals in a free society are responsible for their own behavior" (p. 425). Third, the law should enrich and expand the free marketplace of ideas. Fourth, in a free society, government as the servant of the people should not "inhibit, distort, or dominate public discourse" (p. 426).

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Few will disagree with these statements of general principles, but Haiman's application of them will invite argument. Thus, it is open to question that the law of defamation should not be applied to libelous or slanderous statements if followed by a retraction or there is no opportunity to refute them before the damage has been done. Despite the author's disclaimer, he does appear somewhat callous in arguing that the anguish felt by religious and racial groups exposed to epithets and insults is a price that must be paid for freedom of speech (p. 97). Nor is he persuasive when he questions the conviction of two men intending to picket the funeral of Eleanor Roosevelt, on the ground that "tasteless and repulsive" as it was, a sentence of 90 days in jail may not have been appropriate in a free society (p. 138). In these and many other instances, obscenity, fighting words, picketing, political hyperbole, speeches to hostile audiences, and conspiracy, the author would expand the protection of the First Amendment for expression well beyond the present law, and he tends to accept the public's right to know as a constitutional guarantee.

Despite these subjective caveats, the book has substantial merits. It is provocative and has the virtue of containing a good analysis of the present law as reflected by decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, the inferior federal courts, and many state tribunals. The book is clearly written, and to say that it lacks the eloquence of a Chafee or the broad philosophy of a Meiklejohn is not to question its very considerable contribution to the literature of freedom of expression. Although permeated by advocacy, the volume is not polemical, and opposing views are presented fairly and clearly.

ROBERT J. HARRIS
*University of Virginia*

Ethnic America: A History *by Thomas Sowell. New York, Basic Books, 1981. 353 pp. $16.95.*

Sowell's eminently readable account of the history of nine major American ethnic groups argues an updated version of Booker T. Washington's classic approach to group advancement in the United States. While not without its merits, the emphasis on industry and education as the key variables explaining the progress out of poverty of America's ethnic groups also limits understanding of the complex intersection of class and ethnicity. The fact that the American working class historically has been composed of immigrants and their children tends to transform discussions of class conflict and social mobility into analyses of ethnic antagonism and group succession. This book falls prey to this narrowing field of vision as it seeks to explain the different rates of mobility of American ethnic groups. Although Sowell recognizes a wide range of variables, including time and place of arrival, age and demographic distribution, education level and family structure, as well as the constellation of behavior patterns and norms usually labeled cultural inheritance, he neglects to discuss the argument addressed by many scholars of an "automatic elevator" whereby a maturing industrial economy, with its shifting distribution of employment from blue- to white-collar work, carries an ethnic group into better paid jobs, changing its occupational distribution as a result. Sowell awards high grades to those who, like the

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Japanese and the Jews, followed the path of small business entrepreneurship to economic security and then improved this position by investing in higher education for the next generation, leading to jobs in the professions; and he accords low scores to those who, like the Irish and Blacks, used aggressive political action to acquire jobs and power. His failure to consider the structural relationship of class position with ethnic identification, however, leaves unexplored one of the most important problems in the history of American ethnic groups.

Concerned largely with the socio-economic adjustment of immigrants to the United States, Sowell slights the political context of assimilation. He deals sensitively with the specific political decisions that affected the lives of thousands of ethnic Americans—the emancipation of black slaves, the internment of Japanese-Americans, the massive deportations of Mexican-Americans—but he generally avoids discussing the regnant political culture at each group's time of arrival. Thus Sowell does not indicate the manner by which the ascendancy of progressivism during the mass immigration of Italians and Jews shaped their responses to acculturation, or how the imposition of restrictive legislation, reflecting a changed political climate, may have redirected ethnic group strategies of adaptation. Given the sophisticated multi-variate analysis Sowell presents and his intelligent insistence on the interactive character of ethnic group acculturation in the United States, it is unfortunate that the American political milieu receives such scant notice.

The celebratory thrust of the work, evident in Sowell's concluding assessments of each ethnic group, embodies an ideological posture toward the heterogeneous peoples who comprise American society. Sowell writes from a perspective rooted in American values cherishing the diversity of the United States, yet he remains an outsider to the groups he describes. The costs of acculturation, the sacrifices entailed in becoming middle class, the individual frustrations, and the collective anguish over the choices imposed by a voracious American society do not engage Sowell's attention. In this respect Sowell's point of view represents a significant departure from his book's most influential predecessor, Oscar Handlin's *The Uprooted*. Sowell sees little of the epic quality of the "untapped potential of ordinary people" (p. 14), nor does he reflect a tragic sense of declension regarding the subsequent history of immigrant groups on American soil. Instead he views the peopling of the United States as an unparalleled social trajectory beyond the grasp either of the individuals or the groups involved, a trajectory, moreover, that managed somehow to yield a pluralist, humane society previously unimagined. Sowell's historical vision curiously celebrates a pluralist, ethnic democracy as fact but not as ideal.

In its even-handed treatment of various groups, the book is a tribute to the distance Americans have traveled in their acceptance of diversity as their self-image. In it, the voice of the outsider speaking as insider represents the maturation of American ethnicity, that indigenous home-grown product we are only beginning to recognize as a particularly tasty morsel.

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*Vassar College*

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The Economic Prerequisite to Democracy *by Dan Usher. New York, Columbia University Press, 1981. 160 pp. $22.50.*

Usher's claim is straightforward: Liberal democracy—equated with majority rule decision-making, broadly conceived—cannot survive without a system of equity. A system of equity is a non-political means of establishing the distribution of incomes or property rights. Non-political in this case means not subject to the process of decision by majority rule. Capitalism, that is, a perfectly competitive economy with enforced contracts, is such a system of equity in that it leads to a unique set of prices by which all goods and services are marketed and thus a unique assignment of incomes among people in the economy. No other system of equity will work. Equality fails because it destroys the incentive to work, and the aggregate deadweight loss to the economy from disincentives will ultimately make it unacceptable to all. Socialism fails because the planners' decisions which set prices and thus assign incomes reflect only general and impersonal rules. Through the difficulty of measuring equality and efficiency and the omnipresence of equally attractive alternatives, these decisions inevitably become politicized. Capitalism itself is threatened as a system of equity by monopolization which destroys the "fair" pricing of competitive markets and by the growth of government which politicizes the assignment of incomes by expanding the public share of the economy. Nevertheless, Usher claims that the growth of neither monopoly nor government has reached the point in such Western democracies as Canada, the United States, and Britain where the viability of capitalism as a system of equity is threatened.

How is it that liberal democracy is compatible only with capitalism? Formally, Usher's argument proceeds through a pair of syllogisms. First, inability to resolve a charged or salient issue collectively will cause the collapse of democracy. The distribution of incomes is a charged issue. Thus, failure to resolve it will cause the collapse of democracy. Second, some decision processes (in a game-theoretic context) do not yield determinate outcomes. One such process is majority rule, which in the face of intransitive collective preferences yields no equilibrium outcome. Another is bilateral monopoly, the consequences of which is little known. Finally, combining all this, attempts to settle the distribution of income in a situation of either majority rule or bilateral monopoly will cause democracy to collapse. While limited redistribution (squeezing of the income distribution) might make capitalism more appealing, an expanded public sector which settles prices politically or centralized wage-bargaining between employers and employees (bilateral monopoly) is a threat to the continuation of liberal democracy.

Usher's thesis seems vulnerable to attack from a variety of points of view. First, there is no reason to believe that an imperfect competition economy will be more capable of setting unique prices than a majority rule system. Unless all collusion among economic actors is prevented, the existence of an equilibrium outcome is uncertain. Second, with regard to political processes, majority rule and bilateral monopoly are by no means guaranteed to fail in producing uniquely acceptable outcomes. Solutions abound in which indeterminacy is at most small or in which institutional structures constrain available outcomes considerably. Bargaining theories may offer resolutions to bilateral monopoly problems. Most important, indeterminacy need not lead to the collapse of democracy. There already is a status quo in the distribution of incomes, and inability to agree on

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some other assignment of incomes merely perpetuates the present distribution. Whether the inability to change it produces the collapse of democracy depends ultimately on the expected costs and benefits of attempting to overthrow the existing order. On this problem Usher offers no argument at all.

JAMES E. ALT
*Washington University, St. Louis*

China's Economy in Global Perspective *by A. Doak Barnett. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1981. 752 pp. Cloth, $32.95; paper, $16.95.*

Readers seeking a detailed account of economic developments in China from Mao's death until early 1980 will find it here, accompanied by Doak Barnett's informed, sober, and moderate judgments about the impact of China's development on the world economy and vice versa.

The book is divided into five parts, beginning with a summary of the development record, especially since 1976. Part II deals with trade and technology imports, and parts III and IV with China's food and energy situations, respectively. A final section discusses the evolving economic relations between the United States and China.

Barnett has mined the available literature, including standard academic sources as well as analyses by intelligence agencies and industry specialists, to produce a massive accumulation of information. Whether one needs to know about China's reserves of oil and natural gas, about its reliance on and policy toward foreign technology acquisition, or about the proportion of world grain trade accounted for by Chinese wheat imports, the answer can be found here, thus eliminating the need to hunt in obscure places for separate bits of data.

The author is generally upbeat about China's new economic policies. Analyzing the growing impact on the world market of an expanding Chinese economy increasingly linked to it, he calls for further efforts to integrate China into global forums in which problems of adjustment can be handled through consultation and negotiation. Regarding food policy, he argues that "the rest of the world not only should applaud Chinese efforts to solve their agricultural problems but should also develop effective programs to assist them" (p. 367), since the achievement of global balance between food supply and demand can only be aided by the maintenance of basic self-sufficiency in China. A similar case is made for energy. Barnett shows that, despite some overly optimistic early forecasts of China's near-term potential for oil exports, that country is apt to become a significant factor in the world oil market—with respect to both supply and demand—in the 1980s and 90s. He advocates international cooperation in providing "major assistance" to China's efforts to accelerate oil development, particularly offshore where China is most dependent on foreign technology (p. 492). Regarding U.S. policy toward China, Barnett favors active development of economic relations, while opposing arms sales to China and the "China card" syndrome in U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. Although he suggests that such a posture might require a corresponding attempt by Washington to improve relations with Moscow (p. 557), this subject is left undeveloped.

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The book is not without errors and shortcomings. For instance, the discussion of the urban–rural gap exaggerates its size by comparing average peasant income from collective sources (a *partial per capita* income figure) with the average urban wage *per worker* (p. 342). The concepts of birth rate and rate of natural increase are occasionally confused (p. 98), as are those of marginal and average productivity of labor (p. 329). The treatment of the conflict between "radical ideologues" and "pragmatists" tends to be flat, and misses the distinction within the latter camp between pro-market and pro-bureaucracy forces. With regard to style, too many paragraphs consist of lists of statistics that should instead have been put in tables; this makes for some tedious reading.

Nonetheless, the book is a welcome contribution by one of the major China scholars of our day. It contains much of the information and analysis required for sound thinking about China's growing international role, and its judgments reflect its author's long and varied experience in the field. Where readers may dissent from particular views of the author, they are given more than enough basis to form independent opinions.

CARL RISKIN
*Queens College, City University of New York and Columbia University*

New Directions in Strategic Thinking *edited by Robert O'Neill and D. M. Horner. Winchester, Mass., Allen and Unwin, 1981. 318 pp. $28.50.*

In July 1980, the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at Australian National University sponsored a conference celebrating the bicentenary of Clausewitz's birth; O'Neill and Horner have edited revised versions of the papers presented there. Given the title of this anthology, the conference's purpose, and the opportunity contributors had to rework their essays, readers might expect detailed treatments of countervailing strategies, protracted war, and Presidential Directive 59. If so, they will be disappointed because this volume is not about strategic thinking in the strict sense. The book's purpose, O'Neill writes, is to consider "major trends . . . in strategic thinking" in the 1970s and 1980s, but its contents deal instead with "the whole field of strategic interaction," that is, the "structure of international society, superpower doctrines, the working of alliances, the roles of developing nations, weapons technologies, tactical doctrines, arms control and political-military relations" (p. xii). These are important subjects, but not all of them constitute strategic thinking.

There is little here on such current controversies as the similarities and differences between Soviet and American strategy and strategic cultures; the motives behind the Soviet buildup; whether the Russians believe nuclear wars can be "won," and, if so, whether they are fooling themselves. Theodore Ropp's rambling opening essay, indeed, dismisses much recent American theorizing about such topics as a "socially useful science fiction industry . . . full of distinctions without differences" (p. 8). Warner Schilling is more gentle, but he echoes Ropp's disdain for the characteristically American assumption that strategic problems can be defined and solved in quantifiable terms. Schilling believes that

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this preoccupation with numbers—force structures, throw weights, theoretical ICBM vulnerabilities, and so forth—distracts Americans from the key question: whether changes in these numbers would have meaningful effects on the outcome of a nuclear exchange.

Richard Ned Lebow makes some intriguing comments about the way deterrence theory can affect not just military policy but diplomacy itself. By assuming that another nation is inherently aggressive and merely waiting for an opportunity to strike, the theory focuses attention on the denial of opportunity and the credibility of commitments. When coupled with an emphasis on capabilities rather than intentions or motivations, this attitude imposes heavy burdens on the defender, who must be strong everywhere. Did assumptions like these in the 1950s turn containment into an endless quest for the "positions of strength" that would deny the Soviets opportunities for aggression?

If the book deals more with recent international relations than with the intricacies of contemporary doctrine, one must add that these broader issues are handled well. Hedley Bull contributes two essays that do much to tie the volume together. In the first, he notes that at the end of the 1960s many observers believed that the usefulness of force in the pursuit of political ends was declining. Events in the 1970s, he argues, led analysts to the opposite conclusion. Many of his colleagues explore this theme. For example, R. V. R. Chandrasekhara Rao and Makoto Momoi offer case studies of Bull's thesis that trace the growing importance of military considerations in the foreign policies of India and Japan, respectively. Roman Kolkowicz and Johan Jörgen Holst see Soviet strategic parity casting long political shadows in the Third World and Europe, while Mohammed Ayoob concludes that conflict between Third World countries and the superpowers will increase as the former become more assertive and the latter become less tolerant of challenges.

Bull's second essay and one by O'Neill bring the book to a close; both offer gloomy predictions for the 1980s. They reflect their colleagues' consensus that the coming decade will be more Hobbesian than the last. Their hope that wider discussion of strategic issues by an informed citizenry may hold these ominous trends in check is understandable, but it evokes memories of the faith many had in the early 1930s about the power of world opinion.

DANIEL F. HARRINGTON
*Office of the Historian*
*Strategic Air Command*

Studies in Public Regulation *edited by Gary Fromm. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1981. 393 pp. $45.00.*

This is an outstanding collection of essays; several are already standard references. In particular, the lead essay by Paul Joskow and Roger Noll is quite simply the best survey of what is known about government regulation of business in print.

Nevertheless, this is a collection of essays by and for economists. Most of this journal's readers will be less interested in the theory of solvency regulation (Patricia Munch and Dennis Smallwood), the investment behavior of railroads (Richard C. Levin), or the cost

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behavior of multiproduct firms (Melvyn A. Fuss and Leonard Waverman) than in the broad theme that holds this collection together: who gets what and how much and why. Also interesting is what it tells us about economists' notions concerning the politics of economic issues.

For example, a few years ago most economists seemed quite comfortable with the idea that controls on price and entry did effect and were intended to transfer wealth to the politically influential. It seemed reasonable to them to suppose that the gains from regulation would go to producer groups and that these gains would occur at the expense of economic efficiency. In turn, these beliefs rested on the observation that narrowly focused economic interests are benefited by dealing with public goods problems that militate against interest group formation and the observation that only the losers or potential losers in private market transactions are likely to seek redress in the political arena. At the same time, most economists would have insisted that these suppositions did not apply to the new social regulation.

With the exception of the tautology that government tends to favor the politically influential, the essays in this volume challenge every one of the above conclusions. Direct regulation does not necessarily favor producer interests (Levin; Fuss and Waverman); it does not necessarily lead to inefficiency (Kenneth C. Baseman). On the other hand, the new social regulation as it is practiced and the flaws in the design of the regulatory apparatus show the same kinds of biases that are found in the bad old direct regulation (Robert A. Leone and John E. Jackson). Here too, efficiency is a public good and, as is the case with many public goods, it appears to be all too frequently under-supplied.

Along with these specific challenges to the conventional wisdom of the recent past, one is also gratified that most of the authors included in this volume accept political outcomes as being influenced by political processes and institutional arrangements. None of these essays simply proceeds from interest group demand to policy outcome and back again.

Finally, many readers will find Robert Willig and Elizabeth Bailey's critique of potential Pareto-optimality to be of interest. Willig and Bailey argue that the appropriate policy criterion is social-welfare dominance and demonstrate that a policy change is dominant only when it meets two tests: the standard net-benefit test of applied welfare economics and the Rawlsian test of improving the welfare of those worse off. One does not have to accept their argument, however, to see that regulatory reformers might be well advised to show that their proposals meet both tests.

FRED THOMPSON
*Columbia University*

The Independence of Nations *by David Fromkin. New York, Praeger, 1981. 171 pp. Cloth, $9.95; paper, $5.95.*

David Fromkin is an international lawyer. He formerly was a foreign policy advisor to Hubert Humphrey and several other presidential candidates. His previous writings include a book, *The Question of Government* (1975), and articles in *Foreign Affairs.* These biographic indications are mentioned because Fromkin has written on a subject that

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would normally be addressed by an academician in the field of international relations. Perhaps because of his detachment from the academic field of I.R., his book has a cutting edge that slices through much of the conventional wisdom professed by its practitioners.

Fromkin's thesis, frequently, indeed relentlessly, advanced, is that international politics is "not domestic politics gone wrong . . . . it is a different kind of politics altogether." He argues that, "because they are rooted in the independence of corporate entities, international politics are fundamentally different, and must be understood and conducted in their own terms" (p. 143).

Unlike many lawyers, domestic or international, Fromkin believes that analogies from domestic law and politics are not valid guidelines for the understanding and conduct of international politics. He reviews the perennial idealist–realist debate in international relations and concludes that both sides are in error. The reason is that both idealists (Woodrow Wilson) and realists (E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau) assume the existance of an international society. Fromkin asserts that this is their fatal error since "a society is a group of human beings" (p. 142), whereas the independent sovereign nations are a collection of sovereign corporate entities existing in an anarchical international system. Interestingly, another international lawyer, a former judge on the Permanent Court of International Justice, Charles de Visscher, made the same point in *Theory and Reality in Public International Law* (1968). De Visscher, too, held that society must precede political legal society. Without a true international society, which de Visscher did not find, no very serious international law or organization is possible.

From his practical perspectives as an international lawyer, Fromkin is skeptical about the interdependence–low politics approach to international relations of Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. He insists that nonstate actors have still not significantly displayed sovereign state actors and that security–high politics remain eminently more critical than the low politics emphasized by the interdependence school. In this connection, he reiterates his view that war is the principal agency of change in international politics, not political bargaining.

Cognizant of the suicidal propensities of modern war, as well as of the arguments for transnational economic cooperation, Fromkin observes that logic and enlightened self-interest nevertheless do not noticeably motivate international political behavior. This behavior is "based instead on patterns established at a deeper level. The independence of nations is an expression of the loyalty of populations, and reflects instinctive patterns of human behavior that seem to go back to the origin of the human race" (p. 151).

Fromkin's prescription is for us to continue to aspire to and work for the kind of international society necessary for serious efforts to achieve world government, the logical answer to our problems. At the same time, we dare not confuse our aspirations with reality. We live in a dangerous power-political world of competing independent states and we must apply all of the lessons of power politics. "To survive and prosper, we will have to excel in the skills of the very world politics from which we wish to escape" (p. 159).

Fromkin's style is trenchant, his scholarship competent, and his comments insightful and provocative. This volume will serve the general reader seeking orientation in the vast literature of international relations. Academic international relations specialists might

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read it with profit and assign it as supplemental reading to students of international relations at all levels.

WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN
*Georgetown University*

Alexander Hamilton *by Jacob E. Cooke. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1982. 277 pp. $17.95.*

Jacob Cooke, an eminent Hamiltonian scholar, has given us a concise and lucid account of one of the most controversial Founding Fathers. Rarely has Hamilton received such even-handed treatment. Notwithstanding his evident admiration for his subject, Cooke avoids the partisan apologetics that have sustained contemporary quarrels—most notably between Hamilton and Jefferson—into modern historiography. Both men were equally dedicated to achieving "viable nationhood" for the United States and were often agreed on policy goals, if not on the means to achieve them (p. 115). According to Cooke, Hamilton was a "pragmatist" (p. 100), not a doctrinaire Hamiltonian: His only consistent principle was a passionate devotion to his adopted home.

Hamilton was a compulsively public man, but the shape of his public career was largely determined by "his personal and private life" (p. v). Hamilton's politics were organized around the play of personalities, most conspicuously in clashes with Jefferson, John Adams, and Aaron Burr. Hamilton typically attacked his adversaries for their inordinate ambition and focused his attacks in savage, *ad hominem* newspaper essays on "traits that he was incapable of acknowledging as his own" (p.125). Hamilton's apparent willingness to accept the Jeffersonian "Revolution of 1800" did not reveal a new mellowness or maturity. It was instead, as Cooke suggests, a measure of the inveterate "animus" toward Burr that seemed to lead "inexorably" to the duel at Weehawken and Hamilton's death (p. 227).

Cooke successfully identifies a paradoxical pattern in Hamilton's later life, reflected in acrimonious exchanges with his enemies and a corresponding political obtuseness that ultimately undercut his influence even among fellow Federalists. Cooke's interpretation, drawn largely from Erik Erikson's influential psychobiographies, is plausible, if necessarily conjectural. Hamilton's illegitimate birth, abandonment by his father at age 11 or 12, and the subsequent death of his mother—whose status in St. Croix society had been equivocal at best—drove Alexander to make a name for himself in a new country. He was a relentless social climber. Perhaps, Cooke argues, the most remarkable achievement of his career was "to cast out the incubus of bastardy and to become . . . an American aristocrat" (p. 16). He married well (to the daughter of Philip Schuyler) and joined the circle of bright young men around General Washington, a father figure to Hamilton and to Americans generally. But Hamilton was also drawn to women of lower—or at least dubious—status, as the disastrous affair with Maria Reynolds revealed. Hamilton may have found in Reynolds significant echoes of his own mother.

Hamilton's ambiguity and insecurity about his social status also help explain his hostil-

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ity to self-assured aristocratic "republicans" like Jefferson. Cooke's speculations on these points are unobtrusive: We know much too little about Hamilton's early years and subsequent private life to claim too much. Indeed, this is one of the least "intimate" of the current round of revolutionary biographies. Yet Cooke's personality profile serves him well as a biographer and it is unlikely that any other approach will make better sense of the paradoxes and contradictions of Hamilton's career.

Cooke probably overstates Hamilton's "status as an atypical rather than archetypal American," though it is undoubtedly true that his "commitment to American nationalism was unrestrained by provincial attachments" (p. 156). Recent biographies of Hamilton's contemporaries suggest that the revolutionary crisis made many of them "self-created" men who faced the collective dilemma of giving the newborn nation a retroactive legitimacy. Perhaps Hamilton's experience was more typical than Cooke allows. Group biographical treatments might give us a better sense of this common experience. Nonetheless, within the limitations of the traditional biographical form, Cooke has given us a clear and persuasive portrait of a complicated man.

PETER S. ONUF
*Worcester Polytechnic Institute*

Parties and Their Environments: Limits to Reform? *by Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda. New York, Longman, 1982. 176 pp. Cloth, $20.00; paper, $9.95.*

Despite its brief 134 pages of text, this is really two "books." It is, first, a cross-national study of 95 parties in 28 democracies—representing all continents except Antarctica—for the identification of the environmental determinants of party characteristics. In addition, it is an essay applying those findings to the possibility of achieving more responsible American parties.

Of the two "books," the first is clearly the more important. It is the first attempt I know of to use Janda's data for such analysis. A series of country variables, drawn from an inventory of propositions in the scholarly literature, are related through correlation to four party characteristics: ideological position, organizational complexity, degree of centralization, and legislative party cohesion. The independent variables include both the political (for example, electoral system, separation of powers) and the non-political (for example, population, extent of modernity).

The volume is well organized, and its style, while monographic, is always lucid. One can always quarrel with the selection of variables and indices for them, but most readers will find the ones in this volume largely guided by good sense and the state of knowledge about parties. One reservation concerns the scarcity of non-political variables (21 percent of the independent variables by my count) and the appropriateness of some of their measures—for instance, affluence, measured by GNP per capita, as an indicator of social divisions. The findings are far too complicated to summarize. It must suffice to note that the authors explain between 30 and 45 percent of the total variances in the four dependent

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variables and that while there are few major surprises in the analysis, there are some unexpected relationships.

The second "book" develops simultaneously. After the analysis of each dependent variable, the authors apply the findings to the problem of the reform of the American parties. In other words, do the conclusions point to an environment hostile or friendly to the proposed reforms? The American problem occupies the last two chapters and the appendices exclusively. In truth, these parts of the study seem to add little new information to the subject of reform and change in the American parties; they are at best a useful recapitulation. More seriously, they do not successfully relate the cross-national analysis to this specific, one-country reform issue.

The explanation of the latter problem is caught up in a broader issue: the assumptions the authors make about causes. By reason of their research design, the authors cannot deal with any explanation that is not country-wide, and they seem not to have incorporated those "other" explanations into their assumptions about environment and cause generally. In addition, the implicit causal model used by the authors lacks a time dimension, a sense of process, a multi-step interaction between the two categories (environment and party) or *within* each of them (in establishing a hierarchy of importance). The authors also use language more deterministic than their theory and analysis warrant. Thus, on p. 62, for example, ". . . the extent to which the American environment *requires* such decentralized parties." Finally, the authors have not fully come to grips with the problem of explaining any intentional change (that is, reform) in so completely determining an environment.

Having expressed those concerns, however, I must underscore the seriousness and importance of the project. It is a pioneering work that gets to the basic theoretical questions in the study of parties. It will be required reading for my seminar as a stimulating first attack on those questions and as a sturdy set of shoulders on which later scholars will stand.

FRANK J. SORAUF
*University of Minnesota*

Media Power Politics *by David L. Paletz and Robert M. Entman. New York, Free Press, 1981. 308 pp. Cloth, $16.95; paper, $8.95.*

The critical bottom line on this book by Paletz and Entman is that I intend to use it in the class I teach on mass media and American politics. It is an uneven book, as are almost all books on such an elusive target as "the media," and it is, as the authors claim, speculative and interpretative. Yet it forcefully presents a point of view that should be carefully considered.

The principal theme, which weaves in and out of other sub-themes in the book, is that the media sustains and supports the existing political and economic systems and is therefore a powerful force underpinning the status quo. While this is not an original thesis, the authors probe this relationship between the mass media and specific institutions—elections, the Supreme Court, law enforcement, Congress, and interest groups—and add breadth and depth to their argument. A major claim of the authors is that while the mass

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media do influence the decisions of political elites and can change elite priorities, media power as practiced actually only reallocates power among the already powerful groups and rarely distributes it downward to the ordinary citizen.

There is a provocative section on the ways in which journalism has contributed to the widely heralded "conservative swing." The authors claim that the media's emphasis on a supposedly large conservative popular swing (which the authors' data refute), rather than on a reaction to leadership failures of President Carter, had the effect of contributing to the radical nature of conservative legislation. By not differentiating between the often contradictory elements of popular opinion, the press both legitimated and magnified the Reagan "tide" towards conservatism and helped produce a massive redistribution of income that was little grounded in popular opinion.

While the reviewer's overall assessment is positive, certain limitations must be acknowledged. Although the heavily journalistic style of writing is easier on the reader than the usual constricted style of much political science writing, the authors on occasion tend to write for effect rather than accuracy. The authors have also made a firm set of assumptions about the relationship of mass media institutions to the mass public that may or may not be valid. They present the media as large businesses, principally devoted to selling papers or air time, who present conventional journalistic products that inhibit the activization of a sluggish mass electorate. So far, so good—at least as far as this reviewer is concerned. What is harder to accept, however, is the underlying notion that the mass public really wants and will pay for deeper, more probing, and more detailed reporting about political events and issues than personal touches about candidates, horse race analysis of election campaigns, and so forth, that they get.

Is the kind of reporting we have primarily that of sympathetic journalistic elites merely supporting existing institutions and policies, or is the style and approach of present-day reporting genuinely appropriate to the demand of a relatively uninterested public in a competitive, consumer-oriented industry? Is it not possible that the majority of the American public does not want more than the conventional values and interpretations, and that deeper challenges to the existing political and economic systems, which the authors feel are important (as I do), are not desired by the public as a whole? Is the lack of depth and complexity in reporting primarily the fault of journalistic elites, or the marketplace they serve, or both?

Paletz and Entman have written an uneven but interesting book developing a forthright and valuable perspective on the mass media that will stimulate interest in the classroom.

RICHARD L. RUBIN
*Swarthmore College*

Bureaucratic Democracy: The Search for Democracy and Efficiency in American Goverment *by Douglas Yates. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1982. 224 pp. $18.50.*

Reconciling bureaucracy with democracy is a problem we have faced in the United States at least since Woodrow Wilson's celebrated essay on the "Study of Administration,"

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published by *Political Science Quarterly* in 1887. The problem is vastly more complicated today when the bureaucracy is so much larger and has a range of powers that Wilson and his contemporaries could scarcely have imagined any democratic government allowing it to possess.

Still, as this very useful book shows, our capacity to invent new ways of controlling the decisions and actions of bureaucrats has grown apace. The expansion of the White House staff, the explosive growth in the number of aides helping members of Congress exercise oversight, and the increasing willingness of the courts to monitor bureaucratic decision-making all testify that as bureaucracy grows in a democracy, so also do the mechanisms available for insuring that the bureaucratic apparatus is subject to control by the public or its elected representatives.

Indeed, it can be argued that the effort to control bureaucracy in our day has become an obsession—carried to the point of threatening the effectiveness of many government agencies. As a case in point, if all the proposals currently before Congress for controlling the decisions of regulatory agencies were to be enacted, it is doubtful these organizations would still serve any useful function at all.

Of course, from the perspective of many of their critics, these agencies don't have a useful purpose, and the effort to exert stricter control over their decisions disguises the goal of nullifying their powers. This point perhaps deserves more emphasis than it receives in this book. In many areas, especially where regulatory power is exercised, the struggle to strengthen controls over bureaucracy can significantly weaken the ability of these agencies to perform tasks—in health and safety regulation, for example—that are widely perceived to be in the public interest.

Where the problem of control is most acute is in those situations where an agency succeeds in establishing a position of autonomy, through legal provisions, political support, or professional prestige, and thus the agency insulates itself from control and becomes, in effect, a self-directing entity. This situation is relatively rare, however. Throughout much of its history, the CIA has enjoyed such autonomy, but the CIA is certainly an atypical case. Most government agencies operate under a pervasive network of both internal and external restraints on their behavior and policies.

This book does an excellent job of tracing the controls that now exist or could be imposed to make bureaucracies more responsive to democratic controls. It does less well in pointing up the need for administration discretion. If bureaucrats are not given sufficient latitude to make decisions or take action, then it is the public as well as the bureaucracy which suffers. What is seldom proclaimed in the public dialogue of American politics is that, paraphrasing Hamilton, energy in the bureaucracy is a leading character in the definition of good government. An urgent necessity in many areas of bureaucracy is not stricter external controls but greater organizational energy and productive achievement.

FRANCIS E. ROURKE
*Johns Hopkins University*

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News from the White House: The Presidential-Press Relationship in the Progressive Era *by George Juergens. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1982. 338 pp. $25.00.*

The author draws upon an extensive knowledge of press activities during the Progressive period to provide an effective and important description of relationships between presidents, key aides, and Washington reporters. Organized chronologically, the book includes particularly extensive discussions of Theodore Roosevelt's political style and problems surrounding Woodrow Wilson's second term, including the role of George Creel, censorship, and press frustrations during the peace treaty negotiations.

The analysis of Roosevelt is particularly interesting for students of presidential leadership. After describing changes in the nation's press and in the scope of national government activity that made a more active style possible, the author discusses presidential activities having a distinctly contemporary tone. These include extensive background briefings, trial balloons, releases that maximize presidential coverage (including the day in which Governor Charles Evans Hughes announced his candidacy), and the cultivation of favorable stories around a range of actions, even the careful planning for a successful hunting trip. Roosevelt emerges in these pages as having been highly conscious of the benefits derived from both personal popularity and electoral support for his policy objectives. While clearly viewing many of Roosevelt's techniques favorably, the author also argues that Roosevelt was willing to discipline reporters in a more heavy-handed manner than recent presidents would find possible—in part because the closer president-press relationship was then so new. Also emphasized are Roosevelt's periodic efforts to generate publicity for popular causes which often cloaked the limited nature of his actual policy steps.

Neither William Howard Taft nor Wilson receive comparably high marks. Taft is viewed as having been largely unaware of the potential he was missing, and as likely to have been ineffective even if he had been more assertive. The Wilson discussion, in turn, emphasizes the tension in a president with intellectual commitments to a public-educating role and yet considerable disdain for the White House press corps. Thus, whereas Roosevelt is seen as sometimes manipulative but ultimately quite successful, Wilson is seen as intermittently evasive and even dishonest, but sadly ineffective with reporters. Wilson is given important credit, however, for his success in the development of periodic general addresses to Congress in a manner resembling the tone and thrust of today's major televised addresses.

The author is at his best in describing the personalities, perspectives, and activities of key participants. An extensive range of sources has been used to develop these assessments, particularly for the journalists. In assessing presidents, the author shows a solid familiarity with major sources, although (perhaps wisely, given their complexity) the debate over Wilson's personality is not specifically enjoined. Somewhat more attention to actual press content, particularly in the Wilson period, would have improved the basis for evaluating Wilson's more aloof approach to the press. Some readers, in addition, may be disappointed with the author's limited focusing on explicit hypotheses. The author does not specifically address, for example, such issues as possible differences in behavior over the course of tenure in office, after election victories, or concerning different types of is-

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sues. Nonetheless, the detailed material presented makes a fine contribution to that larger undertaking.

Finally, this book includes a thoughtful consideration of underlying conflicts between presidents and the press. These issues are presented with an awareness of not only the different perspectives each participant brings to that relationship, but also of the frequent ambiguities occurring in specific situations. In sum, the author is to be complimented for a book which is at once distinctly enjoyable to read and an important contribution to presidential studies.

WILLIAM W. LAMMERS
*University of Southern California*

The Government and Politics of New York State *by Joseph F. Zimmerman. New York, New York University Press, 1981. 398 pp. $35.00.*

Notwithstanding the activities of the federal government, states and their subdivisions provide most services which have direct, daily impact upon people's lives. Joseph Zimmerman, professor of political science at the State University of New York, documents the manner in which one state has contributed innovative programs and leadership to the nation. He succeeds admirably in presenting an objective, straightforward account of governance in the Empire State and the legal foundations that influence intergovernmental relations, group politics, and executive authority.

The book offers a solid introduction to state government. The reader is informed that the state contains nearly 2,350 political subdivisions, and that three-fifths of the budget is distributed as local assistance. New York leads the nation in mandates and support to localities. There are useful segments on home rule, constitutional restraints, and state finances.

As former staff director for a joint legislative committee, Zimmerman is a close observer of the capital scene, and the strongest sections deal with executive–legislative relationships. Policy negotiations are usually dominated by a troika consisting of the governor, Assembly speaker, and Senate majority leader; powerlessness and frustration are felt by minority members who are needed only in cases of intra-party divisions or veto overrides. The legislature is depicted as the principal resource distributor. Although the executive budget and line-item veto have enhanced gubernatorial prerogatives, the author punctures the myth of executive dominance. Successful governors have exercised leadership in a "subtle and consultative " manner. While governors have initiated policies of statewide significance, the landmark anti-discrimination law, state university system, and middle-income housing program originated in the legislature.

Zimmerman shows that the state Constitution has responded to changing conditions through piecemeal amendments rather than sweeping reforms. Extra-legal devices have also circumvented restrictions. Governor Nelson Rockefeller initiated moral obligation bonds and lease-purchases to incur state debts without voter approval, while the legislature devised "first instance appropriations" to finance new public authority construc-

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tion. Some agencies have abused rule-making powers and frustrated legislative intent. Even courts which were not considered policy-making bodies have rendered decisions necessitating changes in state programs.

This book demonstrates the dilemma facing scholars who pursue volatile, contemporary issues, for it is already obsolete in its analysis of current federal-state relations. The preface, written in the same month as President Reagan's Inaugural Address, does not reflect the New Federalism. Elsewhere, Zimmerman emphasizes "the increasing use of preemptory powers by . . . Congress in limiting the traditional broad discretionary role of the legislature in establishing state policy" (p. 170). Obviously, he could not have anticipated block grant legislation which consolidated categorial programs and devolved decision-making to the states. He erroneously maintains, however, that "the Empire State will become more dependent upon federal assistance in the future" (p. 29). In reality, over a two-year period, New York is expected to lose over $2 billion in federal aid. Events have outdistanced academe.

In discussing New York City's fiscal crisis, Zimmerman blames the mayor and City Council, overlooking the Board of Estimate's role in the budgetary process. The nettlesome issue of municipal tax limits—the *Hurd* decision—is handled in a concise and explicit manner. On the other hand, fractional assessment of real property which plagued the state for years after the *Hellerstein* ruling is dismissed in a few sentences. In "explaining" the *Levittown* challenge to the school finance formula, the book lists a verbatim summary of obscure program elements which are meaningless to anyone unfamiliar with state aid jargon.

Some shortcomings might have been corrected by an alert editor. Under legislative constraints, Zimmerman commingles such disparate subjects as three-fifths quorums, parochial school aid, and Governor Al Smith's complaints about inconsequential bills. Virtually identical language describing deficiency and supplementary budgets appears in different places. Greater space is devoted to the legislature's scientific and communications personnel than to professionals serving all standing committees. However, Zimmerman does acknowledge that increased staffing has reduced member reliance upon interest groups.

Rejecting questionnaires and quantitative analysis, the author concentrates on traditional research. His 25-page bibliography and 50 pages of notes demonstrate impressive scholarship. This serious synthesis of government and politics merits recognition.

LEONARD P. STAVISKY
*Columbia University*

The Politics of Retrenchment: How Local Governments Manage Fiscal Stress *by Charles H. Levine, Irene S. Rubin, and George G. Wolohojian. Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications, 1981. 224 pp. Cloth, $20.00; paper, $9.95.*

How do cities cope with fiscal stress? What are the standard retrenchment strategies, how effective are they, and when do they work best? When financial resources shrink, what

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happens to the formal structure of government and to the informal distribution of political power?

Levine, Rubin, and Wolohojian may not provide the definitive answers to these questions, but they offer a myriad of insights. If you are interested in the problems of cutback management, you ought to read this book.

Beginning with a summary of New York City's financial crisis, the authors develop a model of the retrenchment process and offer some hypotheses about the interaction between political, financial, and organizational variables. They then test these hypotheses using four case studies of retrenchment in Oakland, Cincinnati, Baltimore, and Prince George's County (in Maryland). By themselves, these four case studies provide useful information about how public managers handle retrenchment. Moreover, the authors summarize and analyze their case studies to develop some broader generalizations.

The authors outline nine ways managers can cope with retrenchment: by terminating or scaling down activities, or transferring activities to other governments; by deferring projects, or reorganizing to increase efficiency; and by using lower cost or no-cost labor. They may also substitute capital for labor; improve data-gathering and decision-making; reduce demand and ration services; and improve the economic base.

Interestingly, the "transfer strategy"—getting state government to take over duties formerly performed at the local level—was used frequently. Both Baltimore and Prince George's County transferred social services to the state of Maryland. Cincinnati got the state to take over the city university and shifted pollution control and transportation to regional entities. In Oakland, however, such transfers did not occur, since Oakland's range of responsibilities was already quite narrow; health and welfare are handled by county government in California, and transportation is the responsibility of a regional rapid transit district.

Yet this strategy of shedding responsibilities cannot go on forever. During the 1970s, it may have made sense to shift services that redistributed income from hard-pressed municipalities to states, which had broader economic bases and, in many cases, operating surpluses. But financially pressed cities cannot continue to shed services—first parks and recreation, then schools, then police, then fire. State governments are now pressed, too. Upon whom can they shed responsibility? The federal government, after all, is attempting to push programs onto the states.

The four case studies presented in this volume indicate that retrenchment is often preceded by at least one or two years of revenue windfalls. Federal and state aid often provide quantum, not incremental, increases. How this windfall aid is used will affect the city's future financial health. If these new funds are spent for special projects—building a new park or reconstructing a sewer system—then they do not create long-term imbalances. If these new funds are used to initiate services for which the demand will steadily increase each year, however, then fiscal stress can begin as soon as the windfall aid is not renewed, or even when it is renewed but not increased. Moreover, this is not a local phenomenon. During the 1970s, the federal government used the windfall revenues provided by "bracket creep" to finance automatic increases in middle-class entitlement programs. As a result, expenditures grow faster than revenues, and the discrepancy cannot be eliminated by terminating discretionary programs or shifting responsibilities to the states.

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Shedding services is only a short-term solution. It can buy time. Yet if the funding requirements for the remaining services are still growing faster than financial resources, more cutbacks will be required. The other eight strategies discussed by Levine, Rubin, and Wolohojian suggest the ways this can be done.

ROBERT D. BEHN
*Duke University*

The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection: The Secret Political Activities of Two Supreme Court Justices *by Bruce Allen Murphy. New York, Oxford University Press, 1982. 473 pp. $18.95.*

The separated powers mandated by the Constitution make judicial independence possible; its shared powers make occasional breaches of that independence probable. Historically, law and custom have combined to staff the Supreme Court with individuals who have relished political activity and who have found abstinence from it a sometimes unattainable goal. Varieties of such political activity are many. Since the time of John Jay's Court, standards of propriety have been least tolerant of partisan ballot-box-related pursuits by justices on either their own or another's behalf. Least objectionable and often even admired have been efforts to improve the efficiency of the courts. In between are things justices can do extrajudicially, directly or indirectly, and more or less privately, to help guide the course of public policy in areas which may or may not come before them for review. Justices are sought out by others or, more commonly, find minds receptive to their own by virtue of their intellect, personality, office, or a combination of the three.

In the work under review, Bruce Murphy of Pennsylvania State University explores the extra-curiam deportment of two men who have been among the half-dozen or so most politically active justices. The book is the product of extensive and generally careful research into numerous manuscript collections and oral histories, a few of which have only recently been open to scholars, and its documentation alone makes publication worthwhile.

The volume is an important, but, excepting only a few particulars, not an original contribution to the literature on the Court and its members. Much is already know about the political interests of these two justices, especially with respect to Brandeis, about whom Murphy offers little that is qualitatively new. For example, Alpheus Mason's biography has already devoted considerable space to Brandeis's off-Court life. Having a narrower scope, Murphy thus provides more detail. His addition to our knowledge of Frankfurter is more notable, although here again there are few surprises. Murphy's account lends support to the developing opinion that Frankfurter's impact as a political operator outside the Court was not only more far-reaching but also more enduring than his bequests to constitutional jurisprudence.

As Justice, Brandeis went to greater lengths than did Frankfurter to keep his off-Court enterprises out of the spotlight. Rather than trying to act as an apologist for Brandeis (as, for example, on p. 342), Murphy might have simply let the facts speak for themselves.

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Brandeis's concern for secrecy is not hard to fathom. The major charge in 1916 against his nomination was "lack of judicial temperament." If by this his critics meant that on the Court he would be unable to abandon his former interests in promoting the commonweal, they were correct. The quality that contrasted so sharply with Holmes's cool detachment was Brandeis's consuming absorption in public welfare. If all the latter's political activity, including the financial arrangement with his close friend Professor Frankfurter, had become common knowledge during his tenure on the Court, or even shortly thereafter, the charge would have proved accurate.

Murphy's book has already fired yet another debate on judicial proprieties and the risks their infringement entails. As Justices, Brandeis and Frankfurter each took chances. Even the latter's close contacts with Franklin D. Roosevelt in planning for war with Hitler—a subject seemingly far removed then from the Court's docket—surged to the foreground in his majority opinion in the *Gobitis* flag-salute case. Both the likelihood and consequences of exposure are greater today for one who ventures beyoud Court-related matters. In any event, the Court's own business can be sufficiently challenging and absorbing.

D. GRIER STEPHENSON, JR.
*Franklin and Marshall College*

Generations and Politics: A Panel Study of Young Adults and Their Parents *by M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1981. 427 pp. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $6.95.*

As a canny senior member of the profession observed in the opening lecture of my first methods seminar in graduate school, "Nobody ever does research like the people who tell you how to do research tell you how to do research." Jennings and Niemi's recent study of the changing political commitments of the generation that came of age in the late sixties is so sophisticated in its design and so careful in its execution as to constitute a contradiction to that aphorism.

In 1965, the authors interviewed a national sample of graduating high school seniors and their parents, querying them about a wide range of political subjects: their psychological predispositions toward politics (political trust and the like); their political involvement and participation; their partisan affiliations and electoral preferences; and their opinions on various political issues. In addition, they included a few explicitly non-political items, such as the belief in the divine inspiration of the Bible, to serve as a basis for comparison. Eight years later they were able to relocate and interview nearly three-quarters of their original respondents and to survey the 1973 high school graduates.

The sum total of these investigations is a data set replete with analytical possibilities. Jennings and Niemi are able not only to track individual changes but also to make comparisons between parents and their children taken as pairs, between the two generations in the aggregate, between the young and their parents at two different points in time, and between the high school graduates of the mid-sixties and those of the early seventies. They are thus able to understand in greater depth the political development of citizens

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and to distinguish more satisfactorily life-cycle from generational and from period effects. The very complexity of their project renders this a demanding book for the reader. Jennings and Niemi pursue their multiple generational and temporal comparisons across such a rich set of dependent variables that to encompass this complicated material requires unusual attentiveness.

To reduce the findings of their dense study to a point beyond absurdity, the authors find both stability and discontinuity and indicate that for all the change, much remains *la même chose*. To be more specific, there is a great deal of variability at the individual level. Even such allegedly enduring political commitments as partisan affiliation were subject to considerable alteration over the eight-year period. What is particularly interesting is the degree to which this variability in political orientations is characteristic of the members of the parental generation as well, indicating that political learning continues even after one has acquired a final diploma, a mortgage, and a pram. In spite of the ubiquity of change at the individual level, however, there is an impressive amount of continuity at the aggregate level. Although there was declining agreement between parents and offspring taken as pairs, the responses of the young adults in 1973 brought them as a group more nearly in line with the parental generation than they had been as high school graduates.

Perhaps even more interesting than the general conclusions are some of the subsidiary findings buried within individual chapters. A few particularly tantalizing ones have to do with political participation. With respect to the strong relationship between education and political participation that surfaces in virtually every study of political activity, those among the high school seniors of 1965 who eventually went on to graduate from college already outperformed their ultimately less well-educated classmates. Although this participatory advantage grew over the eight-year period, it existed before the eventual college graduates ever set foot on a university campus. With respect to gender and political activity, the small gap between the boys and girls in 1965 had widened considerably by 1973—in spite of what would seem to be strong environmental counter-pressures generated by the women's movement. It seems, however, that this increasing male advantage in political participation is largely a function of the depressed level of involvement of the women who had become mothers in the intervening period. It seems, thus, that it is motherhood rather than marriage or gender per se that is responsible for the dropoff in women's political involvement. With respect to political protest, Jennings and Niemi find that those who had taken part in demonstrations and other unconventional activities actually were more likely to have been active in conventional ways than their more quiescent, but equally well-educated peers.

Because the authors self-consciously decided "to paint with a broad brush," many questions are left unanswered. Presumably, they expect to pursue these themes even more deeply in the future. I look forward with anticipation to the results of such investigations.

KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN
*Boston College*

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How Courts Govern America *by Richard Neely. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1981. 233 pp. $15.00.*

"The principal thesis of this book," says its author, the chief justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court, "is that American courts, both state and federal, are the central institution in the United States which makes American democracy work" (p. xi). Neely's defense of judicial activism does not rest on traditional explanations that courts interpret the Constitution—a myth he likens to belief in the Tooth Fairy and Easter Bunny—or to any conceit that judges ("either graduates or rejects of politics," p. 190) are more capable or honest than other officials. Rather, "courts as institutions have certain qualities which are completely independent of the judges sitting on the bench" (p. 190); these qualities are the counter-institutional tendencies of judicial policy joined to structural and operational factors which reduce institutional "self dealing" by judges.

Legislative arrangements are "a brilliantly designed, inherently negative process" (p. 5) intended to protect the public from the adverse consequences of large scale lawmaking. This tendency to inaction is heightened because legislators "seek out constituencies which will pay campaign money and political support in return for no legislative interference with their vested interests" (p. 60). Courts perform the "function of anarchists" by throwing bombs which unsettle the status quo and require legislative reappraisal of existing policy. Such judicial intervention does (should) not occur when legislative inaction reflects a lack of public consensus, but only in "situations where the bare *mechanics* of the legislative process frustrate a democratic result" (p. 73). How courts recognize those issues on which public sentiment is thwarted by the mechanics and politics of an inherently inert legislative process is never revealed by Neely.

Administrative and regulatory agencies are, by contrast, activist. Lawmakers broadly empower them in order to assure government action, while avoiding responsibility for it, and to accommodate a large volume of complex issues. But agencies are spurred by self interests—the enhancement of authority, enlargement of bureaucracy, and advancement of agency personnel—to intrude so deeply into the private sector as to threaten enterprise and paralyze action by endless regulations, orders, hearings, and administrative delay. Here courts act counter-institutionally by curbing agency initiatives, striking down rules, reversing decrees, and compelling laggard agencies to act. Although legal scholars explain this in terms of "procedural due process," as a matter of "practical administrative law" the courts "must be able to reverse agency action merely because the action is wrong, and this is what they do most of the time" (p. 112).

Neely defends the Warren Court's criminal justice decisions as resting on "a justification . . . [that] concerns controlling social institutions which can be controlled only through criminal procedure" (p. 152). He denounces police investigations which "resembled some of the more unpleasant features of Nazi Germany" (p. 155), and he warns that when challenged in judicial proceedings, "police officers routinely lie, particularly to save their own skins. . . ." (p. 156). Overall, "the entire criminal justice system most often boils down to the powerful state with all its weapons—police, prosecutors, courts, prisons, probation officers—going after poor, uneducated, stupid folks" (p. 154), who might, however, often be guilty of some crime or other. The Warren Court's decisions gradually forced restraint and changes in law enforcement—improved training, respect

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for proper procedures, and new investigative methods. But Neely has no doubt about the price paid to curb the excesses of the criminal justice system: persons guilty of crime and often dangerous to society went free.

The fitness of courts for counter-institutional decision-making lies in their relative insulation, strong curbs on judicial conduct, shriveled opportunities for institutional self dealing, judicial workways, and relatively high job security. Legislative suspicion and the nature of judicial work make unrealistic the aggrandizement of judicial bureaucracy. Moreover, judges are isolated by legal mores, the suspicions of the press, public expectations, and the norms of colleagues. Nor is political ambition a realistic motivation: "very few judges go anywhere from the judiciary . . . [which] is usually a terminal condition" (p. 198). Under these circumstances, the judiciary will arrive at counter-institution decisions, not because of superior wisdom, but because ordinary good judgment, often tempered by the long political experience most judges bring to the bench, is not inhibited by institutional self interest.

This remarkable defense of judicial authority will scarcely satisfy many critics. Neely too often slips into pronouncements that judges are better or more broadly educated than other officials, that they are "neutral arbiters," and that they possess special prestige and legitimacy. Critics have convincingly challenged most of these assertions. Moreover, Neely makes only the barest case that judges are not driven by personal and institutional interests in making policy, a heady substitute for the more narrow personal, bureaucratic, and political self dealing that mainly drives other politicians and institutions. Isolation and the absence of tempering incentives may allow judicial ideology to run without rein. Those of us generally favorable to judicial activism in protecting civil rights and liberties will find Neely's reported deeds highly pleasing, but we will devoutly hope that such judicial actions rest on better justifications than he presents *extra curiam.*

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Prohibitive Policy: Implementing the Federal Endangered Species Act *by Steven Lewis Yaffee. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1982. 239 pp. $17.50.*

Prohibitive policy, according to author Steven Yaffee, "prescribes behavior by outlawing actions beyond a certain standard" (p. 1). It does so by absolutely enjoining certain actions (as in outlawing certain pesticides), by affirmatively requiring certain actions in such a way as to make others illegal (for example, protective equipment), or by setting standards that prohibit actions beyond a certain level (for instance, concentrations of chemicals in the workplace). Economists, and to some degree policy analysts, find prohibitive policies troublesome because "they appear to disallow any balancing of the benefits of the policy against the costs of compliance" (p. 1). The act of prohibition, it seems, embodies the assumption that costs are zero up to some point and unacceptably high above that point and that the total benefits of compliance exceed total costs over the entire range of prohibited actions. In the economic literature, prohibitive policy is synonymous

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with unreasonableness and inefficiency; rational regulatory policy, the economists tell us, consists of graduated financial incentives calibrated to recover the incremental external costs of regulated actions.

Yaffee undertakes two improbable tasks: demonstrating that the range of instances in which prohibitive policy is appropriate is wider than economic theory would suggest; and demonstrating that prohibitive policy is both fundamentally rational and effective in some instances where economic theory would suggest it is irrational and inefficient. He chooses as his case in point the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973, a law that would appear to embody everything wrong with prohibitive policy. In its essentials, the ESA prohibits any action that poses a threat to the continued existence of certain specified plants and animals, regardless of net economic benefit. The law has provided some comical examples of apparent regulatory unreasonableness, such as the protracted legal and political battle over whether the endangerment of the snail darter, a modest fish, should be allowed to derail the multi-million dollar Tellico project in the Tennessee Valley Authority. (Ironies abound: The snail darter ultimately lost, but not before an expert panel had concluded that the Tellico project was "ill-conceived and uneconomic" on other grounds.)

Yaffee's case rests on an appeal to political realism, rather than economic theory, but it is an analytically sophisticated form of political realism. Prohibitive policies are enacted not out of bull-headedness and stupidity but because prohibitions are satisfactory ways of addressing policy problems where knowledge does not permit elegant calibrated responses or where, as in the case of ESA, policies are designed to prevent irreparable or irreversible harm. Furthermore, prohibitive policies are rarely, if ever, administered prohibitively. The process is one in which "uncertainty is rampant," "judgment . . . critical," and "administrative discretion necessary"; "the medium of exchange is power, and the mode of interaction is negotiation" (p. 7). The logic entailed in implementing prohibitive policy is no less rational than the optimizing logic of economic theory; it simply places a higher value on political adjustment. Understanding the utility of prohibitive policy, Yaffee argues, requires understanding "the individuals, organizations, and agencies that implement it and the nature of the information, resources, authority, and incentives that flow between these actors" (p. 9). Prohibitive policy, in other words, cannot be understood in isolation from its implementation.

This book is useful to a wide audience. It adds to our understanding of environmental policy. It also, as noted, sheds light on the conflict between economic and political theories of regulation. Most importantly, it pushes the study of policy implementation forward in significant respects: by measuring and analyzing policy outputs, by explaining the role of administrative discretion, and by clarifying the relationship between expertise and politics. It also sets a standard for clarity and simplicity of writing that is all too rare in the policy analysis literature. It is an important and well-written book.

In the final analysis, though, it is unlikely that the book will convert any economists, since economic theories of regulation rest on a deep distrust of the very political and administrative forces that Yaffee puts at the center of his study. Whether economists are persuaded or not, Yaffee successfully demonstrates that they should not be allowed to appropriate the term "rational" for their exclusive use. The real source of disagreement between economists and people like Yaffee who take a broader view is whether the rational-

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ity of political and administration action should be given equal footing in policy analysis with the rationality of normative economic theory.

RICHARD F. ELMORE
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The Regulation of Natural Gas: Policy and Politics, 1938–1978 *by M. Elizabeth Sanders. Philadelphia, Pa., Temple University Press, 1981. 254 pp. $18.95.*

In the 1970s, energy policy emerged as a major political issue in the United States. It has proven to be exceptionally controversial, with sharp debate continuing over the availability, costs, and risks of nuclear power, coal, oil, solar energy, and other sources. At least one major segment of energy policy—natural gas regulation—has been around for a long time, however, and invites an examination of the ways in which governmental regulation of energy and associated political conflicts change over time and under varying conditions. Given the posture of the Reagan administration toward regulation of business and its distaste for a large public sector role in energy development, this kind of inquiry may be instructive as the nation defines further the preferred path to its "energy future." In this book, Elizabeth Sanders provides us with such an analysis by focusing on the political conflict accompanying four decades of the administration of the Natural Gas Act. The work is a very useful contribution to the burgeoning literature on regulatory policy and an insightful commentary on the political and administrative context in which energy policy is formulated and implemented.

Chapters 2 through 7 describe the "saga of natural gas regulation." Here Sanders reviews the economic and political environment surrounding initial consensus building and passage of the Natural Gas Act in 1938, the early history of the Federal Power Commission's (FPC) regulatory activities, the shifting character of natural gas policy, the increasingly politicized environment of the FPC, and, more recently, the Carter administration's energy proposals and the congressional response to them. Chapter 1 summarizes the "theories" of regulatory behavior and their utility for explaining the politics of natural gas regulation. The last chapter places the major findings within a broader assessment of economic regulation, energy policy, and the policy process.

The strength of the book is its rich and detailed history using the Lowi typology of congressional and administrative politics and the transformation of natural gas policy over time from regulation to redistribution. This analytical narrative is thorough, carefully written, and extensively documented. Sanders quite reasonably tries to produce more than a descriptive history, and she is partially successful in the attempt. Regrettably, the theories available on which one can hang empirical data on regulation are extremely limited, as she notes in Chapter 1. References are made to Marver Bernstein's concept of agency "life-cycles," Murray Edleman's notion of symbolic quiescence, Mancur Olson's work on groups, Theodore Lowi's typology of public policy, and the purposive behavior suggested by theories of political economy. Sanders relies chiefly on the perspective of political economy to anchor the analysis, and manages to get considerable mileage out of it. There isn't enough explanatory power in any one theory, or in all taken together, to ac-

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count for variation in regulatory politics, but this is less a criticism of Sanders' work than of the state of theoretical development in the field. Although an enormous amount of new material has been appearing lately, sparked in large part, one imagines, by the renewed political significance of regulation and regulatory reform, there is still no generally applicable theory of regulatory policy or behavior.

It should also be said that the book has significance beyond the politics of natural gas regulation. Sanders quite rightly suggests that in this policy area economics has been more important than partisanship or ideology and that the history of natural gas regulation illustrates both the strengths of the pluralistic American political process (for example, responsiveness to organized interests and policymaking by compromise) and its perhaps inevitable disappointments (for example, in producing a policy that is neither rational nor well conceived). Her conclusions about regional loyalties in Congress, sectional politics, and the difficulty of fashioning coherent policy given existing constitutional constraints and political incentives are important. They should be of particular interest to those concerned with development of comprehensive and long-term national energy policy.

MICHAEL E. KRAFT
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Across the Border: Rural Development in Mexico and Recent Migration to the United States *by Harry E. Cross and James A. Sandos. Berkeley, Calif., Institute of Governmental Studies, 1982. 198 pp. $12.00.*

The immigration issue distinguishes itself in the history of U.S.-Mexican bilateral relations by the degree to which both sides of the border have misrepresented and exploited it. The subject has become fairly treacherous, its elucidation complicated by exaggerations and inaccuracies which have settled into the historical record. Cross and Sandos have determined to provide us with an unbiased, "binational and biregional" phenomenon (p. xiii). To this purpose they combine their talents as historians and their specialized research backgrounds: the first in the social history of haciendas in Zacatecas and San Luis Potosí, the second in the revolution. They show themselves to be equal to their task and beyond, for they bring a much missed dedication to succinctness and accuracy to a subject often discussed without much regard for either.

The authors divide their discussion evenly between an historical sketch of the period of sustained migration (roughly 1908 to the present) and an assessment of current research into the effects of migration and its policy implications. The first half opens with the observation that, "The states of Durango, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, San Luis Potosí, and Zacatecas [the North Center] have traditionally formed the core region of 'sending' states. . . . In the 1920s, this region contributed about 70 percent of all Mexican migrants to the United States. [It] . . . still directly sends more than half of all Mexican migrants to this country" (p. xvi). What has sustained both the concentration by origin and the level of migration?

Original conditions are not of great concern here. While the authors agree with most

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commentators in finding initial impetus in the revolution, the breakdown of traditional land tenure and social organization, and the ruthless suppression of the *Cristeros* (pro-Church elements who rebelled from 1926–29), they traverse the years between 1800 and 1940 in fifteen pages. Subsequent chapters are more fruitful. There is a detailed description of the impact and tendency of Mexico's "green revolution," with a clear explanation of the rationale behind the systematic preference of wheat (an exchange earner) over maize (a staple). Perhaps without intending to do so, the authors have provided a catalogue of the vices to which top-down land reform is prone. Other chapters pay adequate tribute to the Bracero program of institutionalized migration (1942–64) and the uneventful character of its official termination. Chapter four is distinguished by a clear, brief discussion of changing patterns of labor demand and a comparison of labor utilization in California and Texas.

The second half of the book features a more technical analysis of research results on the staple topics of current policy debates. Demographic profiles, stock and flow estimations, job displacement, tax contributions, remittances, social service use, human rights, and the incidence of racial discrimination are all included for comment. While the authors contribute little here that is original, they have taken pains to assemble existing material and to bring forward many previously obscure but valuable bits of evidence. Regrettably, they venture no comment on the proposition, now becoming common, that donor countries "prepare" and "retire" long-term or repeat migrants (the costs of preparing and retiring being unremunerated) while the recipient country benefits from the value of their productive labor. Any proposition so redolent with controversy richly merits its dispassionate discussion. The authors' silence on the unequal division between federal and state levels of the costs and benefits from migrant labor is also unfortunate, especially in these days of boisterous New Federalism.

While defined in scope, this book justifies the authors' ambitions and sheds some new light on an extremely difficult subject. It is difficult at this time to gage the strength of an analogy between migration from Mexico's North Center and the migratory patterns now metastasizing throughout Central America. Nonetheless, readers may well find that this book retains usefulness as a primer on the political economy of a phenomenon, long after the research and policy quarrels have become dated.

SAMUEL CRAWFORD
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The Failure of the Franklin National Bank: Challenge to the International Banking System *by Joan Edelman Spero. New York, Columbia University Press, 1980. 235 pp. $17.50.*

Spero has provided a concise and thoughtful review of the events surrounding the failure of the Franklin National Bank in 1974 and the attendant banking environment, with a special emphasis on the emerging international aspects of U.S. banking.

The Franklin story has been told by a number of governmental officials in the Federal

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Reserve and elsewhere. Spero's book makes particularly good use of her access to the official records and of the opportunity to interview most of the participants in the Franklin matter. She describes with clarity the classically tragic convergence of many separate events that killed the Franklin Bank. Among these she notes the incompetence of its management, as Franklin, beginning as a regional bank on Long Island, became a major money institution and the considerations leading to, and risks assumed by, Franklin (and others similarly situated) in funding its long-term assets with short-term deposits, including Eurodollar deposits and Federal funds transactions. She also discusses the effects of the amalgamation of U.S. public policy, including the interest equalization tax, the voluntary credit restraint program, and Federal Reserve Regulations Q and D which induced many banks, including Franklin, to look to the international market as a place for deposit-gathering and interest rate speculation. Further, she investigates the unrealized expectation of Franklin, shared by many other banks, that an upturn in interest rates in the winter of 1973 and spring of 1974 would allow it to rebuild its crumbling earnings base.

Spero's examination raises, but does not explore, several considerations particularly relevant to today's economic banking environment. As the traditional barriers separating banking from other financial activities are being dismantled, the banking industry is fast losing its separateness and becoming part of the much broader "financial services" industry. Spero focuses on the importance of a regulatory structure and solvency protection as factors that were lacking in the international banking milieu into which Franklin plunged, and the effect of the lack of regulation and governmental back-up on Franklin's ultimate demise. Her discussion of these issues prepares the ground for cogent questioning of the propriety of the policy of abandoning the regulated atmosphere for banking, which has pervaded the industry since the enactment of the various banking statutes following the Great Depression.

This book also invites consideration of the implications of the Monetary and Interest Rate Decontrol Act of 1980 as the spearhead of the current inexorable move toward deregulation of banking. The move away from regulatory limits on interest rates that banks may pay, together with the breakdown of the constraints on the banking industry evolving out of the Glass Steagall Act, the McFadden Act, and comparable market-delineating statutes, is pressuring the banking industry to become "merely" another form of economic enterprise—similar perhaps to the auto industry (Chrysler) or retail marketing (W.T. Grant). If this happens, the Franklin experience in the unregulated aspects of international banking might well be emulated more broadly on the domestic banking front. A move into an unregulated environment without adequate time to adjust assets and earning capacities may entail a formidable price tag.

This is not to say that the deregulation of banking is not good public policy; I firmly believe it is. It is equally important, however, that such a desirable policy be implemented with some care.

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The Impossible Dream: The Rise and Demise of the American Left *by Bernard K. Johnpoll with Lillian Johnpoll. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1981. 373 pp. $29.95.*

This study of American utopians, communitarians, labor radicals, and socialists covers the years from 1820 to 1920, which, to the authors, constitutes the period of the rise and demise of the American Left. A brief twenty-page section surveys developments since 1920. Virtually all references (which total over 60 pages) are to primary sources that the authors have studied in numerous archives.

In the first third of the book, the authors present thumb-nail sketches, averaging four or five pages, of no less than 23 utopian socialist experiments and a few labor organizing efforts for the period up to 1877. Each sketch is generally centered around the ideas of a particular thinker or leader. One problem with this section is the lack of focus. A major figure such as Wendell Phillips surprisingly gets but two pages, and that only on his labor activism. This is apparently because the authors do not regard the abolitionist movement as sufficiently "radical," but the problem is that major radical leaders and thinkers of the period, such as William Lloyd Garrison, Frederick Douglass, Sojourner Truth, John Brown, and Margaret Fuller, are never taken up. One result is that 22 of the first 23 thinkers and leaders taken up in detail are white males. While the attitudes of these figures toward women and Blacks is certainly discussed, with many of them found to have held racist and sexist prejudices, there is no significant discussion of the abolitionist or women's movements.

The authors are much more focused, and also more successful, in their treatment of the labor Left from 1877 to 1920. Here central events of the period, such as the major national labor upheavals of 1877 and 1886, do form a background to the discussion of the rise of a unified Socialist Party. In this section, constituting the core of the book, the problem is not the lack of focus, but the reverse, a too narrow focus on a single organization—the Socialist Party. While the Populists do get mentioned as an important part of the preparatory period for the Socialist Party in its heyday, 1900–1920, the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) are treated as a peripheral movement whose main contribution seems to have been disruption of the Socialist Party.

On the other hand, the discussion of the rise of the Socialist Party out of the Populists, the German-American Socialist Labor Party (SLP), the Jewish socialists, and the De Leon SLP gives an interesting treatment of the relationship between the various strands. The analysis of the Socialist Party is also very comprehensive and sheds much light on the interrelationship of key figures such as Eugene V. Debs, Morris Hillquit, and Victor Berger. Some major figures, such as W. E. B. Du Bois and Emma Goldman are, unfortunately, left out of the discussion, resulting once again in a series of white male protagonists. Nor is there discussion of the attitude of the Socialist Party toward Blacks and women.

The final chapters on the period since 1920 are quite superficial and should really be considered an epilogue. Here rancor seems to overcome scholarly analysis. The activities of the Left during the era of the Communist Party in the period 1920–50 are dubbed "the politics of duplicity" (p. 323), and the New Left of the 1960s is dismissed as "at best, an arrogant collection of pseudointellectuals" (p. 338). But this generally scholarly study

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should not itself be dismissed for this reason, or because of the authors' patronizing characterization in the Preface of recent studies on the same topic, without naming them: "most of them should be avoided in any research into radical movements" (p. x).

Had the authors discussed some recent studies on American radicalism by writers such as Stanley Aronowitz, Jeremy Brecher, Raya Dunayevskaya, or Howard Zinn, they might perhaps have focused more sharply on theoretical problems such as the relationship of women and minorities to American radicalism, or on the relationship of spontaneous rebellions (as in 1877 or 1967) to radical movements. Because it fails to address any deeper theoretical issues, this study is more a survey than what its title seems to claim: an explanation of the tortuous path of the American Left.

KEVIN ANDERSON
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Reforming Regulation: Processes and Problems *by Lawrence J. White. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1981. 244 pp. Cloth, $13.95; paper, $8.95.*

Economist Larry White spent the 1978–79 academic year as a senior staff economist with the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), overseeing regulatory issues largely in the health and safety fields. He has written a work which serves on the one hand as a useful record of the conflicts between regulatory agencies and the Executive Office of the President (EOP) and on the other, as a defense of the "management" or balancing strategy which the Carter administration adopted as its approach to regulation.

The heart of the text is 12 case studies concerning regulatory issues in which White was involved as CEA "second-guesser" of agency decision-making. In a summary chapter, he makes several criticisms about the way agencies approach health and safety issues. First, there is the tendency to dichotomize the world into "safe" and "unsafe" levels of health and safety based on a threshold concept of risk. Second, agencies tend to underestimate the costs of regulation and to use affordability criteria to measure economic impacts rather than efficiency. Third, the use of technology-forcing strategies make industries develop and apply new and not fully tested technologies to control health and safety side effects. Finally, agencies often make risk-averse, politically safe regulatory decisions which protect regulators against the possibility of a highly visible safety disaster but ignore the less visible, chronic social costs that are a result of these strategies.

The case material, which includes several decisions concerning air pollution standards, development of super-fund legislation, and rules for implementing the Toxic Substances Control Act (1976), as well as controversies involving the endangered species and fuel economy laws, are rich in examples where an agency's interpretation of medical and scientific evidence or legal guidelines has leaned heavily toward the risk-averse end of the scale at substantial costs to industry and the consumer. The CEA's job was to point out these biases and offer alternatives in the hope that a balance could be achieved between agency and EOP perspectives. Despite White's preferences for an economist's efficiency approach to regulation, he presents fairly objective narratives of decision-making which

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should be useful to instructors in public policy and in political science regardless of their own biases.

The book is less successful in fulfilling its second implicit goal, that of defending the Carter administration's "management" approach to regulatory reform which was based on EOP oversight rather than recommendations for wholesale changes in substantive and procedural law. Of course, Carter's appointments to the health and safety agencies did not make the task any easier since several "public interest" advocates were given high positions. In the final chapter, White dismisses administrative law reform and sunset legislation as unlikely to affect substantial changes in outcomes while also taking a negative view of the regulatory budget (unworkable) and the legislative veto (unconstitutional). Instead, White favors a series of institutional changes to strengthen the role of the EOP as manager of the regulatory process as well as legislation to encourage cost-benefit balancing, use of noncompliance fees as an enforcement mechanism, and deregulation of several areas of traditional economic regulation.

Unfortunately, the analyses in the concluding chapter are too brief and superficial to serve as useful comment on the merits of recent reform ideas. Moreover, there is no underlying theory of the political process put forth that can be used to judge the likely effectiveness of reform concepts. White must be congratulated for the candor with which he discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the EOP during the Carter years. One hopes, however, that when he returns to academia from his current post in the Justice Department, he will use his considerable talents to address these institutional aspects of regulatory reform in more detail.

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## Competition in International Business: Law and Policy on Restrictive Practices

*edited by Oscar Schachter and Robert Hellawell. New York, Columbia University Press, 1981. 441 pp. $35.00.*

Restrictive business practices are a staple concern of domestic economic policies in advanced industrial states. That is especially true in the United States, with its tradition of strong anti-trust laws. Yet only recently have restrictive practices emerged as a topic of genuine international concern. Interestingly, it is the advanced states, including the United States, that have opposed tough and binding international codes of conduct.

Recent discussions of restrictive practices have their precursors in the early post-war era. Article V of the proposed International Trade Organization (ITO) charter attempted to enjoin both price-fixing and market sharing. That early effort died along with ITO and has not been resuscitated by its successor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). As a result, the problem of restrictive business practices was submerged until recently, when developing countries raised the issue as part of the North-South debate. It is primarily through their efforts that the United Nations moved to adopt a code on restrictive practices in 1980.

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While the U.N. code reflects a remarkable agreement among diverse polities, its gaps are equally remarkable. To begin with, the code is not legally binding. Its provisions admit significant exceptions; it contains only rudimentary procedures; and it lacks enforcement mechanisms. Still, as Schachter and Hellawell observe, "the fact that the code was adopted attests to the persistence of views that anticompetitive practices are harmful to international trade and economic development" (p. vii).

As editors, Schachter and Hellawell have taken a broad view of the U.N. code and the issues it addresses. For a conference held in November 1979, they commissioned seven papers by international lawyers and economists. The papers are accompanied by formal commentaries and informal discussion. The result is a useful overview of restrictive practices by transnational firms, as well as international efforts to deal with cartels, mergers, intrafirm pricing, and technology transfers.

One of the more interesting papers, by economist Douglas F. Greer, outlines the varied terms of technology transfer and highlights the sources of bargaining leverage in negotiations between transnational firms and host states. Greer introduces a useful distinction between policies aimed at controlling firms' conduct and more structural policies designed to alter bargaining relationships. Ingo Walter's comments on this paper are themselves a useful excursion into the strategic aspects of international investment and technology transfer.

Several papers offer legal analyses of broad subject areas: Sigmund Timberg on technology transfer, James A. Rahl on international cartels, and Kurt Markert on Western European merger policies. Robert E. Smith's analysis of cartels, by contrast, is an extended exercise in economic analysis and taxonomy, lacking a clear focus. Smith is to be commended, however, for at least broaching the subject of state-imposed restraints on liberal trade—a crucial issue that is surely relevant to the subject of this volume. It is not firms alone that restrict competition; states are energetic architects of import controls and export cartels.

As wide-ranging as this volume is, it lacks a sustained treatment of the political aspects of all these issues—issues that, after all, arose from political demands for a New International Economic Order. Joel Davidow, who was involved in the U.N. and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) negotiations, does provide a helpful chronology and a lawyer's inside view. But this perspective could have been supplemented by a critical analysis of why so many countries fought so long and hard over a voluntary code. One conference participant, K. Venkata Raman, provides a vital clue. "The codes," he says, "will give developing countries some additional bargaining position in negotiations with transnational corporations" (p. 426). This central point is not elaborated elsewhere in the volume, even though it suggests a significant link between voluntary international codes and binding (but diverse) national policies. Still, the editors themselves seem to agree that the code's practical significance lies precisely in that connection. "The code," they say, "furnishes a political basis and a stimulus for enforcement through national legislation and administrative action. It remains to be seen how effective it will be in practice" (p. vii).

CHARLES LIPSON
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Oral History and Delinquency: The Rhetoric of Criminology *by James Bennett. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1981. 363 pp. $28.50.*

It can be argued that a discipline establishes itself when critical self-analysis occurs, by examining its own rhetoric, for example. Fortunately, this volume begins this process for the discipline of criminology. Given the importance of the theme of marginality in the creation of oral histories (pp. 8–9), it is fitting that the author to undertake this analysis is himself "marginal" to the disciplines he so skillfully discusses—namely, sociology, criminology, and history. What makes this work a remarkable intellectual achievement is that Bennett has made a valuable contribution to all three disciplines.

This book investigates the use of life histories of juvenile delinquents from 1840 to the present. Through a series of case studies, Bennett examines what conditions generated oral histories, the functions they served, and what they accomplished. In addition, Bennett attempts "to open up the rhetorical study of criminological and social science literature and to encourage the humanistic penetration of this area" (p. xi). Bennett's method of analysis is to examine in detail the biographies of the persons who have utilized oral histories, the themes of the delinquents' histories, and finally, the audiences receiving these histories.

The work is organized into four distinct parts following a chronological order. The first two chapters focus on Henry Mayhew. This marks a significant contribution to the field of criminology in that, although "marginal" to the discipline, Mayhew's work is often overlooked in examinations of nineteenth-century criminological thought.

The second part "traces the rather more dreary construction of *things* or programs" (p. 9). Chapter 3 presents Reverend John Clay's prison reforms and his use of oral histories ("confessionals"). Chapter 4 follows the House of Refuge movement in the United States, specifically the use of case histories and "inmate letters" in the annual reports of various institutions. Chapter 5 examines the first juvenile courts, particularly Ben Lindsey's use of "snitching bees," and William Healy's method of obtaining a juvenile's "own story."

In the third and strongest part of the book, Bennett discusses the heyday of life histories, at the University of Chicago during the 1920s and 1930s. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 analyze the important works of William Thomas, Robert Park, Ernest Burgess, Frederic Thrasher, and most significantly for the subject at hand, Clifford Shaw.

The fourth section focuses on principles. Chapter 9 examines the politics of oral history through writings by Saul Alinsky and Howard Becker. The final chapter outlines the social, rhetorical, and personal conditions necessary for the creation of oral histories (pp. 241–49). In turn, the functions of oral history—persuading an audience of a delinquent's "essential humanity," communicating this message across social classes, and promoting social reform by attracting resources (pp. 256–63)—are discussed together with the accomplishments and limitations of oral histories of juvenile delinquents. An appendix examines the technique of oral history, useful because such concerns are now paramount in oral history research.

A few points demand more discussion. For example, Bennett claims that delinquents' oral histories do not convey a political analysis because they cannot transcend local experiences (pp. 33, 141, 250–51). Yet recent works by Claude Brown and Piri Thomas seem

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to contradict this. More significantly, Bennett contends that oral histories are not widely used today because the field of sociology has become "more theoretical, specialized, professionalized, and political . . ." (p. 234). But ideological shifts can also explain this decline: Not only are we less optimistic about efforts to reduce and prevent crime than Shaw and his colleagues, but we are also less interested and concerned with "the factors contributing to delinquent conduct" than Shaw appeared to be (see *The Jack-Roller: A Delinquent Boy's Own Story*). These minor qualifications aside, this is an outstanding book, and I wholeheartedly applaud Bennett's endeavor.

JOHN H. LAUB
*Northeastern University*

The Division of Europe After World War II: 1946 *by W. W. Rostow. Austin, University of Texas Press, 1982. 212 pp. Cloth, $19.95; paper, $8.95.*

This book is the second volume in a series that Rostow plans to write—the Ideas and Action Series—on policy decisions. Although he is not writing autobiography, Rostow believes that one has a better chance of grasping the connection between thought and behavior if one is "close" to the events under study. This belief may surprise historians who find participants in an event at as much of a disadvantage in understanding it as writers more distant in time who must reconstruct the event. Nevertheless, in consequence of his belief Rostow's books examine decisions in which he was an observer or participant. The first book concerned General Dwight Eisenhower's pre-invasion bombing strategy. The book under review concerns the American government's decision in 1946 not to pursue a plan devised by Rostow, then a minor State Department official, for a general European settlement. Critics will have to determine for themselves if this story fits into a series described as focusing on "major policy decisions."

Rostow is correct in arguing that the diplomacy of 1946 has received relatively little attention from historians, but his book does not alter the balance. There is an excellent index and some very good footnotes reflecting on the historiography of the Cold War. Yet this 212-page book has only 93 pages of text—there are 105 pages of documentary appendices, and 22 pages of the text itself (including seven pages of charts showing Europe's precarious economic state in 1946–47) are comprised of lengthy quotations from other works. Rostow's analyses do rise above the seven pages it takes him to tell us that Europe was in economic trouble in 1946–47. But the conclusions of the book appear to justify its brevity if not its price.

BRUCE KUKLICK
*University of Pennsylvania*

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Which Side Were You On? The American Communist Party During the Second World War *by Maurice Isserman. Middletown, Conn., Wesleyan University Press, 1982. 306 pp. $19.95.*

The Communist party and its history has fascinated Americans far beyond the members it recruited or the power it wielded. Given birth to by such youths as Jack Reed, Jay Lovestone, Hal Ware, and Charles Ruthenberg, at a time when many of the young were disillusioned by the follies of their elders, it hoped to lead a proletarian revolution which would bring peace, unity, and equality to the world. Maurice Isserman tells the story of the party in middle age—scarred, cynical, somewhat compromised, and yet still squinting at the original vision somewhere off on the horizon.

The American Communists had two periods of comparative glory—during the Popular Front days of 1935–39 and again during the wartime alliance, 1941–45. Quite surprisingly, no scholar has written an adequately researched study of either of these eras until now. The author plugs the latter gap and, indeed, has perceptive observations on the earlier of the two.

Isserman starts with a shaky thesis when he implies that his book will analyze the party by observing the young people who joined during the Great Depression and who left after the Khrushchev disclosures of 1956. It is just as well that he does not follow through because he has a more cogent theme: the interplay of forces represented, on the one hand, by Chairman William Z. Foster and, on the other, by the real leader, General Secretary Earl Browder.

Browder had emerged almost from nowhere in 1930 to rebuild a party which had been badly shaken by the expulsion of its leader, Jay Lovestone, and whose other contenders, like Foster, were tainted by factionalism. Browder, a quiet Kansas bookkeeper, guided the Communists through the hyper-revolutionary Third Period of the early 1930s and then hit his stride during the Popular Front after 1934. Browder skillfully played on the prestige of the Soviet Union as the leading anti-fascist force and at the same time latched onto the popularity of the New Deal and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (C.I.O.).

The Hitler-Stalin pact, 22 August 1939, turned the Communist world topsy-turvy. Front organizations collapsed, and fellow travellers decamped, but the party—however uncomfortably at times—grabbed onto those old American virtues of isolationism and anti-imperialism. Communists were happier when the German invasion of Russia, 22 June 1941, set the stage for a new wartime Popular Front.

Browder rode high in wartime. He deluded himself into believing—because he so desperately wanted recognition—that a somewhat wacky old gentlewoman, Josephine Truslow Adams, was giving him a direct pipeline to President Roosevelt. In spite of that aberration, he astutely guided the party on an ultra-patriotic line which won friends and allies.

As Communists pitched into the war effort, Browder projected the temporary unity into a postwar comity of nations and beliefs. In 1944, he even dissolved the party and formed the Communist Political Association to be part of a great alliance. But Browder's dream of himself and the president of the Chamber of Commerce shaking hands and seeking new markets was not to be. In a roundabout way, through a critical article by a French Communist leader, Browder was brought down in 1945. His enemy, Foster, who

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had never believed that a revolutionary party could remain pure while dallying with capitalists, won a short, brutal battle for control.

Isserman's book covers these important years well. Each reader can find his or her own quibbles, but it is one of the five or six chronological studies necessary to understand the party. Next, perhaps, after the innumerable biographies of Norman Thomas, we can have at least one of Earl Browder.

LOWELL K. DYSON
*Alexandria, Virginia*

Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1943–49 *by Robert J. McMahon. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1981. 338 pp. $22.50.*

This new book sounds an old theme: During the 1940s, the United States failed to understand the nationalism underlying the Indonesian revolution and consequently sowed seeds for two decades of disastrous disagreement.

The author analyzes American policy in three phases. During the first, from 1942 through 1945, Washington spoke the rhetoric of anti-colonialism but acted very differently. Franklin D. Roosevelt and his State Department never really intended to prevent the return of the Dutch. General MacArthur agreed to that in 1944, and a year later, at Potsdam, Field Marshall Mountbatten was given responsibility for reoccupying the islands. London lacked the resources and will for that distasteful task, and Washington blithely provided lend-lease aid which enabled the Dutch to return in force late in 1945.

From 1946 to 1948, the second phase, the Dutch and Indonesians alternately talked and fought. Once again Washington appeared to back the nationalists but in practice supported their colonial overlords. The United States interpreted the Linggadjati agreement of 1946, which promised eventual independence, in a pro-Dutch fashion and did nothing to halt Holland's first "police action" in 1947. Although two Americans, University of North Carolina President Frank K. Graham and diplomat Coert DuBois, presided over United Nations commissions sent to the islands and reported Dutch intransigence for what it was, their State Department superiors gave them little support. Instead, reading successive Indo-Dutch agreements in Holland's favor, and continuing to give economic aid to the Hague, they witnessed in December 1948 a second "police action," which resulted in Dutch seizure of the nationalist capital and most of its leaders.

The final climactic year of the Indonesian fight for independence produced a different American response. For pragmatic rather than idealistic reasons, Washington gradually reversed its policies. Having previously crushed their communist adversaries, the Indonesian nationalists looked more like a desirable "third force" midway between colonialism and Mao Tse-tung's communism. Dutch excesses created an uproar in the press and prompted Senator Owen Brewster to introduce a resolution threatening to cut off economic aid. Fearful lest the Indonesian affair disrupt progress toward consolidating NATO, State Department officials reversed course, backing the ultimately successful ef-

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forts of H. Merle Cochran, their representative in Djakarta, to get the Dutch to yield sovereignty over most of the Indonesian archipelago.

McMahon has mined American, United Nations, and, for its first two phases, British archives to detail his story. His solid, traditionally diplomatic-historical account focuses primarily on what men within the Department of State thought, said, and did. Yet McMahon offers only a line or two to describe his policymakers and pays slight attention to shifts in internal policy development procedures under Secretaries James Byrnes, George Marshall, and Dean Acheson. He provides supporting evidence from military, CIA, and business-statistical sources but does not explain fully why extra-departmental forces did or did not affect policy. He does not appear to have consulted State Department studies of public opinion and does not give evidence of the relative volume of press commentary in 1947 and 1949. These weaknesses render his estimate of the Brewster resolution's importance plausible but not entirely convincing. Finally, McMahon appends to his sound conclusion a wandering epilogue which, on the basis of secondary sources alone, advances value-laden judgments about the downward spiral of Indonesian-American relations after 1949.

These flaws aside, this monograph presents the best account of American diplomacy toward revolutionary Indonesia yet to appear. The book points the way toward the task of the future: writing a comprehensive comparative analysis of Washington's responses to revolution in post-1945 East and Southeast Asia.

ROGER DINGMAN
*University of Southern California*

Law and Inflation *by Keith S. Rosenn. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylania Press, 1982. 451 pp. $40.00.*

While the title of Rosenn's book may appear to be unduly ambitious, it is as informative and accurate as most book titles. He has produced a sensible and wide-ranging commentary on the responses of the judicial systems of the world to the economic effects of inflation. (Deflation is mostly written off as an historical curiosity.) There may be a few specialists and monomaniacs, somewhere, who, after reading this book, would like to know still more about these responses, but most readers will be sated with the subject if they stick with Rosenn until the end.

In the early chapters, Rosenn gives us all that we need to know about the most fashionable and influential theories of inflation of the present day. While each is given a civil hearing, his preference for the monetarist explanation is never in doubt. This is not to say that he is a zealous convert to the view that "only money matters." He can more accurately be described as a lawyer who, on the basis of the briefs submitted so far, has concluded that the monetarists have made the best case for their position (as they have). Monetary theory, however, is not a major interest of this book. Rosenn is mainly concerned with examining the ways in which private parties have tried to use law to protect themselves against the undesired consequences of inflation and how courts and sover-

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eigns have reacted to these efforts. There is nothing parochial about his approach. The illustrative material comes from all over, not excluding ancient China and modern Luxembourg.

In a very limited sense, the implications of Rosenn's research are reassuring. It leaves no doubt that once human beings have decided that inflation is probably the wave of their futures, they display remarkable and unremitting ingenuity in devising contractual arrangements to protect themselves. On first meeting, judges often react with suspicion and hostility to these legal innovations but they usually come around to accepting some versions of them.

I suspect that in the course of writing this book, Rosenn became a sadder as well as a wiser man. He dislikes inflation both because it generates inequities and because it causes the economy to spend resources to mitigate its effects. He is under no illusion that some rate of inflation is a prophylaxis against an undesirable rate of unemployment. He endorses and would enlarge Milton Friedman's proposal for indexing some incomes and prices. Nevertheless, his evidence is overwhelming that most governments most of the time lack the power or the will to engineer a stable price level and that since World War II their ranks have included even countries which once had a decent legacy from the nineteenth century of responsible money management. Rosenn's main hope seems to be that the judicial system should not become part of the problem. If government must regularly debase its currency, so be it. But at least leave private parties free to devise arrangements that allow commerce to be carried on with minimal disruptions in an inflationary world.

DONALD DEWEY
*Columbia University*

Computers and Politics: High Technology in American Local Governments *by James N. Danziger et al. New York, Columbia University Press, 1982. 280 pp. $25.00.*

The expectation of many analysts that the widespread adoption of computers would serve principally to enhance the rationality of decision-making in American cities and counties is brought into serious question by this excellent book. The volume is the culmination of the five-year Urban Information Systems (URBIS) research project funded by the National Science Foundation at the University of California, Irvine. After positing four models of the possible impact of technological change—"managerial rationalism," "technocratic elitism," "organizational pluralism," and "reinforcement politics"—authors Danziger, William Dutton, Rob Kling, and Kenneth Kraemer conclude that this process is profoundly conservative. It results in little shifting of power among major actors in the local polity. The biases in computer use favor administrative efficiency, financial accountability, and social control, and not program innovation or enhanced social service delivery. In sum, the authors demonstrate that the main effect of computing in local government to date has been to reinforce already dominant political coalitions.

The attentiveness of the URBIS team to research design and the methodological care

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evident in this work makes it a model of contemporary political science analysis. Their effort proceeded in two phases. Initially, all counties above 100,000 and cities above 50,000 in population were surveyed to determine the extent of their "computer package" (people, equipment, and technique) and the chief executive attitudes towards computer use in local government. The results of these surveys, augmented by extended case studies of selected jurisdictions, allowed an analysis of the factors in the "computer milieu" that affected the speed and extensiveness of equipment acquisition, the key bureaucratic actors in computer-related decisions, and the local commitment to the new technology. Not surprisingly, the availability of federal funding provided major incentives, but particular local factors—an entrepreneurial data processing manager in Lane County, Oregon, a home town boy as president in Grand Rapids, Michigan—often affected whether opportunities available from the national government were successfully exploited.

In a second research phase, a stratified sample of 42 cities was selected, and each was visited and studied extensively by one or more members of the research team. Here the questions concerned where and by whom in the policy process computers were being used and their effect on the local distribution of power. In one interesting counter-intuitive finding, the authors suggest that rather than reducing uncertainty in government decision-making by increasing information levels, computers may increase it by allowing access to information, centrally held, to larger numbers of actors.

In a final chapter, normative issues raised by the research are addressed. The authors deplore the negative effects of technological change on government—increased costs, lack of equal access to services, declining responsiveness, and general inconvenience—though these are never discussed or measured in earlier chapters. They call for such steps as the decentralization of computer expertise and equipment in local government in order to combat the "reinforcement of dominant coalition" effect that their research identified, and therefore to use change to democratize the decision process and its consequences. As the URBIS team itself notes, however, computers did help give Americans what they said they wanted from local government in the late 1970s: fiscal constraint and enhanced efforts to control crime.

But differences in normative position should not detract from the great overall value of the empirical work reported in this book. It is hard to imagine a graduate program in political science, public administration, or public policy that now might allow a student of American local government to graduate without a thorough familiarity with its approach, findings, and implications.

GERALD BENJAMIN
*State University of New York, New Paltz*

Imprisonment in America: Choosing the Future *by Michael Sherman and Gordon Hawkins. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1982. 146 pp. $15.50.*

In nearly every state today, prisons are filled to the bursting point. In many states, federal courts have mandated substantial improvements to meet constitutional standards. Given

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the need to do something about their prisons, state legislators and other policymakers have an opportunity to reassess the premises on which their entire criminal justice systems are based—not just the question of whether or not to build more prisons.

The debate over crowded and inadequate prisons has been narrowly focused on the construction issue and sharply polarized between the "build more" and the "don't build any more" movements. The authors of this provocative study assert that this issue is just "the tip of the policy iceberg." The more important debate should be over why we imprison people, who really should be incarcerated, and what we can do about offenders if we do not put them in prisons (p. 10). Three paradigms of a criminal justice system are described: "crime control," including deterrence, incapacitation, and prevention; "legalist," articulating and reinforcing the legal norms of society; and "social service," including counseling, training, and education (pp. 77-78).

Given the widespread doubts that prisons rehabilitate criminals or deter them from crime, what should prisons do? Sherman and Hawkins argue that prisons can confine offenders and keep them from repeating the offense while they are imprisoned. They conclude that the basis for a sensible policy is to "ensure that the prison does what it can—immobilize criminals—and then to find other, acceptable measures for doing what it cannot" (p. 100). They also emphasize that imprisonment should be treated as a scarce political and economic resource and not as something synonymous with punishment. They propose that imprisonment be used where it seems necessary to meet the threat of physical violence; new prison space be built primarily to replace existing facilities or to bring them up to humane and constitutional standards; and existing social services programs be maintained if they can be "truly voluntary and facilitative" (p. 101). These policies would involve a determination of the categories of criminals who should be incapacitated and a range of sentences, generally up to a five-year maximum. They would also greatly reduce the need for prison space but would not reduce the cost of correctional systems because the burden of dealing with offenders would be shifted to other components of the system —presumably community programs and facilities.

The authors understand the political nature of correctional policies and acknowledge the political constraints on policy choices. Yet by dealing almost entirely with the underlying issues—the purpose of imprisonment and the need to divorce punishment from imprisonment—they stop where the debate actually starts in most state legislatures. There are two extremely practical problems: determining which offenders are dangerous and finding ways to deal with non-incarcerated offenders in a way that is politically acceptable to a society frightened and frustrated by its crime problems. The authors acknowledge the first difficulty (as have Norval Morris and others) but do little with the second. Until specific proposals for solving these problems are presented to financially pressured state legislatures, it would seem there is little chance to make the bold changes suggested. For, as the authors point out, there is no consensus in the general public today that prison conditions are too harsh or that incarceration is being over-used (p. 125). The problem cries out for policy leadership at a critical point in the history of our criminal justice system. This book provides both factual data and a thoughtful examination of underlying is-

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sues that should be considered before additional billions are committed to the enlargement of our prisons.

JEAN BICKMORE WHITE
*Weber State College*

American Intervention in Greece, 1943–1949 *by Lawrence S. Wittner. New York, Columbia University Press, 1982. 445 pp. $19.95.*

Joining recent works by John O. Iatrides (*Ambassador MacVeagh Reports* and *Greece in the 1940s*) and Bruce Kuniholm (*The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*), Wittner's book breaks new ground in detailing what happens to a recipient of substantial American aid and advice. Wittner's archival research is rich, his narrative well-paced, and his conclusions sensible. He demonstrates that the United States had power in the early postwar years and intended to use it, even to the point of blatantly manipulating foreign politicians. Although Wittner does not label the outcome of this exercise of American power "empire" or "hegemony," he tells "a sad story of intervention in the affairs of a foreign land, culminating in war, dictatorship, and alienation" (p. 311). Two decades ago, William Appleman Williams wrote a controversial yet increasingly respected book titled *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. Williams decried the fact that Americans undermined their own best principles, like democracy, in efforts to satisfy U.S. expansionist needs abroad. Wittner does much the same in this provocative case study. The argument is not simply that American officials ultimately came to control Greece, but that when they failed to persuade reluctant and sometimes resentful Greeks to heed American counsel, they believed it necessary to coerce them.

The Greek story is set in the context of the wartime and postwar collapse of the old order, the rise of left-wing resistance groups, the decline of British power, the emerging superiority of the United States, American anti-Communism, and the worldwide scramble for oil. Because Greek politics was polarized between left and right, the United States stood with the right, while trying to nudge it toward needed economic reforms to insure the effective application of aid dollars. Wittner catalogs the virulent but mistaken American Cold War belief that the Soviets were masterminding the Greek civil war. Yet he establishes that the Soviets were not at all active in Greece, that Moscow in fact showed "indifference" toward the Greek rebels (p. 8), and that the international Communism Americans feared might sweep the Near East did not exist. What existed instead was a civil war, derived from indigenous sources, and the Tito–Stalin schism, exacerbated by sharply opposing Yugoslav and Russian views of the Greek conflict.

After the Truman Doctrine of 1947, the debate over which Wittner summarizes well, American officials assumed that they would have to intervene in Greek internal affairs. Wittner's major contribution lies in his account of the myriad ways in which American diplomats and generals worked to reorganize the Greek government, military, economy, and labor unions. American leaders did not always agree—the embassy and aid mission

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squabbled, for example. Still, they agreed on the necessity of suppressing Greek dissenters, especially the Communist party, and on vetoing compromises with the leftists. In the end, the American program was largely military, in contrast to the initial thrust of the Truman Doctrine. The 1949 victory over the insurgents, however, was due less to the American military presence than to Tito's decision to close his border to the rebels, thus denying them supplies and sanctuary.

Disagreeing with writers like Kuniholm that the containment line had to be drawn in Greece, Wittner suggests there were alternatives, including a legitimate Communist party, such as now functions in France and Italy, and a nonaligned (even if Communist) Greece, like Yugoslavia. He disputes the interpretation that a Communist Greece necessarily would have become a Soviet client.

In his last chapter, an overview of 1950–1980, Wittner might have compared the American counterrevolutionary experience in Greece with other later interventions, especially because he argues that the lessons Americans drew from their short-term success in defeating the Greek left influenced their optimistic belief in victory elsewhere, such as in Indochina. Readers of this valuable historical case study will find themselves making comparisons. Thus Wittner stimulates us to pose difficult questions about current interventions, such as in El Salvador.

THOMAS G. PATERSON
*University of Connecticut*

Sexism: The Male Monopoly on History and Thought *by Marielouise Janssen-Jurreit, translated by Verne Moberg. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1982. 376 pp. $12.95.*

To readers whose introduction to "the male monopoly of history and thought" has been by way of American writing—almost half of the writers quoted even by the present author are American—it is fascinating to see the same monopoly viewed from a German perspective and illustrated mainly by German examples.

The quotations at the heads of chapters themselves carry much of the weight of the message. Here, for example, is a nineteenth-century German children's song: "Miller, miller, mill it! / The youths cost a dollar. / The young maids sell for pigeon dirt / that people quickly kick aside. / Miller, miller, mill it! / The maids get a dollar, / The young boys get a saddlehorse, / well worth a thousand dollars" (p. 3.) Even the biblical patriarchs valued females at three-fifths of males—as we do today in our pay scales—but a thousand dollars to one! That in any language has to be sexism at its worst.

Yet change is in process. Paternal authority and economic power no longer coincide; men are no longer reliable allies of the state. "No one has children out of patriotism" (p. 349). Patriarchal control of the marriage market is passing.

Recognizing that feminist theory is still in its infancy, the author does not have a doctrinaire explanation of the sexism she so abundantly documents in this book. She rejects visions of an original matriarchy as nonproductive; nor does she find socio-biology,

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Freud, Levy-Straus, Harris, and Divale (pp. 343–44), or even Marx and Engels helpful (pp. 329–32). But she does emphasize that the discrimination women face in both the economy and the polity is related directly and indirectly to their role in reproduction. The "empowerment" of sexuality rests on "the historical formation of conditions for reproduction" (p. 332). Those who control the reproductive services of women, especially mother–child relationships, control the whole system. In a kind of update of the Oedipal theme, the author states that if children and youth were permitted to develop solidarity with mothers, the position of grown men would be in jeopardy. Such potential social weakness gives rise to the need among men to prevent such solidarity. "If men want to win allies in the following generation, they must develop a sex-specific solidarity structure. The control of women requires the suspension of the natural, close relations between the mother and the male child. The boys, in other words, must be convinced above all of the insignificance of motherhood" (p. 336). A powerful and subtle set of cultural patterns shape this sex-specific structure of female subordination and male superordination and render it all but impossible for women to resist (p. 337). The value of the fascinating contents of the book, it should be noted, does not depend on acceptance of the hypothesis.

Solutions are not easy to envision. Sexual denial, homosexual relations, birth strikes, and refusal of female services can become useful political issues only if feminist organizations on an international scale can coordinate a variety of such refusals and strikes (pp. 351–52). (There is that—probably apocryphal—story of the psychological havoc wrought in one office when the clerical workers went on a "smile strike.") There still remains, though, as in so many other wonderfully logical ideas, that ineluctable "if." If women could collectively muster the denial weapon on a large scale what would, indeed, be impossible? (Without that "ineluctable if" even Reaganomics would work.) But until that "if" can be overcome, I'll settle for the achievement by women of recognition of their own value and psychological un-dependence on men.

I should add that special credit should go to the translator who has succeeded in making this valuable contribution to the sociology of knowledge accessible to a non-German-reading public; it is, in fact, an absorbing reading experience.

JESSIE BERNARD
*Washington, D.C.*

Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World *by Elisabeth Young-Bruehl. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1982. 563 pp. $25.00.*

Now that the din of controversy that marked Hannah Arendt's career in America has largely subsided, the time has come for an objective assessment of her life's work. Only seven years after her death one can already assert with confidence that her impact on American political thought will continue to be felt for a long time to come. She never attempted to found a "school" and did not search for disciples, but it seems evident that the mark of her thought on political theorists such as George Kateb, John Schaar, or

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Sheldon Wolin, to mention just a few, has been profound and lasting. This being the case, Elisabeth Young-Bruehl's book is welcome indeed.

This book intends to be both a personal and an intellectual biography. It succeeds brilliantly on the personal level. One doubts that there will be a need for another biography of Hannah Arendt in the near future. The author has uncovered a number of significant details about the life of her subject in Germany and in France. Few of Arendt's admirers here knew that Martin Heidegger was not only her teacher but her lover. Her biographer brilliantly evokes the intellectual atmosphere of the Weimar Republic in which Arendt grew into intellectual maturity. She provides evocative portraits of the many intellectuals, both in Germany and later in France, who influenced Arendt's thought even as they themselves were influenced by her sparkling mind. A few inaccuracies have crept into the account of Arendt's formative years, but as a whole the treatment of these years provides information on her European background that is essential if one wishes to understand the wellsprings of her later thought.

The amply detailed account of her many years in America is even more rewarding. One now understands much better how Arendt, even though she repeatedly proclaimed that as a "pariah" Jew in America she could never grow secure roots here, nevertheless managed to establish a great variety of ties to American intellectuals, both Jewish and gentile. One also can now appreciate the sources of the ambivalent relations she had with the New York intellectuals as well as with many scholars in the various universities where she taught as a lecturer or a visiting professor. One already knew her involvement with the writers loosely gathered around *Partisan Review*, but much less was known about her close friendship with such poets as W. H. Auden or Randall Jarrell. The triumphant success of her work, *The Origin of Totalitarianism*, is well documented; it may truly be said to have powerfully influenced the thought of several generations of readers on the nature of the totalitarian phenomenon. Young-Bruehl now shows in instructive detail that several of Arendt's later books had a comparable, though perhaps somewhat more restricted, impact.

Peter Berger, in a recent review of this book in the *New York Times*, asserts that Arendt was fairly representative of European left-wing thought. He is seriously in error. Arendt never evinced any particular interest in social questions, surely a hallmark of left-wing thought both here and in Europe. Her major concerns were almost totally confined to the political realm. That is why she rated the American Revolution above the French: The former, she felt, had limited itself to the political sphere while the latter attempted to change the social structure. The political participation of citizens and their involvement with the *res publica* was Arendt's central concern. Her love of the Greek *polis* stemmed from this prepotent interest, as did her admiration for the soviet type of popular democracy during the few tragic days of the Hungarian Revolution. Arendt's principled stand for participatory democracy colored all her political judgments and transcended the usual Left–Right political dichotomies. It explains why she could be conservative on social issues while being radical in the political sphere. These matters are only touched upon in this book and will have to be elaborated by future commentators. As it is, Young-Bruehl

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has provided a superb evocation of Arendt's person and her intellectual milieu. For this, one can only be grateful.

LEWIS A. COSER
*State University of New York, Stony Brook*

Elites in France: Origins, Reproduction and Power *edited by Jolyon Howorth and Philip G. Cerny. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982. 253 pp. $27.50.*

This is a collection of 13 papers given in 1980 at the meeting of the Association for the Study of Modern and Contemporary France at the University of Aston (U.K.). Of the contributors, one is American, the others are British and French. Footnotes and statistical tables have been added for publication, some of the papers have been updated to take into account Mitterand's election, and the French contributions have been translated.

Conference papers in book form often hang together so poorly that one wonders why they were published as a collection. This book is an exception: common themes link the chapters, and one does indeed emerge with an impression that corresponds to the title. However, two caveats are in order. First, the articles contain extensive and often crucial quotations in scholarly French. Second, they presuppose a thorough knowledge of French administrative and political structures along with abbreviations of their names. The editors would have been well-advised to have provided full translations of the former and a glossary of the latter to make the book accessible to more readers. As it is, nonspecialists will find some of the chapters hard going.

France is usually taken as the model of continental European democracy. Yet the French themselves and outside observers have often asserted that the reality is elitist domination. This shows up in such stock phrases as "the Republic of dukes," then of cronies, and now of technocrats. The *notables* have been with us since the Old Regime, and the fabled "200 families" probably always will be, at least in the popular imagination.

On what is this perception based? The chapters make it clear in a rather orderly sequence, though the editorial grouping of them into three parts seems arbitrary. The first and probably best chapter shows that the old pre-revolutionary nobility did not, as is often asserted, constitute part of the ruling elite by amalgamating with the upper bourgeoisie. Instead, the old nobility kept to itself, and though it remained rich, it wielded little influence, even in the army or the Church. The true elite was and still is the product of the educational system, one of the most elitist in the world. Individual chapters show how the *bac*, the diploma from a good *lycée*, has been the necessary ticket for getting ahead in modern France, and how from there the selection of the elite leads through the *grandes écoles*, particularly the *Ecole Polytechnique* and the *Ecole Normale Supérieure*. No one in France needs to be told who *normaliens* are or that they come from the rue d'Ulm.

Later chapters emphasize that products of this elitist system have been interchangeable parts in administration, business, and even political parties in a way not found elsewhere.

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One writer (Anne Stevens) stresses that the Communist party is the only one that does not parallel the hierarchy found in other French institutions (p. 144). Seeming breaks with the past in 1944 and 1958 have done little to change all of this. Indeed, one chapter on the post-war period even contains the proverb "the more it changes the more it stays the same" in its title. The only real change was the addition of yet another elitist school, the *Ecole Nationale d'Administration*, which trains *énarques* (a new stock term) for national administration.

Is it true, then, that France is in fact governed by an undemocratic elite? Only if one equates democracy with egalitarianism, but the French have never done so. On the contrary, the French democratic tradition insists on rigorous selectivity through layers of competitive examinations. Family and connections help, as everywhere else, but it is seldom possible to make it without merit in France. This book is highly recommended to those who want to know how this meritocracy works.

ROBERT E. NEIL
*Oberlin College*

Strategies for Change: The Future of French Society *by Michel Crozier, translated by William R. Beer. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1982. 230 pp. $17.50.*

In this provocative book, French sociologist Michel Crozier redefines France's political and social malaise and proposes new lines of action to achieve change. His diagnosis and prognosis are not easily categorized; his criticism of France's administrative elite is at odds with traditional conservation while his denunciation of "worker participation" contrasts with demands of the political left. In fact, Crozier explicitly disavows ideology and asserts instead the necessity for a realistic approach which sheds outworn ideological frameworks and utopian visions. In his view, only new ways of looking at reality can generate indispensible social change.

First, the diagnosis. Crozier argues that France's bureaucratization has become an acute problem. Increasing complexity is leading individuals to doubt the effectiveness of social controls, but the stagnant and uncommunicative bureaucracy stifles the very mechanisms which might create new social institutions. In his view, bureaucracy is neither a "regulative nor a counterbalancing mechanism but an agent of disintegration or entrophy. It is capable of adapting itself, and it paralyzes innovation, the only action that will allow a society to adapt in an active way" (p. 175). The excessive bureaucratization which affects all aspects of French life must be reduced.

Second, the solution. Crozier proposes three specific strategies: political decentralization through popularly elected provincial assemblies; an opening up of the governing class through changes in both the elite schools and the administrative corps they produce; and linking the results of knowledge gained from empirical research to action. In his choice of targets, Crozier proposes change where it is most likely to succeed—in the provinces—and where its effects will be most widespread—in the elite administrative strata

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which controls France's bureaucracy. In his emphasis on knowledge, he suggests coping with change by fostering intellectual innovation and reducing the "essentially conservative" power of the technocrats (p. 129). This can be accomplished by relying on people and by teaching them, through the French educational system, to make choices. This trust in people, Crozier argues, is "implicit in any democratic ethic" (p. 147). Thus, his reforms aim at the core of French political culture and socialization.

Also important to Crozier's blueprint for the future are two approaches: an entrepreneurial spirit which involves creativity through risk, and a style peculiar to the new service industries which stresses the relationship between consumer and provider. While on the one hand he seeks to reinvigorate the sense of initiative and inventiveness which characterized an earlier period in France's economic and political history, he also calls for a rejection of old industrial and organizational models. His suggestions for decentralization seem possible especially in the context of France's socialist government, but achieving the administrative reforms he advocates seems a formidable task. Nevertheless, Crozier is persuasive concerning the logic of his suggested reforms as well as their practicality.

This book contains a challenging and complex argument. Crozier's analysis is peculiar to France, but the American reader is struck by similarities between the French situation and the present economic and political conditions in the United States and in other post-industrial societies. The uselessness of existing organizational and political remedies and the sterility of the present political debate are characteristic of many Western democracies today. From this perspective, Crozier's arguments contain some useful guides to the framework in which future problems will emerge, and some suggestions as to how human capacities to solve them may be harnessed. Though not written in the popular style of some futuristic works, Crozier's book is more valuable than most as a clue to the years ahead.

MARIANNA P. SULLIVAN
*Trenton State College*

The Collapse of the Weimar Republic: Political Economy and Crisis *by David Abraham. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1981. 366 pp. Cloth, $30.00; paper, $12.50.*

Ever since fascism first appeared in Europe in the 1920s, Marxists have for obvious reasons striven to explain it as a product of capitalism. The crimes of the Nazi regime in Germany added paradigmatic significance in their eyes to that capitalist country's horrendous course. The prevailing Marxist consensus long held that German capitalists played the decisive role in bringing Hitler to power. Now that extensive research based on the records of numerous major German industrial firms and banks has rendered that position untenable, Marxist writers have retreated to a second line of defense. Like Abraham, they contend that contradictions inherent in the structure of German capitalism ruled out any resolution of that country's political crisis other than the one offered by fascism.

Much of Abraham's book is devoted to development of a highly schematic model of

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German society. Anyone conversant with the country's dynamic development will wince at his reduction of a complex industrial nation to eight hermetically-sealed socio-economic categories that omit any consideration of such powerful determinants of political behavior as region, religion, and age. For some American readers his distinction between two "class-fractions" of industry—static, home-market-oriented heavy industry and dynamic, export-oriented industry—may seem illuminating. But others will recognize it as merely a warmed-over version of the "monopoly group theory" developed by central European Marxists in the 1920s. Unfortunately for its proponents, whatever validity that theory may have had for earlier times was drastically reduced during the Weimar period by the diversification of large industrial firms and the emergence of huge trusts and conglomerates that blurred the distinctions underlying the theory. To construct his model, Abraham has to downplay or simply ignore those developments. To the unwitting reader, the influential and politically active industrialist Paul Reusch will thus appear as an archetypical spokesman of the stagnant, heavy industry of the Ruhr, not as the architect of a variegated conglomerate that produced ships, motors, and industrial machinery as well as iron and steel. The IG Farben chemical trust will appear as a purely export-oriented firm whereas some of its major branches, such as those producing fertilizers and synthetic gasoline and rubber, relied almost exclusively upon domestic markets. A different sort of complexity characterized the economic interests and the socio-political attitudes of Paul Silverberg, the industrialist Abraham casts as spokesman of the "dynamic, export-oriented fraction." To cram Silverberg into that category Abraham must extend it to encompass lignite strip-mining, whose markets were virtually wholly domestic and whose dynamism was questionable. He must also omit mention of Silverberg's heavy involvement in bituminous coal mining, one of the bastions of the "stagnant, domestically-oriented" category of industry as well as Silverberg's role as a charter member of the *Ruhrlade*, the secret cabinet of Ruhr heavy industry.

Invoking the familiar primacy of economics, Abraham presents a highly reductionist version of the dissolution of the Republic and the rise of Nazism, which he explains in terms of his vastly simplified model of German society. He assures us that conflicts among the once dominant classes of the Empire—industry and large-scale agriculture—and between the "class fractions" of industry thwarted chancellors Brüning, Papen, and Schleicher. Ultimately, only fascism offered a formula that could reunite the "historic ruling bloc" and provide it with a mass base. Although Abraham repeatedly denies any interest in such an epiphenomenon as individual businessmen's aid to the Nazis, he also repeatedly invokes the myth of massive big-business support for the National Socialist German Workers' Party before 1933. When he characterizes Hitler's acquisition of power as a reestablishment of the coalition of dominant classes, he has heavy industry exercising the leadership. Unfortunately, Abraham's footnotes do not marshal evidence adequate to support his thesis. Informed readers will also balk at his disparagement or omission of institutions, ideologies, and personalities vital to comprehension of the German calamity. In a footnote near the end, he announces: "we slight, for example, Hindenburg's camarilla, the similarly pro-Nazi bureaucracy, and the somewhat more complicated situation in the military" (p. 315). An overdue admission—if too short a list—most will agree.

Abraham's book will, unfortunately, be of little use to future scholars. His indiffer-

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ence to particulars leads him to misidentify numerous individuals and publications, to rewrite quotations, to invoke only those parts of documents that suit his needs, and to employ footnote citations so vague as to discourage a check of his sources. The book is, in short, unreliable in detail as well as in terms of its thesis.

HENRY A. TURNER
*Yale University*

Religion and Politics in Latin America: The Catholic Church in Venezuela and Colombia *by Daniel H. Levine. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1981. 342 pp. Cloth, $22.50; paper, $6.95.*

The coming of age of the study of religion and politics in Latin America is clearly demonstrated by Daniel H. Levine's excellent book. Up until the late 1960s, such studies tended to use models derived from North American or European contexts and to depend on the repetition of a limited set of ideas concerning the Catholic Church in Latin America. While Levine maintains the institutional focus of these studies by rooting his data in interviews of the Colombian and Venezuelan bishops, his analysis is far more sophisticated, insightful, and sensitive to the human element. Levine also has a dispassionate feel for the institution and the people involved in it and touched by it. Although the author himself wonders how a non-Christian, non-Latin had the temerity to undertake such a study, he has clearly turned this to advantage, for the work does not suffer from the tendency of some other recent studies to give expression to frustrations generated by individual disenchantment with the Catholic Church.

Levine focuses on evolving images of the Church and their effect on the manner in which religious faith influences social and political activism; the recent emergence within the Catholic Church of more dynamic views of change and the role of the Church in the world; and how concepts of power, force, and violence determine the attitudes of Church people towards class conflict. The author aptly describes the dynamism of change within the Catholic Church over the past two to three decades without becoming enamoured with a vision of the Church as a revolutionary institution. Rather, he clearly perceives the weight of the traditional sectors, particularly among church elites. Levine also realizes that even these have undergone substantial permutations and relates these to attitudes and behavior towards church administration, authority, social and political action, as well as to the clerical and lay bases of the Church. The author notes that the post-Vatican II (1962–65) and post-Medellín (1968) enthusiasm for social action and renewal of church structures quickly declined in favor of preoccupation with lessened unity in the Church and intensification of evangelization. While Levine does not focus specifically on the base Christian communities (although he is currently engaged in such a study), his work suggests that such innovations were very much part of the desire to renew the Church by incorporating into it substantial numbers of the relatively unevangelized in the face of increasingly strong appeals from both religious and secular competitors. This conservative tactic has spawned mechanisms that have promoted societal and ecclesial change. Such developments, at the same time that the Catholic Church was receiving an infusion of

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more professionalized staff resulting from improvements in the training of local clergy, cultivation of lay leaders, as well as an influx of foreign missionaries, meant that bishops had to deal with more assertive and change-oriented staffs. Episcopal response raised questions concerning traditional authority patterns, management practices, resource allocation, and the overall role of the Church in societies undergoing rapid change.

Levine establishes that the concept of authority enunciated at Vatican II emphasizing equality, mutuality, and communitarian structures has made only partial inroads. In addition, while the Church's increased focus on issues of justice and the preferential option for the poor has had impact, the leadership of the Church continues to try to be inclusive rather than exclusive, and thus is profoundly opposed to models of change based on class warfare. Levine argues that criticism by Church radicals of the continued priority of institutional preservation is illogical given the Church's self-proclaimed mission of preserving and communicating to all the message of salvation. Hence, among the episcopacy motivating others to action to promote change is more popular than church activism. Levine has succeeded in revising some conclusions stimulated by misperceptions of the nature and extent of change within the Church, as well as by intense media coverage of progressive sectors.

There have been numerous studies of the episcopacy in Latin America; Levine's is a model in terms of analytical balance. It justifies its institutional focus by an appreciation of the depth and impact of religious commitments by individuals and by a phenomenological approach that "puts analysis within the context of the rules, perceptions, and lives of the actors themselves" (p. 292). This is also reflected in the richness, even pungency, of the direct quotations which leaven the narrative. Finally, Levine has broken another stereotype—that there is a Latin American Church. Rather, the national churches in Colombia or Venezuela, Argentina or Peru, Guatemala or Nicaragua are dissimilar in their attitudes, actions, and orientations; they need to be studied individually in order to understand their actual roles in the politics of their respective countries. Only then will the actual relationship between religion and politics in Latin America begin to be better understood.

MARGARET E. CRAHAN
*Occidental College*

Ideology and Development in Africa *by Crawford Young. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1982. 376 pp. $29.95.*

Crawford Young is an embodiment of the mutual benefits of area studies and comparative politics. As an expert on Zaire, he has for 20 years produced a uniquely well-informed running commentary on the heart of darkness and its coronary ailments. In this and his more comparative work, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism,* he has shown a serious, energetic commitment to the aims and central issues of comparative politics.

This new work is significant both as a consummation of 20 years of research and writing and as a timely review of what has happened to Africa in the interim. Young argues

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that it is now possible and proper to evaluate the achievements at least of the older African states and the developmental impact of particular ideologies. Among the latter, he distinguishes three categories which have an effect on policies, if not on outcomes. The first, the "Afro-Marxist," he examines in relation to the experiences of Benin, the Congo (formerly Brazzaville), Madagascar, Ethiopia, Somalia, Angola, and Mozambique. The second, the "populist socialist," is exemplified by Tanzania, Algeria, Ghana (under Nkrumah), Guinea, Mali (under Modibo Keita), and Guinea-Bissau. The third, "capitalist," represented mainly by the Ivory Coast, Kenya, and Nigeria, involves the adoption, if not the preaching, of values and strategies which most post-colonial governments do not care or dare to embrace, at least not publicly.

Formally, the book is concerned with exploring "the interrelationship between ideological preference and developmental performance" (p. 9). Young selects six criteria—growth (mainly as reflected in rural incomes), equality of distribution, autonomy (relative to other states), "preservation of human dignity" (p. 17), participation, and "the expansion of societal capacity" (p. 19). In less experienced or confident hands, such a project could collapse into meaningless quantification and question-begging correlations, but Young is very alert to conceptual and empirical pitfalls, and justifies and deploys both his ideological categories and his criteria with sophistication and ingenuity. The result is a confidently discursive and authoritatively subjective work.

Yet the general outcome is one of systematic ambiguity. There is no clear correlation between ideology and performances on any criterion, though ideology clearly does shape policy choices. Capitalism does not have to be accompanied by inextricable dependency: Benin, Congo, and Madagascar continue to flutter hypnotically around the undimmed lights of France and have got precious little from the Soviet Union in return for adopting Leninism. There is some association between capitalism and conspicuous concentrations of affluence; but, Young argues, at least the Ivoirien and Kenyan farmers have more money, whereas their counterparts in Ghana, Guinea, and some other socialist states have been taxed to finance abortive and ambitious schemes of state-controlled development which have drained the treasury and, as in the extraordinary case of the Congo, have become welfare bureaucracies for the urban educated elite. Yet capitalism may also neglect agriculture, as in Nigeria and Zaire.

As regards political expression, Young generally finds neither the gulags suspected by the conservatives nor the repression which the left sees as present or potential under capitalism. Government under capitalism may actually be more effective at the periphery than under some urban-biased socialist regimes, and it is always more interventionist in the economy than its rhetoric might suggest.

Young's book confirms his authority as Africanist and as comparativist not only by demolishing relationships too easily assumed but also by suggesting some associations never adequately explored, as for example, between socialism, bureaucratic inflation, and the eventual seeking of Western capital. What we need now is a cheaper student edition.

MARTIN STANILAND
*University of California, Berkeley*

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Women in Islam: Tradition and Transition in the Middle East *by Naila Minai. New York, Seaview Books, 1981. 283 pp. $12.95.*

Minai's book is a thoughtful and well-balanced attempt at assessing the role and status of Muslim women in the Middle East and North Africa. The author, a journalist of Turkish background who was educated in France and the United States, has done her homework well. Her collective portrait of Muslim women is based on a review of available literature, interviews, and personal experience. The book, in her own words, is "not meant to be an exhaustive study of Middle Eastern women, but rather a personal view by a Muslim woman who has spent her life commuting between the East and the West" (p. xiii).

Minai writes in a clear, easy flowing style and manages to convey a lot of information in a simple and straightforward manner. She does not underestimate the complexity of the subject nor is she unaware of the enormous risk taken in any attempt to generalize on Muslim women who, like women everywhere, differ in terms of social class, ethnic background, personality factors, and educational level. She adopts an historical perspective that permits her to evaluate the changing position of women in terms of the changing socioeconomic and political context. Beginning with a brief description of the condition of women in western Arabia at the dawn on Islam (sixth century A.D.), she ends her book speculating about the implications of the current Islamic Revival (more correctly, the resurgence of Islamic conservatism in national politics) to the status of women. This latter is perhaps one of the most urgent issues facing Muslim women today, especially in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution which has already restricted women's role in the public domain and rescinded the liberal reforms promulgated under the Shah in the Iranian Codes of Personal Status.

Having pointed out some of the positive aspects of Minai's book, I must now admit to what I consider its main shortcoming, namely, its blandness. In her overcautious effort to be objective, fair, and sensitive to the cultures involved, the author has managed to diffuse and neutralize what is today one of the hottest political issues in Muslim countries: the status of women in the family and public sphere. I suspect that this effect is partly the result of Minai herself not holding any clear or strong ideological stance on the subject. When she briefly experiences the humiliation and frustration of forced segregation (while travelling alone in southern Tunisia), Minai writes, "In my dismay over being cloistered, I had almost forgotten what it was like to be alone in this part of the world. After weeks of being mistaken for either a waif or a whore, it was a relief to belong to the Shelli household and have a respectable place in the community. As the weeks passed, I found myself more passively and even willingly submitting to the restrictions on my freedom which had so irritated me at first. The male-dominated outside world was too uncomfortable for me. It was so much easier to accept the harem system and work within it, as the women around me did" (p. 110).

While it may be true that in the short run it is easier for the woman, especially if she is only a visitor, to work within the given rules rather than to challenge them, in the long run the price is too costly for both the women and the society as a whole. Witness the extreme cases of Iran and Saudi Arabia where over half of the population are in no position to contribute actively and effectively to their countries' development.

This book seeks neither to analyze the status of Muslim women (how can it when it

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deals with so vast an area and so varied a culture?) nor to advocate a program of action to ameliorate their condition. As such it is not fair to judge it by strict scholarly standards or political ones. As a journalistic account, however, it succeeds well in introducing the general Western reader to a much misunderstood and misjudged aspect of reality in the Middle East and North Africa.

AMAL RASSAM
*Queens College, City University of New York*

The Dynamics of Chinese Politics *by Lucien Pye. Cambridge, Mass., Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1981. 306 pp. Cloth, $22.50; paper, $9.95.*

This engrossing and sophisticated work attempts to penetrate the often opaque nature of Chinese political behavior by defining some key patterns and principles. Lucien Pye's central theme is that tension is created between the imperative of consensus, on the one hand, and anxiety-produced particularistic relationships, on the other. These special relationships, which undermine consensus and produce factions, are a much decried but enduring feature of elite political behavior. Pye argues that the psychocultural roots of factionalism have remained unchanged despite the innovations of Marxism-Leninism, Maoism, and modernization. Although many aspects of Chinese political history are drawn upon, concentration is primarily on the succession struggle which began with the death of Mao Zedong and ended with Deng Xiaoping's success in removing Hua Guofeng from his posts as premier and chairman.

Building on themes developed in his earlier works, Pye maintains that the basis for Chinese political behavior is the psychological repression of aggression. This originates in the imperative of absolute filial piety, the central theme of Chinese culture. Since this imperative does not permit any manifestation of hostility towards fathers, it denies "man's potentially strongest feelings" (p. 137). This, together with other enduring features of the socialization process, such as teasing, shaming, and suddenly stepped-up discipline, creates anxiety. Despite the abandonment of Confucianism, the young are still taught to suppress their own feelings and to conform to the group. Anxieties produced during this socialization process are allayed through the formation of dependable, hierarchically structured, faction-creating personal relationships. Political life takes place behind a screen of consensus, but its activities and decisions are largely the result of factionalism.

Pye, who has long been noted for his scholarship in political psychology, has produced a study of significant explanatory power. It is especially useful in clarifying such enigmas as the relative lack of articulation of institutional and regional rivalry and the importance of personal ties (*guanxi*), which, it is argued, have been overlooked by Western observers in favor of the perhaps more attractive concept of face (*lien* or *mienze*). The book also elucidates the shrillness of Chinese political rhetoric; a tendency to enunciate but not implement grand policies; the trivialization of political opposition and fallen leaders by dwelling on their personal faults; and the uses of "study" as an expression of political hostility. A major function of the media in the political process is to "destroy" individ-

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uals. The capacity to do this exemplifies the power of words in Chinese society, a power which derives from a socialization process in which shaming and teasing have traditionally been practiced and which are used even more freely under communism in schools and in criticism sessions.

This readable and fascinating work provokes some questions. How typical were the 44 interviewees, all former People's Republic of China (PRC) residents now in Hong Kong, whose responses formed an important component of Pye's data base? How does the control of hostility towards mothers, which is another aspect of filial piety, ultimately, if perhaps indirectly, affect the shaping of political attitudes? Most importantly, why do Chinese cultural values continue to retain their primacy despite decades of turmoil?

In addition to suggesting that change among the elite has been more imagined than real, the study implies that, in an overriding search for security, Chinese political life is uncomfortable, anxiety-ridden, and humorless. Pye's antidote lies in his suggestion that the gradual institutionalization of factional politics would be a positive development.

RHODA WEIDENBAUM
*Waterford, Connecticut*

Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy, 1949–1976 *by Harry Harding. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1981. 418 pp. $29.50.*

Professor Harding emphasizes at the outset that this is not a book about the Chinese bureaucracy, but about the Chinese leaders' policies toward the bureaucracy. Still, as necessary background, several chapters or sections of chapters are devoted to descriptions of the size, recruitment, structure, and difficulties of the party and state bureaucracies from 1949 to 1976.

This approach leads to certain problems. Most seriously, the secondary focus is logically primary. It is hard to know how to evaluate the leaders' concerns without knowing the facts about the bureaucracy's growth over the period studied, its patterns of corruption, the actual level of efficiency of its functioning, the formal and informal incentives to efficient and inefficient behavior, and the actual degree of public alienation. Hard as they are to investigate, these subjects have been studied by Doak Barnett, Gordon Bennett, Ezra Vogel, and a few others, but much work remains to be done. Second, in the absence of facts there is a tendency to treat the leaders' diagnoses of bureaucratic problems as factual. For example, in 1955 the leaders said the bureaucracy was overstaffed, and Harding seems to believe them (p. 88). Yet its size then was only 5.3 million (p. 74). Today the state bureaucracy is 20 million strong, and the party has 39 million members. Was the bureaucracy in 1955 really too large? Third, Harding's potentially important conclusions in the last chapter about the effectiveness of Chinese bureaucracy lack a strong evidentiary base. He finds that each of eight organizational pathologies afflicts the Chinese bureaucracy to some degree, but he cannot say which are most severe or whether Chinese bureaucracy is better or worse than Soviet or American.

Harding believes that disputes among the leaders about organizational principles have

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been at the center of the major political upheavals in communist China—the Hundred Flowers episode of 1956–57 and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966–68—as well as being central to minor conflicts and the succession crisis of 1969–76. He further argues that the disputes have concerned ways of dealing with eight organizational pathologies: lack of commitment, zeal, and skill on the part of the bureaucrats; insufficient control and information; organizational inefficiency; public dissatisfaction; and official corruption. Harding believes that in China and elsewhere four main approaches exist for dealing with these pathologies. These approaches are rationalization (perfecting the bureaucracy), external remedialism (controlling it from outside), internal remedialism (control through indoctrination), and radicalism (destroying bureaucracy). Having laid the conceptual groundwork, Harding proceeds to a chronological discussion of organizational disputes and their impact on political events, with the 27-year timespan of his study divided into nine periods focused on the two great crises.

The result is a thorough sourcebook on the history of organizational thinking among the leaders of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Anyone who wants to understand the anti-bureaucratic arguments of the Democracy Movement (1978–81) will find material here on the origins of their ideas. So will students of the current reforms in party and state bureaucracy being carried out under the aegis of Deng Xiaoping. Harding's work will also help scholars to a more sophisticated understanding of the past. Particularly innovative in this respect is his close look at organizational forms used during the Cultural Revolution, including Cultural Revolution committees, Red Guards, governmental (not agricultural) communes, revolutionary committees, and May Seventh cadre schools. Harding also makes an important contribution to our understanding of Mao's thought by showing that Mao was never an organizational "radical" seeking to destroy the bureaucracy, even during the Cultural Revolution.

In the end, however, Professor Harding seems to exaggerate the importance of organizational issues in Chinese politics. One cannot quarrel with the effort to extract organizational references from past polemics, but this version of history seems to overlook the multifarious ideological issues that were equally or more important in Chinese politics as well as the non-ideological, purely political causes of PRC crises. Recent Chinese revelations have taught us to see more of the tempestuous dictator in Mao and less of the philosopher-king. What once looked like Mao's serious contributions to organizational theory and design now often seem misguided or even whimsical slogans thrown up in the course of political disputes. Harding's approach is so intelligently analytic that one wishes the debates he studies had had deeper sociological or philosophical meaning.

ANDREW J. NATHAN
*Columbia University*

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Circulation of News in the Third World: A Study of Asia *by Wilbur Schramm and Erwin Atwood. Hong Kong, Chinese University Press, 1981. 352 pp. $25.00.*

Close observers of the U.N. system will have heard the clamor in support of a New World Information Order. It is based to a large extent on certain perceived shortcomings of the news distributed around the world by the Associated Press, United Press International, Reuters, and Agence France-Presse. The complaints being pressed by many Third World countries, with the support of the Soviet Union, may be summarized as follows: The Big Four agencies—based in New York, London, and Paris, respectively—dominate the flow of international news by reason of their size and efficiency. Their product, designed for domestic consumption, is largely ethnocentric, and such news serves western interests, not those of the developing countries. Lacking news organizations of their own, most developing countries have become too dependent upon foreign sources. The agencies, moreover, are preoccupied with news of disasters, coups, and corruption (that is, bad news) from the Third World and pay little attention to the (good) news of economic and social developments in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Schramm and Atwood tested some of these complaints by monitoring the output of the four transnational agencies as delivered to Asian client newspapers during a single week in December 1977. They also recorded and measured the news content of 18 Asian newspapers for the same week. Their sample included one English language daily and one native language daily from each of nine countries.

The dependence factor, the authors found, cannot be dismissed. Asian newspapers—like all but a handful of elite American papers—"can seldom afford to send correspondents to foreign news centers," and, unlike their American counterparts, "they have pressures on them, from government or elsewhere, to publish this and not that, less of this, more of that" (p. 167).

While the authors found that development news gets short shrift in many Asian newspapers, they suggest that much of the blame ought fairly to be assigned to Asian editors. The international agencies, in fact, deliver more development news than most editors are able or care to print. The notion that Third World editors will as a matter of duty or solidarity print a great deal of news from other Third World countries turns out to be a fallacy. Like gatekeepers in other countries, Asian editors pick and choose. Schramm and Atwood show that almost half the stories transmitted to Asia by the agencies in an average day dealt with news of the Third World; the average Asian daily, however, chose to print approximately 9 percent of the Third World news available on the wires.

One reason is, of course, the chronic shortage of high-cost newsprint. Another is the element of proximity. It would appear that East Asian editors are not greatly interested in news from India and Pakistan, even less in news from Africa, the Middle East, or Latin America. The authors cite two parallel developments that took place in Asia during the test week: the retrial of a former Philippine senator, Benigno S. Aquino, before a military court on charges of murder and subversion; and the denial of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's appeal to the Pakistan Supreme Court against a murder charge. The Bhutto story was big news, of course, in West Asia. Each of the Southeast Asian papers in the sample ignored it, although one found space to report that a wildcat in Pakistan had "made off with a

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man's ear." The Aquino story was big news in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia, but neither the Indian nor the Indonesian newspapers touched it. A Sri Lankan paper reported that the trial was about to open, but failed to carry a word about it when it did (p. 104).

The authors acknowledge that their study, which measured the quantity rather than the quality of the news flow to Asia, was on that score incomplete. Nevertheless, they have performed an extraordinary service in beginning to separate demonstrable facts from the cloud of myth that hangs over the controversial topic of world news distribution.

ELIE ABEL
*Stanford University*

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# Correspondence

## American Ideals versus American Institutions

*To the Editor:*

In his essay "American Ideals versus American Institutions" (*PSQ* 97 [1982]: 1–37), Samuel P. Huntington proclaims that the imperatives of historical development run counter to the American creed of liberty, democracy, and egalitarianism. Domestically, according to Huntington, the American creed is the antithesis of those historical trends which seem essential to "material improvement," namely, "large-scale organizations, hierarchy, specialization, and inequality in power and wealth" (p. 5). He does not tell us why the American people cannot enjoy prosperity and a fruitful life and at the same time maintain their liberties with equal justice and opportunity for all.

As regards the international scene, Professor Huntington asserts that by taking the American creed seriously, the people "undermine and weaken the power and authority of government and detract, at times seriously, from its ability to compete internationally" (p. 18). Again, one wonders why the U.S. position in world affairs would suffer because the people held on to their values of "openness, liberalism, equality, individual rights, and freedom to dissent" (p. 18).

Although he first harps on the "gap" between the American creed and what must be done to further American interests, Professor Huntington subsequently discovers that there is really no contradiction between American power as applied abroad and the American creed. "The future of liberty in the world," Huntington declares, "is intimately linked to the future of American power" (p. 33). In another passage he writes, "The promotion of liberty abroad thus requires the expansion of American power. . . ." (p. 34). To lend credence to these sweeping pronunciamentos with their chauvinistic overtones, Professor Huntington is compelled to adopt the Procrustean strategy. That is to say, he insists on bending the facts to fit his model of American power.

Thus he refers to the period between 1900 and 1933 as a time when the United



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States was supposedly spreading the blessings of liberty in the Caribbean and in Latin America. In that connection, we are told that the intervention of U.S. Marines in Haiti, Nacaragua, and the Dominican Republic "often bore striking resemblances to the interventions by federal marshalls in the conduct of elections in the American South in the 1960s. . . ." (p. 27). He who would characterize the activities of the U.S. Marines as substantially no different from the mission of federal marshalls in the South would probably view the hydrogen bomb as nothing more than an improved version of the artillery shell!

Despite Professor Huntington's efforts to fob it off as a "myth," Washington's unsavory role in Latin America has been indelibly recorded in government documents and congressional hearings, and by other authoritative sources. In a number of instances, U.S. interventionism made a mockery of the American creed.

Describing the fate of the Dominican Republic, for example, under the impact of American power prior to World War I, the noted authority Carleton Beals wrote as follows in his book *Latin America: World in Revolution*: "The U.S. Navy, when it took over, governed directly. . . . The occupation carried on ruthless fighting, jailed or killed the outstanding intellectuals, writers and artists, closed down newspapers, roughed up honorable citizens, perpetrated wanton killings in the main streets."

Until Americans are prepared to face the facts of history—unpleasant as they may be at times—we shall not be able to develop wise policies abroad.

HERBERT KRIEDMAN
*Nassau Community College*

*Professor Huntington replies:*

A content analysis of Professor Kriedman's comment is in order.

(1) He devotes 240 words to summarizing or quoting passages from my article.

(2) He devotes 207 words to expressing his personal distaste for my argument with words like "chauvinistic," "Procrustean," "bending the facts," "fobbing off," and the like.

(3) He devotes all of 74 words to his one effort to adduce evidence in the form of a quotation from Carleton Beals. Beals was a polemicist, not a scholar. If Professor Kriedman had instead consulted any recognized authority on the Dominican Republic, he would have found that in 1916 the Marines occupied a country that was totally poverty-stricken, overrun by violence and banditry, pervaded by disease (particularly venereal disease), lacking roads, schools, public health facilities, or any of the basic infrastructure of civilized society. When they left six years later, much of this had been put in place: 700 schools had been opened and 100,000 children were attending them; 600 kilometers of roads had been constructed; law and order had been restored, with 67,000 weapons and

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200,000 rounds of ammunition collected from a total population of 75,000; sanitation codes had been established and a Department of Sanitation and Beneficence created to enforce them. No Dominican could doubt but that his country was a far, far better place to live in 1922 than it was in 1916.

So much for the 1916 occupation to which Professor Kriedman refers. More to my point is the extent to which the United States has over the years nurtured the development of democratic institutions in the Dominican Republic. Most recently, President Balaguer attempted to stop the vote count when it was clear that he was going to be defeated in the 1978 re-election. The United States told him it would not tolerate this action, and the duly elected opposition candidate became president. This year in another free election an opposition candidate again was elected president. Democratic institutions may or may not be firmly established in the Dominican Republic; to the extent that they are, the United States deserve a lion's share of the credit.

(4) In sum, the total word count for Professor Kriedman's comment comes to 521; the total intellectual content comes to zero.

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON
*Harvard University*

*The Property Tax and Local Finance,* the 137th in the Academy's conference/*Proceedings* series, will appear in early 1983. Grants from the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and the Robert Schalkenbach Foundation made this undertaking possible.

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


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


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